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Portfolio Credit Risk Modelling for a Canadian SME Loans Portfolio 
 
Jade Michel Haddad 
 
The Basel II Capital Accords make strong and controversial assumptions on the 
behaviour of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in a credit portfolio.  Benefiting 
from a rich, and as such rare, dataset of default and credit risk events, we measure the 
portfolio credit risk characteristics of one of the riskiest segments of the Canadian SME 
market.  The depth of our data allows for robust segmentations of the data along dual 
dimensions, including risk grade and size of borrowers, not commonly found in the 
literature. This, in turn, allows for an SME-specific calibration of models for portfolio 
credit risk.  In particular, we use the Merton-type asset value model (AVM) and the 
CreditRisk
+
 frameworks to present empirical estimates of the correlations that underline 
the relationship among borrower segments in the portfolio.  In addition, we present loss 
distribution estimates for our SME portfolio under various extensions to the AVM and 
CreditRisk
+
.  These extensions include a Multiple Correlated Sectors implementation of 
CreditRisk
+
 and simulation-based, as well as analytical implementations of both 
frameworks.  Our results allow for a thorough testing of Basel II assumptions for 
portfolio credit risk and its application to SME borrowers.  In particular, we present 
evidence in contrast to Basel II specifications on SME asset correlations, and quantify the 
impact of the single sector and infinite granularity assumptions in the Basel II Internal 
Ratings Based (IRB) approach to portfolio credit risk.  Our work is undertaken within a 
consistent calibration of the AVM and CreditRisk
+
 frameworks and presents an SME-
specific calibration refinement for CreditRisk
+
.  Finally, we focus on capital allocations 
under the Basel II framework and present a partial implementation analysis quantifying 
the impact of the application of various Basel II conventions to our SME portfolio.  
Capital allocations from our internally-calibrated portfolio credit risk frameworks reveal 
a misallocation of capital among SME segments under Basel II.  Given our thorough 
assessment of both Basel II and the credit risk characteristics underlying SME portfolios, 
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Chapter 1. Introduction  
 
The Basel II treatment of portfolio credit risks places strong and controversial 
assumptions on the behaviour of Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) borrowers within 
a credit portfolio.  In particular, specific assumptions on the sensitivity of these borrowers 
to systematic developments, as represented by their asset correlations, have resulted in 
lower capital charges for SMEs as compared to larger borrowers and disjointed capital 
allocations among SME segments.   
 
These assumptions include decreasing asset correlations with decreasing borrower size, 
for SME borrowers treated under the Corporate asset class, while SME borrowers treated 
under the Retail asset class are, by default, assigned generally lower asset correlations.  
Under both treatments, a negative relationship between asset correlation and Probability 
of Default (PD) results in diminished capital charges for SME borrowers, generally 
considered to be of a riskier nature than larger borrowers. 
 
Empirical evidence on these strong assumptions has been mixed.  Jacobson, Linde, and 
Roszbach (2005) reject the claim that SME borrowers require less capital than larger 
borrowers.  Focusing on asset correlations, Duellmann and Scheule (2003) and Lopez 
(2004) find evidence of increasing asset correlation with borrower size, while Dietsch 
and Petey (2004) find evidence to the contrary, rejecting that assumption.  On the 
relationship between asset correlations and PD the results appear weaker but nonetheless 
contradictory, with Lopez (2004) showing signs of a negative relationship and Gordy 
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(2000) and Dietsch and Petey (2004) finding a positive relationship.  This work, and 
especially that focused on SME borrowers, has been marked by aggregated data sets and 
generally limited historical span. 
 
We present a unique and rich source of Canadian SME credit data, and use it to estimate 
the portfolio credit risk characteristics of this crucial segment of the financial sector.  The 
availability of such a rich dataset, made up of over 25,000 SME borrowers spanning a 
time period from 1997 to 2010, concentrated within a single portfolio presents a 
significant contrast with the existing literature which has typically relied on aggregated 
data sets of SME borrowers with, in many cases, limited historical span.  In and of itself, 
the use of aggregated data presents a potential for a dilution of risk characteristics and, 
for single institutions looking to benefit from SME portfolio credit risk analysis, a 
potential for a misrepresentation of the risks as they may relate to a single lending entity; 
see, e.g., Basurto and Padilla (2006) and Dietsch and Petey (2004).    For example, 
Dietsch and Petey (2002) estimate portfolio credit risk over a database of 220,000 French 
SME borrowers, accounting for more than two thirds of all French SMEs,  Dietsch and 
Petey (2002, p. 305), spanning the period 1995 to 1999; Dietsch and Petey (2004) 
estimate SME portfolio credit risk characteristics over an aggregated  database of 
440,000 French and 280,000 German borrowers spanning the periods 1995 to 2001, and 
1997 to 2001, respectively; Duellmann and Scheule (2003) use another aggregated 
database of over 53,000 predominantly small and private-owned German borrowers 
spanning the period 1991 to 2000, while Jacobson, Linde, and Roszbach (2005) study the 
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riskiness of SME borrowers as compared to larger borrowers over an aggregated database 
of approximately 60,000 Swedish borrowers spanning the period 1997 to 2000.   
 
We begin with a comprehensive description of the makeup of our SME portfolio, and the 
credit risk characteristics that define it.  An understanding of such characteristics allows 
for a clearer understanding of where risks typically lay and the risk patterns that emerge 
within such portfolios.  In particular, we present a dual dimension segmentation of the 
data along risk grade, size, and industry segments.  The availability of such 
segmentations within a coherent SME portfolio is rare in the literature, and allows for 
involved empirical work in outlining robust relationships between size and risk grade 
segments of a portfolio.  Ultimately, it is the study of these patterns that is a major driver 
of existing guidelines for portfolio credit risk measurement and management.  This work 
is undertaken in Chapter 2. 
 
Having studied the unique characteristics that underpin a high-risk SME loans portfolio 
we proceed, in Chapter 3, with a partial implementation analysis aimed at studying the 
impact of the various assumptions on the behaviours of SME borrowers as found in the 
Basel II Pillar 1 minimum capital regulatory framework.  Specifically, we look at capital 
results for SME segments under the Standardized and Internal Risk Based (IRB) 
frameworks of Basel II, and examine the impact of the application of capital calculation 
adjustments based on borrower size, probability of default, Corporate versus Retail asset 
classification, and loan maturity.  This analysis allows for a deeper understanding of the 
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drivers of Basel II capital allocations across SME segments with respect to the 
assumptions made within the framework.   
 
In Chapter 4 assumptions on the level and relationships of asset correlations in Basel II 
across SME segments are tested.  We present a careful and robust partition of our data 
into homogenous segments of borrowers, by Risk and Size Groups in particular, and use 
a single factor implementation of the asset value model (AVM) to non-parametrically 
estimate correlations within these segments and evaluate patterns across them.  The 
portfolio credit risk AVM framework is based on the work of Merton (1974) and Vasicek 
(2002) and is commercialized in such products as J.P. Morgan’s CreditMetrics; see,  J.P. 
Morgan (1997).  Its application to the estimation of correlations derived from credit data 
is presented in Gordy (2000).  The unique depth of our data allows for various SME 
segmentations to be presented and allows for an empirical testing of hypothesised 
patterns across segments free of theoretically imposed constraints.  These points are 
emphasised in order to dispel purely theoretical assumptions or poor data quality as 
justifications for the imposition of patterns and relationships on results, as is found 
elsewhere in the literature. 
 
Our work in Chapters 3 and 4 also serves to highlight the reduced data requirements in 
the Basel II framework as compared to the non-neglible requirements typically needed 
for the calibration of modern portfolio credit risk models.  The Basel II Accords 
presented portfolio credit risk managers with an unprecedented degree of integration of 
internal bank rating and monitoring systems into regulatory capital adequacy 
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frameworks.  This was accomplished by the Accord’s adoption of modern methods for 
portfolio credit risk measurement, familiar to modellers and managers in the field, within 
strict restrictions on the applied framework of these methods.  In particular, these 
restrictions include an assumption of infinitely granular loans portfolios over which the 
regulatory framework is applied and a single factor underlying risks in the portfolio.   
 
Our use of a single factor AVM in Chapter 4 allows for direct comparison to the 
asymptotic single risk factor model (ASRF) implemented in the Basle II IRB framework, 
and allows us to test the impact of the Basel II infinite granularity assumption.  Previous 
tests of this assumption, namely those found in Gordy and Lutkebohmert (2007), have 
focused on the size of the portfolio and the PDs measured within it as potential factors in 
the estimation error that may arise in the application of the infinite granularity 
assumption to real-world portfolios.  Our work will build on correlation analysis 
undertaken in Chapter 4 to extend the impact analysis of this assumption to this crucial 
credit risk variable. 
 
In Chapter 5 we take a broader view of the underlying credit risks in an SME portfolio by 
using the CreditRisk
+
 framework to extend our analysis from a single sector framework 
to one in which multiple sectors are modelled as risk drivers within an SME portfolio; 
here CreditRisk
+
 refers to the actuarial-type model for default risk commercialized and 
released to the public by Credit Suisse, see Credit Suisse (1997).  The use of multiple risk 
factors allows for the introduction of correlations between risk factors, calibrated from 
historical time series within our SME dataset, into the analysis of portfolio credit risk; 
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here we use methods presented in Burgisser, Kurth, Wagner, and Wolf (1999) and 
Akkaya, Kurth, and Wagner (2004).  With this framework in place, we are thus able to 
challenge another assumption of the Basel II framework - that of a single risk factor - and 
provide evidence from a portfolio with distinct characteristics where such evidence has 
previously been found inconclusive; see, for example, BCBS (2006b).  Our analysis 
quantifies the impact resultant from the use of three assumptions on the nature of risk 
factors driving the portfolio credit risk: that of a single risk factor, multiple correlated risk 
factors, and multiple independent risk factors.  We are thus able to present results and 
impacts as derived explicitly from an SME loans portfolio with the unique credit risk 
characteristics derived in Chapter 2.  Our ability to present a uniform calibration method 
for the three implementation assumptions in Chapter 5 underlines the robustness of our 
results on the impact of a single sector assumption with respect to other studies in the 
literature in which results have been undermined by incompatible calibration techniques; 
see, for example, Lesko, Schlottmann, and Vorgrimler (2004).  The relevance and 
importance of these calibration methods is further investigated in Chapter 6, with specific 
recommendations for the application of the CreditRisk
+
 framework to SME portfolios. 
 
Our work in this Thesis, and in Chapter 6 in particular, presents a consistent calibration 
of the AVM and the CreditRisk
+
 frameworks for the estimation of portfolio credit risk in a 
real-world SME environment.  This work builds on findings in Koyluoglu and Hickman 
(1998) in which a single general framework with harmonized input parameters is shown 
to underline both models.  In addition, we add to results in Gordy (2000) wherein a 
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mapping between the asset value model and the CreditRisk
+
 model is presented, by 
providing consistent calibrations specific to SME portfolios. 
 
In particular, we present a simulation-based implementation of the CreditRisk
+
 within a 
mathematically consistent framework to the AVM, and present an empirical SME-specific 
calibration of the CreditRisk
+
 single sector normalized volatility consistent with the 
calibration obtained in the AVM.  This SME-specific calibration can be traced back to the 
robust segmentations presented in Chapter 4 and the statistical default rate characteristics 
associated with these segments.  The end-result calibration differs from those typically 
presented using Corporate data generally provided by external rating agencies such as 
Standard & Poor’s; see, for example, Gordy (2000).    In addition, our work on the 
CreditRisk
+
 calibration methods reveals significant restrictions on calculated default 
correlations and, by implication, resultant capital charges in a portfolio. 
 
From a prudential point of view, a not insignificant testament to the Basel II treatment of 
portfolio credit risk lies in the minimal changes to the framework considered in the post-
2008 financial crisis transition to Basel III; for the Basel III implementation according to 
the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada (OSFI), see OSFI 
(2012).  For both the CreditRisk
+
 and the AVM we implement a prudential adjustment to 
our model parameters.  In particular, we are able to boost asset correlations in the AVM to 
values observed in Basel II, a mapping between the two models allows this boost to be 
extended to the CreditRisk
+ 
framework.  This exercise allows for Economic Capital level, 
and allocation, comparisons in line with prudential levels pursued by banks and 
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regulators, and highlights a significant pragmatic component of modern portfolio credit 
risk management. 
 
Despite the lack of change in the prescriptions for the treatment of portfolio credit risk for 
Small and Medium Enterprise loans, the transition from Basel II to new capital adequacy 
and risk management guidelines under Basel III certainly bears further comment.  In 
particular, as the primary global regulatory initiative in response to the post-2008 
financial crisis, Basel III introduced a number of amendments to the Basel II framework 
aimed at increasing the resilience of both, individual banks and the financial sector as a 
whole; see BCBS (2010).  These amendments include: 
 
 An increase in the quality and quantity of capital – with greater emphasis on 
common equity and retained earnings as the basis of “going concern” capital;  
 
 Greater risk awareness, recognition and coverage – especially as these risks 
relate to complex securitizations and credit derivative products; 
 
 Supplementary measures to risk-based capital requirements – aimed at 
countering model risk and measurement error in risk-based measures, reducing 
procyclicality effects and constraining excess leverage in the financial system; 
 
 Addressing systemic risk and interconnectedness – through the identification of 
globally and domestically systematically important financial, and; 
 
 Introduction of strong global liquidity standards – aimed at ensuring that 
financial institutions are capable of withstanding extended periods of illiquidity 
in the market place, as well as ensuring a robust funding structure for institutions 
over the long run. 
 
Due to the dynamic and interactive nature of the issues covered in this Thesis, we present 
in Figure 1.1 a schematic for the structure of the Thesis which should help the reader 
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trace the issues discussed and the contributions presented across various Chapters and 
Sections.  For example, the impacts of various calibration methods presented in Chapter 6 
can be traced to robust segment characteristics described in Chapter 4, while patterns 
across estimated asset correlations in Chapter 4 are elucidated by portfolio characteristics 
described in Chapter 2.  In Chapter 5 we tackle the Basel II single factor assumption 
described in Chapter 3 and calculate industry-based capital charges reflective of 
characteristics highlighted in Chapter 2.  Average asset correlations in Chapter 3 form the 
basis for the prudential adjustment presented and applied in Chapters 4 and 6. 
 
To recap, Chapter 2 presents the Financing Company portfolio of SME loans and 
explores the portfolio characteristics as well as the general structure of data inputs into 
models of portfolio credit risk.  Chapter 3 introduces the Basel II regulatory framework 
for the treatment of portfolio credit risk; we analyze the approaches and assumptions of 
the models used in the framework, as well as the data requirements in the application of 
the framework.  We present an evaluation of the impact of various aspects of the Basel II 
framework through a partial implementation analysis, and describe capital allocations 
across SME segments under Basel II.  Chapter 4 presents the asset value model (AVM) as 
a tool for both, portfolio credit risk estimation and empirical estimation of SME 
correlations directly from data in our SME portfolio.  Our work in Chapter 4 is bolstered 
by our ability to segment our data by both Risk and Size Groups, thereby providing 
empirical evidence on any relationship or pattern that may exist among correlations 
across these segments.  Results are generated for asset correlation levels and patterns as 
well as resultant capital allocations.  Chapter 5 introduces the CreditRisk
+
 framework and 
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presents results on the overestimation that may arise from the use of a single factor 
model.  Finally Chapter 6 presents a comparison between the results and models of 
Chapters 3 to 5, as well as consistent calibration of the AVM and CreditRisk
+
 frameworks 
and a comparative analysis of capital allocations as compared to Basel II. 
 
The major contributions of this Thesis can be found in full detail in the concluding 
section of Chapter 6, and are presented here in summary form as follows: 
 
1. A Comprehensive Analysis of an SME loans portfolio within a financial institution 
SME portfolios in the literature have typically been of an aggregated nature with 
limited historical time span.  Our in depth analysis of a rich and heavily populated 
SME loans portfolio provides a unique database over which significant analysis 
can be performed. 
 
2. A Detailed Schematic for SME Portfolio Credit Risk Input Data and Structure 
The significant depth of our unique database allows for a dual-dimension 
segmentation of our SME portfolio.  As such, we are able to estimate credit risk 
measures, such as probabilities of default (PDs) and correlations, for homogenous 
segments of borrowers dually defined by risk grade and size.  These credit risk 
measures form the underlying basis on which our work in this Thesis is 
conducted, both in testing the assumptions and relationships inherent in the Basel 
II treatment of SME portfolio credit risk, and in establishing internally-calibrated 
models of our own.  The elevated data requirements accompanying the estimation 
of these models, and our ability to meet them in a robust manner, highlights the 
unique and important data source on which our results are based.   
 
3. A View of Conceptual & Pragmatic Implications of Basel II treatments for SMEs 
We engage in a Partial Implementation exercise to test the impact of the 
assumptions within each implementation on capital charges.  Our focus is on SME 
borrower Size segments and we find a U-shaped capital allocation with increasing 
borrower size with the source being a size adjustment applied to asset 
correlations. 
 
4. Empirical findings concerning SME Asset Correlations 
These results run counter to Basel II specifications of a negative relationship 
between asset correlations and PD, and the Corporate asset class assumption of a 
positive relationship between asset correlation and Size.  Our results appear to 
provide some support to specifications under the Retail-Other treatment, however 
this support remains limited by that treatment’s programming of a negative 
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relationship of asset correlations with PD.  In addition, our results on the lack of 
clear relationships between asset correlations and size and PD, contrast with the 
literature wherein such relationships have been deduced from generally weak 
empirical evidence.  Our work in defining robust risk-size segments of SME 
borrowers allows us to present stronger evidence the presence of such 
relationships, or lack thereof. 
 
5. Increased Granularity Effects in SME credit portfolios with Low Asset Correlations 
Our findings appear within the context of a very large portfolio and show an 
approximation error, or granularity effect, of approximately 6% on Economic 
Capital.  This result is the first, to our knowledge, to show empirical evidence of a 
link between asset correlation values and the granularity effect in a credit 
portfolio. 
 
6. Empirical Evidence on Economic Capital Impact of Single Sector Assumption  
Our results show that for our portfolio of SME borrowers the use of a single risk 
factor can increase EC figures by approximately 40%.  The assumption of 
independence across multiple sectors in our portfolio was shown to underestimate 
Economic Capital charges by approximately 60%. 
 
7. A Consistent Calibration of Single Sector CreditRisk+ and Asset Value Models for 
SME Portfolio Credit Risk 
Our results show that a calibration of the risk factor weights according to 
segment-specific ratios of the PD standard deviation to its unconditional mean, in 
the presence of a fixed sector normalized volatility figure of 0.5, generates 
segment-specific default correlations consistent with those observed in the AVM. 
In such a setting, the accompanying CreditRisk
+
 loss distribution displays fatter 
tails that of the AVM implementation, and therefore produces higher EC values.  
Alternatively, we show that a fixed unitary weight setting for the CreditRisk
+
 
model can provide a comparable loss distribution to the AVM, with thinner tails.  
We also reveal implications of various calibration methods on default correlations 
and highlight the potential for strict restrictions as a result. 
 
8. An SME portfolio-specific calibration refinement for CreditRisk+ models 
Fixed sector normalized volatility values of 0.5 and 0.25 are not commonly found 
in the literature, which has tended to focus on calibrations from Corporate 
borrowers.  These calibrations, along with the unitary weight calibration, therefore 
present SME-specific calibrations of the Single Sector CreditRisk
+
 model.  
 
 
9. A thorough Assessment of Basel II approaches to SME credit risk modelling 
Our results reveal that Basel II leads to misallocation of capital charges, such that 
in some cases, smaller and riskier SME borrowers are charged less than larger and 
safer SME borrowers.  These Basel II capital charges can represent cases of 
under- or over-charging of capital to borrowers as compared to the capital charges 




10. Suggestions for an SME portfolio credit risk management framework 
The misallocation of capital across SME borrower segments in Basel II may be 
alleviated through the removal of size-based adjustments within SME segments.  
Such a case exists in the Retail-Other treatment of SME borrowers, but is limited 
in its applicability to all SME segments due to exposure limits and other 
restrictions on its use.  Our adoption of a simulation-based implementation 
methodology in the CreditRisk
+
 framework, and our successful calibration of the 
model to our SME portfolio in a manner consistent with that of the AVM provides 
another avenue for SME portfolio credit risk measurement and management, and 
presents practitioners with a variety of settings to which the model structure can 
be set without some of the drawbacks usually associated with original model and 
its suitability to SME portfolios.  The AVM provides a useful a direct avenue for 
allowing the data to talk, and revealing patterns and relationships across segments 







Chapter 2. A Canadian Small & Medium Enterprise Loans Portfolio 
 
Our study of Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) portfolio credit risk is centred on the 
unique characteristics of our Canadian portfolio and the Financing Company in which it 
resides.  In particular, we note that the Financing Company that is the source of our data 
is a specialized SME financer that specifically targets high risk niches within the SME 
loans market, both in terms of borrowers of diminished size (e.g., assets, sales, etc.) and 
industries which have historically faced some level of under-servicing from Canadian 
banks.   
 
The Financing Company portfolio, therefore, is one in which small borrowers make up 
the vast majority and where exposures to medium-sized enterprises, can present a 
significantly large exposure for the portfolio.  In addition, we note a marked 
concentration of our SME loans portfolio in the Manufacturing sector, widely considered 
a source of elevated risk.  This manufacturing focus has resulted in an Ontario- and 
Quebec-centered geographical dispersion among borrowers in the portfolio.   
 
This concentration in the riskiest segments of the Canadian credit market has given rise to 
a rich and unique database through which extensive segmentation and analyses of credit 
behaviour can be observed.  In particular, we note that Size Buckets – even within 
industry-defined “small borrowers” segments, for example – can provide distinct 
information on default behaviour, with the smallest Sizes showing exceptionally elevated 
default rates.  In addition, we observe that default rates suggest a reaction to 
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macroeconomic events, with the degree and shape of this reaction potentially differing 
between industry-based segments, as well between size-based and risk-based segments.   
 
These heuristic observations form the basis of further study on the portfolio and the 
behaviour of its credit risk components.  Chapter 2 is thus organized as follows: Section 
2.1 provides an overview and introduction to the Financing Company’s mission and 
operational scope; Section 2.2 provides a brief review of the treatment of SMEs in the 
credit risk literature; Section 2.3 explores in detail the Financing Company risk 
management systems and takes a snapshot of the portfolio at the heart of the thesis; 
Section 2.4 concentrates on analysing the Finance Company’s default rates; finally, 
Section 2.5 provides a summary in the form of ten stylized facts related to the Financing 
Company portfolio, both in terms of the portfolio we evaluate and its history, and in 
terms of the underlying credit risk drivers – namely the default rates – which define the 
shape and characteristics of the loss distribution generated by this unique portfolio of the 
riskiest segments of the Canadian SME credit market. 
 
 
Section 2.1. The Financing Company 
 
The Financing Company whose loan portfolio is studied in this Thesis provides 
specialized lending solutions to Canadian SMEs facing difficulties in obtaining financing 
from traditional sources.  As such, the Financing Company focuses on the capital needs 




This focus has resulted in a significant presence of the Financing Company in areas 
where the market has generally failed to provide adequate access to financing.  Industry 
Canada classifies gaps in financing to SMEs as the following: the risk gap, characterized 
by conventional lenders’ unwillingness to supply financially riskier loans even as demand 
for those loans generates higher interest rates; the size gap, reflecting chartered banks’ 
preference for larger-sized business loans over relatively higher cost small-sized business 
loans; the flexibility gap, describing the lack of flexibility in repayment terms and 
conditions for companies with distinctive growth and revenue streams; and, the 
knowledge gap, reflecting an observed reticence on the part of lenders to provide loans to 
businesses operating in a knowledge-based industry (KBI) – such as the arts, computer 
services, electronics and biochemical industries – with entrepreneurs’ lack of tangible 
assets and lenders’ lack of know-how in these industries seen as possible factors in the 
widening of this gap; see Industry Canada (2001).  Thus, the Financing Company is 
strategically positioned to provide financial services and support to a segment of the SME 
loans market that, is at least qualitatively, riskier than the rest of the market.   
 
In order to account properly for the elevated risk levels inherent in the segment of the 
loans market in which it operates, and by extension its loans portfolio, the Financing 
Company must ensure that it maintains internal risk systems capable of accurately 
measuring and managing those risks.  These systems must thereby provide sensible 
quantitative assessments of the credit risk as measured by Expected Loss and/or 
Provisions for credit losses, and by Unexpected Losses and/or Economic Capital.   
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Section 2.2. SME Loans Credit Risk Measurement 
 
The Financing Company’s data is that of a portfolio of SME credit exposures, where 
SMEs are defined as enterprises with fewer than 500 employees and less than CAD $50 
million in annual revenues.  In this Section we underline the significance of SMEs in the 
broader economy, and review the credit risk measurement tools and conventions, as 
presented in the literature, used in their evaluation. 
  
Industry Canada relates enterprise size to the number of employees.  As such, small 
enterprises are defined as those employing up to 99 employees, while businesses with 
100 to 500 employees are regarded as medium.  Approximately 97% of the businesses 
serviced by the Finance Company can be considered small, 2% medium-sized and 0.3% 
large.  According to Altman and Sabato (2005), SMEs account for over 97 percent of the 
total number of firms in OECD countries, while they employ approximately half of the 
entire workforce and account for over 99 percent of all employers.  In Canada the story is 
similar with SMEs accounting for over 99 percent of all businesses in the country, 
employing approximately 50 percent of the labour force, or about 5 million people, and, 
in the case of small businesses with fewer than 50 employees, accounting for 26 percent 
of national GDP, Industry Canada (2009).   
 
In addition to their significant economic presence, SMEs pose an interesting challenge to 
credit risk management through their characteristics.  In the same paper, Altman and 
Sabato (2005) point out that SME credit risk profiles can differ significantly from those 
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of corporate borrowers.  This feature is especially relevant in relation to those exposures’ 
default correlation structures and overall credit quality.  These differences can be 
exacerbated in the presence of banks’ information deficiencies when it comes to SME 
borrowers.  These deficiencies arise, in part, due to the high cost-to-dollar value ratio of 
extensive monitoring systems for these small-sized loans (along with other small-sized 
“Retail” loans such as personal, credit card and residential mortgage loans) as compared 
to “Wholesale” loans (in which large corporate as well as sovereign loans are classified). 
 
The retail credit market is typically used by small unrated borrowers to access funds.  
These borrowers require loans that are relatively miniscule when compared to loan sizes 
in the wholesale market.  As such, the loss on any single retail loan has minimal effects 
on a bank’s solvency.  Loans in the wholesale market, on the other hand, are usually 
made to agency-rated borrowers on a syndicated basis, and for which there generally 
exists a secondary market.  And while the most significant drivers of risk for retail loans 
remain the Probability of Default (PD), Loss Given Default (LGD), Exposure and Default 
Correlation, the characteristics of these drivers differ significantly from those of 
wholesale portfolios. 
 
In an extensive survey of credit risk management practices for retail credit products, 
RMA (2000) finds that lower default correlations between retail credit products, as 
compared to corporate credit products, lead to lower economic capital requirements for 
those products; while, by contrast, those same retail products generally require a higher 
level of provisioning due to higher PD and LGD estimates and, consequently, higher 
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expected losses than corporate credit products.  This result is reinforced in Dietsch and 
Petey (2004) as underscored by Altman and Sabato (2005).   
 
In Dietsch and Petey (2004) the level, volatility and correlation of default rates for 
German and French SMEs are studied, where SMEs are defined as “incorporated firms 
with turnover under €40 million”, Dietsch and Petey (2004, p. 776).  By segregating 
obligors into size buckets according to turnover (Bucket 1: <€1 million, Bucket 2: €1m - 
€7m, Bucket 3: €7m - €40m), as well as risk rating categories, the authors are able to 
observe and measure default characteristics by size and credit quality.  As such, the 
authors generally observe decreasing default rates by size for a given credit quality in the 
French sample.  The German sample, however, does not show evidence of a similar 
monotonic decrease in default rates with size. 
 
In terms of default correlations, Dietsch and Petey (2004) find that default correlations 
are higher for smaller firms than for larger ones, although the robustness of this finding is 
questioned by the authors.  A more solid finding is that of higher correlations for obligors 
with lower credit quality, independent of size.  To explain this result, the authors point to 
the possibility of a diversification effect operating across firms of similar size but 
different industry.  The authors find higher default rate volatility for larger size buckets 
and argue that this can be construed as a form of higher sensitivity to economic 
conditions.  In addition, RMA (2000) also finds that constrained data collection systems 
may apply to banks’ retail loans portfolios and limit the availability of individual loan 




Retail loans portfolios can therefore pose specific challenges which require an alternative 
approach than a simple scaling down of approaches developed for wholesale portfolio 
modeling; Allen, DeLong, and Saunders (2003).  Again RMA (2000) finds that it is not 
uncommon for a bank to apply different approaches for tracking and management of its 
retail credit products than those used for its wholesale credit products.  For instance, 
where Mark-to-Market (MTM) models – in which credit losses due to credit exposures’ 
upgrade or downgrade are measured and accounted for – might be used to measure credit 
risk for a bank’s corporate loans portfolio, the same bank might opt to use a Default 
Mode (DM) – in which credit losses are strictly defined in terms of defaults – for its retail 
loans portfolios.   
 
 
Section 2.3. The Financing Company Portfolio and Risk Management Systems 
 
The Financing Company’s loans portfolio as of March 2009 is composed of over 35,000 
loans to over 25,000 borrowers, totalling over $10 billion in dollars Outstanding ($OS).  
Loans are segregated into a Performing Loans Portfolio, containing those loans not 
classified as impaired according to the Financing Company criteria, and an Impaired 
Loans Portfolio.  The Financing Company’s Impaired Loans Portfolio, which accounts 
for approximately 5% of the Financing Company’s loans portfolio by number of loans 
and dollars outstanding, will not be discussed in this thesis.  Loans and borrowers 
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classified as Performing but subject to “watch list” monitoring are also excluded from our 
analysis. 
 
Our study of the Financing Company Performing loans portfolio will therefore examine 
both the number of borrowers in the Bank’s portfolio as well as the $OS to these 
borrowers.  Our analysis will concentrate on the characteristics of the portfolio as defined 
by the credit quality, size, industry, and geographical region.  Our characterization of 
each of these dimensions follows the internal Financing Company risk classification and 
management systems and terminology, while some adjustments may be applied to ensure 
anonymity for the Finance Company. 
 
For each borrower in the Financing Company credit portfolio our data consists of an 
internally assigned Risk Rating (RR), Size segmentation, Industry, and the dollars 
Outstanding at a given time.  At the loan level, our data consists of the Security Coverage 
Interval (SCI) and months to maturity (Maturity).  The separate assessment of default 
risk, through the RR system, and of collateral and recovery risk, through the SCI system, 
highlights the Financing Company’s use of a two-dimensional system for the evaluation 
of credit risks in its portfolio.  To assign Risk Ratings, the Financing Company uses two 
separate scoring methodologies for borrowers on either side of a $250,000 size threshold.  
The scoring methodologies are then reconciled to a common Risk Rating.  This method 
aims to exploit the discrepancies in available financial records for borrowers on either 
side of the threshold so that, for example, small borrowers with inadequate financial data 
to be approved under a credit scoring model for larger, corporate borrowers may still 
21 
 
qualify for financing when such factors as the owner’s credit history are evaluated.  The 
Size measurement is based on the borrower’s maximal total commitment to the 
Financing Company at last authorization, including $OS to other borrowers with 
common ownership on the Financing Company books.  
 
In the subsequent subsections, portfolio characteristics will be evaluated along overall 
dimensions, such as Risk Rating or Size, as well as for segments at cross-sections of 
these overall dimensions, e.g., the >$5,000,000 – 5 RR Size-Risk Rating segment.  This 
analysis is extended to borrowers as well as $OS in the portfolio. 
 
Subsection 2.3.1. The Portfolio at a Glance: Borrower Concentration 
 
Table 2.1 provides key figures and percentiles along various benchmark $OS values.  In 
Table 2.1 we observe that just over 55% of the Financing Company borrowers have $OS 
of $150,000 or less, while approximately two-thirds of borrowers have $OS of $250,000 
or less.  These borrowers’ cumulative $OS account for approximately 14% of the overall 
portfolio $OS.  On the other end of the spectrum we observer that less than 3% of the 
Financing Company borrowers have $OS greater than $3,000,000, accounting for 
approximately 25% of overall portfolio $OS, while approximately 10% of borrowers 
have $OS greater than $1,000,000, accounting for approximately 60% of overall portfolio 
$OS.  In an extensive examination of bank balance sheets, Carey (2000) finds that the 
largest 10% of credit exposures generally account for approximately 40% of total 
exposure in a bank’s commercial loan portfolios.  Our results in Table 2.1 show, by 
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contrast, that the largest 10% of the Financing Company clients account for 
approximately 60% of overall dollars outstanding, indicating a significant over-
concentration of $OS among a relatively small proportion of borrowers for the Financing 
Company portfolio as compared to those of commercial institutions.   
 
Subsection 2.3.2. The Portfolio at a Glance: Risk Systems 
 
In a survey of the fifty largest US banking organisations’ internal risk rating and credit 
scoring systems Treacy and Carey (2000) find that approximately 60% of those 
institutions use one-dimensional ratings systems in which a single rating incorporates 
both the PD and the LGD.  The remaining 40% of those banking institutions use two-
dimensional systems appraising obligors’ credit worthiness (e.g., Risk Rating) on one 
scale and the risk of exposure loss on another.   
 
For each loan, the Financing Company documents the percentage of dollars authorized 
that is secured by borrower collateral.  This percentage, when extended into intervals 
referred to as Security Coverage Intervals (SCI), provides the segmentation along which 
the Financing Company applies its Loss Given Default (LGD) measurement and 
estimation.  The intervals over which security coverage categories are organised, and 
along which LGD estimates are made, can vary depending on the granularity of security 
coverage categories required. While Risk Rating, and therefore credit quality and/or 
default, evaluations are made at the borrower level, Security Coverage evaluations are 
made at the loan level.  A common convention is to classify loans with less than 30% SC 
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as unsecured and those with 70% SC as secured.  An SC greater than 100% is not 
uncommon among loans. 
 
For its PD evaluation, the Financing Company uses internal credit scoring and risk rating 
systems to assign to each borrower a RR ranging from 1 (least risky rating) to 9 (riskiest 
rating) for borrowers in the Performing portfolio.  The 10 RR acts as a watch-list 
grouping for borrowers still performing but with extremely elevated risks warranting 
enhanced monitoring – this can include previously defaulted or impaired borrowers who 
have been cured.  Technically part of the Performing portfolio, the 10 RR is excluded 
from our analysis.  Performing portfolio RRs, consisting of 9 rating grades, are assigned 
at authorization and are reviewed at one-year intervals for most obligors.  In their survey 
of the largest 50 U.S. banking institutions, Treacy and Carey (2000) find that the number 
of ratings for performing borrowers varies between two and a figure in the low twenties, 
with a median of five performing loans grades.  Banks with eight or more grades 
accounted for only 8% of banks surveyed.  These results indicate that the Financing 
Company’s risk rating systems are comparable to the top quantile of banks’ internal 
rating systems in terms of granularity of risk rating grades.  However, direct comparisons 
of banks’ internal risk rating systems are not only constrained by the varying number of 
ratings and the diversity of classification systems and criteria employed at these 
institutions, but also by the activities of the banks and the composition of their portfolios.  
For instance, according to Allen, DeLong, and Saunders (2003), banks with significant 
activity in the large corporate loans market tend to have more risk rating grades for 
investment-grade instruments than those for sub-investment grade ones. For banks with a 
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predominantly middle-market loans portfolio, the number of investment-grade and sub-
investment-grade rating grades tends to be more balanced, with middle-market portfolios 
here approximated by a test portfolio with 2,500 obligors with average exposures of 
£894,000 and an investment grade to non-investment grade loan ratio of 2:1, Allen and 
Saunders (2002, p. 144).   
 
Tables 2.2 and Figures 2.1 segregate borrowers and $OS into Risk Ratings and Size 
Buckets.  The main findings evidenced by the table are presented such that findings under 
points (a) will deal with concentrations of borrowers while those under points (b) will 
deal with concentrations of $OS.  The findings are as follows: 
 
1. a) The Size Bucket with the largest number of borrowers, for the portfolio as a 
whole, is the $250,000 - $1,000,000 Size Bucket, containing 30% of the overall 
number of borrowers in our portfolio.  b) The Size Bucket with the largest amount 
of $OS, for the portfolio as a whole is the $1,000,000 - $3,000,000 Size Bucket, 
containing 31% of the overall $OS in the portfolio. 
 
2. a) The RR with the largest number of borrowers, for the portfolio as a whole, is 
the 8 RR, containing 16% of the overall number of borrowers in our portfolio.  b)  
The RR with the largest amount of $OS is the 3 RR, containing 13.5% of the 




3. a) The RR and Size Bucket segment containing the highest number of borrowers 
is the ≤$100,000 Size Bucket - 9 RR segment, containing 7% of the overall 
number of borrowers in the portfolio. b) The RR and Size Bucket segment 
containing the largest amount of $OS is the $1,000,000 - $3,000,000 Size Bucket 
– 6 RR segment, containing 4% of the overall portfolio $OS. 
 
4. a) Within RRs, we observe that for the 1 to 7 RR the $250,000-$1,000,000 Size 
Buckets are the most heavily populated; while for the 8 and 9 RRs, it is the 
≤$100,000 Size Bucket that contains the largest number of borrowers. b) 
Similarly, we find that the 1 to 7 RRs show the highest concentration of $OS in 
Size Buckets of $1,000,000 or greater, while the 8 and 9 RRs show the highest 
concentration of $OS in the smaller $250,000 - $1,000,000 Size Bucket. 
 
5. a) Examining our data by Size Bucket, we observe that for those borrowers in 
Size Buckets of $250,000 or less, the RR containing the largest number of 
borrowers are the 8 and 9 RRs.  For those Size Buckets in the $250,000 to 
$3,000,000 range, the Risk Rating with the highest number of borrowers is the 7 
RR, while in Size Buckets of $3,000,000 or more it is the 3 RR that accounts for 
the highest number of borrowers.  Finally, we note a weakly inverse relationship 
between the concentration of borrowers in Size Buckets of $250,000 or less, and 
credit worthiness.  This inverse relationship results in the proportion of borrowers 
in Size Buckets of $250,000 or less increasing from 33% for the 1 RR to 83% for 
the 9 RR.  This concentration of approximately 80% of borrowers in the smallest 
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Size Buckets for the 9 RR, along with one of 60% for the 8 RR, represents a 
significant departure from the small-Size Bucket concentration range of 32% to 
45% observed in lower RRs.  For the portfolio as a whole, the proportion of 
borrowers in Size Buckets of $250,000 or less is 49%.  b) Examining the 
distribution of $OS between Size Buckets for given RRs, we observe a monotonic 
increase in credit qualities containing the highest proportion of $OS by Size 
Bucket.  This is exemplified by the ≤$100,000 Size Bucket having the 9 RR as the 
RR with the highest proportion of $OS while the >$5,000,000 Size Bucket has the 
2 RR as the RR with the highest proportion of $OS. 
 
To summarize, we observe that approximately 1 in 5 borrowers in our portfolio can be 
classified in the smallest and riskiest segments (Size Bucket of $250,000 or less and Risk 
Rating of 8 or worse).  In addition, we find that the riskiness of the borrowers decreases 
monotonically with size so that Size Buckets of $250,000 or less are the most likely to 
have the highest proportion of borrowers in the 8 or 9 RRs, while the Size Buckets of 
$3,000,000 or more are the least likely.  This result is reinforced by the finding that for 
the 1 to 7 RRs, it is the $250,000 - $1,000,000 Size Bucket that contains the highest 
proportion of borrowers, while for the 8 and 9 RRs, it is the ≤$100,000 Size Bucket.   
 
Figures 2.1A and 2.1B provide a visual representation of the distribution of borrowers 
across RRs and Size Buckets.  From Figure 2.1A we observe that for the 8 and 9 RRs the 
number of borrowers is generally decreasing with Size Bucket, so that the Size Buckets 
with the most borrowers are the smallest.  This pattern is generally transformed as RR 
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decreases, so that borrowers in RRs from 1 – 7 display a generally bell shaped 
distribution within RRs and across Size Buckets, with significant skewness towards 
higher value Size Buckets.  By contrast, Treacy and Carey (2000) find that among the 
largest 50 U.S. banks, 36% of them assign more than half of their rated loans to a single 
risk grade, the Financing Company’s risk rating system therefore seems to provide more 
adequate segregation and classification of obligor default risk. 
 
Subsection 2.3.3. The Portfolio at a Glance: Industry Concentration 
 
The Financing Company borrowers are also grouped along industry, providing a measure 
of the Financing Company’s activity throughout the various sectors of the Canadian 
economy.  For our immediate purposes, we have chosen a NAICS-based 11 industry 
classification system of the Financing Company credit portfolio.  Borrowers are 
classified as accordingly belonging in one of the following industries: Business Services 
(BUS); Construction (CON); Manufacturing (MAN); Non-Business Services (NBUS); 
Resources (RES); Retail (RET); Supplier of Premises (SOP); Tourism (TOU); 
Transportation and Storage (TRS); Wholesale (WHS); Other (OTH).  A full description 
of the industries and their composition is given in the Appendix to Chapter 2.  Table 2.3 
provides a breakdown of the distribution of borrowers across Size Buckets and Industries, 
while Figure 2.2 provides a visual representation.  The main findings revealed by the 




1. a) The Industry with the largest number of borrowers is the Manufacturing 
industry, containing 24% of all borrowers in the portfolio. b) The Manufacturing 
industry is also found to account for the highest proportion of $OS in the 
Financing Company portfolio, totalling 31% of the overall $OS. 
 
2. a) We observe that the predominance of the Manufacturing industry carries 
through to all Size Buckets, where it accounts for a majority of borrowers in each. 
b) For all Size Buckets, the Manufacturing industry is also found to account for 
the highest proportion of $OS, albeit to varying degrees.  For instance, while the 
MAN industry accounts for the highest proportion of $OS in the ≤$100,000 Size 
Bucket, it is only 3% greater (in terms of overall $OS for that industry) than the 
industry with the second highest proportion of $OS (RET).  For the ≥$5,000,000 
Size Bucket, however, the difference between the largest and second largest 
industries, MAN and RET, respectively, is 24%.  As such, Table 2.3 allows us to 
document a positive relationship between concentration of clients in the MAN 
industry and Size Bucket.  An explanation can perhaps be found in the MAN 
industry as one in which fixed and start-up costs are the most elevated, compared 
to Retail, Wholesale and the Services industries, for instance. 
 
3. a) Within Industries, we observe that the Size Bucket with the highest proportion 
of borrowers in almost all industries is the $250,000 - $1,000,000 Size Bucket.  
Exceptions can be found in the Business Services, Non-Business Services, 
Wholesale, and Other industries, for which the ≤$100,000 Size Bucket accounts 
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for the highest proportion of borrowers.  b) In addition, we observe that for almost 
all industries the Size Bucket with the highest proportion of $OS is the 
$1,000,000 - $3,000,000 Size Bucket, with the exceptions being the NBUS 
industry (for which the $250,000 - $1,000,000 Size Bucket is the largest), and the 
SOP and TRS industries (for which the ≥$5,000,000 Size Bucket is the largest). 
 
4. a) Unsurprisingly, we observe that the Size Bucket-Industry segment with the 
highest number of borrowers is the $250,000-$1,000,000 Size Bucket in the 
Manufacturing industry, containing 7.5% of all borrowers in the portfolio. b) In 
addition, this result holds true for the $OS wherein the 250,000-$1,000,000 Size 
Bucket in the Manufacturing industry accounts for 10% of all $OS. 
 
5. a) Table 2.3 shows that the industry with the highest proportion of borrowers in 
Size Buckets of $250,000 or less is the BUS industry, with 65% of borrowers in 
those Size Buckets, while the industry with the lowest proportion is the SOP, with 
18% of borrowers in those Size Buckets.  Excluding both SOP and BUS 
industries, we observe that this proportion varies between approximately 40% and 
60%, with a mean and median of 50% across all industries.  As such, the SOP 
industry presents a significant outlier in its proportion of borrowers in Size 
Buckets of $250,000 or less.  Conversely, out of all the industries, the SOP 
industry has the highest proportion of borrowers in the 250,000-$1,000,000 Size 
Bucket.  This result may suggest a significant size threshold for that industry. b) 
Similarly, in terms of $OS, we observe that the BUS and SOP industries account 
30 
 
for the industries with the highest and lowest proportion of $OS in Size Buckets 
of $250,000 or less, respectively.  In addition, we find both the TRS and MAN 
industries exhibit significantly lower concentrations of $OS in Size Buckets of 
$250,000 or less (5%) as compared to the mean and median (9%) across all 
industries. 
 
Segregating our industries along Risk Ratings, as in Table 2.4 and Figure 2.3, we observe 
the following: 
 
6. a) For all industries barring the CON and WHS industries, the 8 RR accounts for 
the highest proportion of borrowers, with proportions ranging from 24% for the 
SOP industry and 14% for the MAN industry.  For the CON and WHS industries, 
we observe the highest concentration of borrowers in the 9 and 3 RRs, 
respectively.  Taking the two highest RRs of 8 and 9 together, we observe a 
concentration of 31% of the overall portfolio, with the highest concentrations 
across industries being in the SOP, TOU, NBUS and OTH industries 
(approximately 35%), and the lowest being MAN and WHS industries (23% and 
25%, respectively).  b) Conversely, a broad pattern is hard to detect when 
examining the distribution of $OS across RRs for each industry, with industries 
showing a large variety of predominant concentrations among RRs, and these 
concentrations being limited to a range of approximately 15% to 20%.  One 
surprising observation is that of the 2 RR being the RR with the highest 
concentration of $OS for the CON industry – which is the only industry to have 
the 9 RR contain the highest concentration of borrowers.  The industry with the 
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highest risk top concentration of $OS is the RES industry, for which 17% of $OS 
have a RR of 8.  The CON industry is joined by the MAN industry, for which 
14% of $OS have a RR of 2.  The CON industry is the industry exhibiting the 
highest concentration level in any one RR within an industry, at 21.4%, while the 
MAN industry exhibits the lowest at 14.1%.  For the portfolio as a whole, the 3 
RR contains the largest concentration of $OS, accounting for 16.0% of the overall 
portfolio $OS. 
 
7. a) Unsurprisingly, we observe that the MAN industry accounts for the highest 
proportion of borrowers for all RRs. We observe that the proportion of borrowers 
in the MAN industry decreases with increasing RR so that for the 1 RR 30% of 
borrowers are in the MAN industry, while for the 9 RR, that figure is 17%.  For 
the portfolio as a whole, the concentration of borrowers in the MAN industry is 
24%.  b) In addition, the MAN industry accounts for the highest concentration of 
$OS for all RRs.  We observe that the proportion of $OS in the MAN industry 
decreases with increasing RR, so that 40% of $OS in the 1 RR are attributed to 
the MAN industry while the same can be said of only 22% in the 9 RR.  For the 
whole portfolio, 31% of $OS can be attributed to the MAN industry.   
 
8. a) The RR-Industry segment with the highest proportion of borrowers is the 8 RR 
in the MAN industry, containing 831 borrowers and accounting for 3.3% of all 
borrowers in the portfolio.  b) The RR-Industry segment with the highest 
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concentration of $OS is the 2 RR in the MAN industry, containing $464m in $OS 
and accounting for 4.4% of the overall portfolio $OS. 
 
Summarizing, we observe that the MAN industry is the largest in terms of both, number 
of borrowers and $OS to those borrowers, accounting for nearly a quarter of the portfolio 
in the former and nearly a third in terms of the latter.  This relationship is replicated in 
each Size Bucket for the portfolio.  A bell shaped distribution of borrowers (with 
skewness towards higher value Size Buckets) is exhibited for most industries, including 
MAN, TOU, SOP and TRS.  However, for industries such as BUS, RET and WHS, we 
observe a decreasing proportion of borrowers with Size Bucket.  This phenomenon, along 
with that observed in (3.a.), could be explained by the low start-up and operational costs 
in such industries as RET and BUS.  This argument is reinforced with the large 
predominance of borrowers in Size Buckets of $250,000 or less in the low-cost BUS 
industry and disproportionately low proportion of borrowers in Size Buckets of $250,000 
or less for the high-cost SOP industry.  For almost all industries, the 8 Risk Rating 
accounts for the highest concentration of borrowers.  The lack of a bell shaped curve in 
defining borrower distributions is evident in Figure 2.3a, where at best, we observe an 
almost bimodal distribution, with the first mode centered on the 8 RR and the second 







Subsection 2.3.4. The Portfolio at a Glance: Geographic Distribution 
 
Table 2.5 provides a snapshot of the Financing Company’s presence (in terms of its 
Performing portfolio), by Industry, across twelve Canadian regions: Newfoundland & 
Labrador (N. & L.); Prince Edward Island (P.E.I.); Nova Scotia (N.S.); New Brunswick 
(N.B.) – collectively, these four provinces are referred to as the Maritimes; Quebec (QC); 
Ontario (ON); Manitoba (MN), Saskatchewan (SK), Alberta (AL) – collectively, these 
three provinces are referred to as the Prairies; British Columbia (B.C.); the Yukon (YK), 
Northwest Territories and Nunavut (N.W.T.).  Table 2.5 and Figure 2.4 describe the 
distribution of borrowers and $OS across geographical regions and industries, while 
Table 2.6 and Figure 2.5 describe the distribution of borrowers and $OS across 
geographical regions and Size Buckets.  Results from Table 2.5 and Figure 2.4 can be 
described as follows: 
 
1. a) Nearly two thirds of the Financing Company borrowers are concentrated in the 
provinces of Quebec and Ontario, which contain approximately 34% and 27% of 
borrowers, respectively.  b) Quebec and Ontario jointly account for approximately 
70% of overall $OS in the Financing Company portfolio, with the former 
accounting for 38% of $OS and the latter accounting for 30%.   
 
2. a) MAN is the predominant industry, in terms of borrowers, for the Prairies, New 
Brunswick, B.C., Ontario and Quebec, in the Financing Company portfolio.  For 
provinces and territories where MAN is not the predominant industry among the 
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Financing Company borrowers, we observe RET to be.  Two exceptions to this 
general observation are found in P.E.I. and the Yukon, for which the Tourism 
industry accounts for the highest concentration of the Financing Company 
borrowers.  b) The MAN industry is similarly observed to have the highest 
concentration of $OS in the Prairies, New Brunswick, B.C., Ontario and Quebec 
regions.  For most other provinces or territories, RET accounts for the highest 
proportion of $OS, with the exception being the P.E.I. where the TOU industry 
accounts for 33% of $OS. 
 
3. a) For almost all industries, Quebec and Ontario are the provinces in which the 
highest concentration of borrowers is found and which make up a majority of all 
borrowers for those industries.  The exception is Resources industry wherein the 
highest concentration of borrowers is found in Newfoundland and Labrador.  b)  
Similarly, the Resources industry presents the only exception to the finding that 
for all industries, Quebec and Ontario account for the highest concentration of 
$OS.  For the Resources industry, the highest concentration of $OS can be found 
in province of Alberta.  It should be noted that the MAN industry shows an 
extremely elevated $OS concentration in the provinces of Ontario and Quebec.  
These two provinces combined account for 65% of $OS in the Financing 
Company’s MAN industry portfolio. 
 
4. a) Accordingly, borrowers in the MAN industry in the province of Quebec 
account for the highest concentration of borrowers in any Industry-Geography 
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segment.  This segment is observed to contain approximately 10% of all 
borrowers on the Financing Company’s portfolio.  b) The MAN industry in 
Quebec is the Industry-Geography segment with the highest concentration of $OS 
in the portfolio, containing 13% of the overall portfolio $OS. 
 
Results from Table 2.6 and Figure 2.5 are described as follows: 
 
5. a) For most geographical regions we observe approximately 80% of borrowers to 
be concentrated in Size Buckets of $1,000,000 or less.  Specifically, we note that 
Manitoba and New Brunswick show the highest concentrations of borrowers in 
the ≤$100,000 Size Bucket (33% and 31%, respectively); Alberta and B.C. in the 
$100,000 - $250,000 Size Bucket (29% and 28%, respectively); and the remaining 
regions in the $250,000 - $1,000,000 Size Bucket (ranging between 30% and 
44%).  Interestingly, in the region of the Northwest Territories and Nunavut, we 
observe the lowest concentration of borrowers in the ≤$100,000 Size Bucket 
(8.0%).  In addition, this region is shown to contain the highest concentration of 
borrowers in the $1,000,000 - $3,000,000 Size Bucket (35%).  The Yukon 
exhibits similar traits but to a lesser degree.  We observe that the province of 
Manitoba has the highest concentration of its borrowers in Size Buckets of 
$250,000 or less, while the Northwest Territories and Nunavut have the lowest.  
In addition we observe that P.E.I. has the lowest concentration of its borrowers in 
the ≥$5,000,000 Size Bucket, while the Yukon, followed by Alberta has the 
highest. b) For all regions barring AL, YK, and N.& L. we observe the 
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$1,000,000 - $3,000,000 Size Bucket accounts for the highest concentration of 
$OS.  In the case of the former 2 regions (AL & YK) we observe the >$5,000,000 
Size Bucket to be the largest, while in the case of the latter (N. & L.) it is the 
$250,000 - $1,000,000 Size Bucket. 
 
6. For all Size Buckets, the provinces of Ontario and Quebec account for a majority 
of borrowers, with Quebec, in particular, accounting for the highest number of 
borrowers and the highest concentration of $OS. 
 
7. a) Borrowers in the $250,000 - $1,000,000 Size Bucket in the province of Quebec 
account for the highest proportion of borrowers in the Bank, with approximately 
11% of the overall number of borrowers in our portfolio. b) Also in the province 
of Quebec the $1,000,000 - $3,000,000 Size Bucket accounts for the highest 
concentration of $OS, with approximately 10% of the overall portfolio $OS. 
 
Summarizing, we observe that approximately two thirds of the Financing Company 
borrowers and $OS are located in QC and ON.  The MAN and RET industries are 
predominant in almost all provinces and territories excluding P.E.I. and YK, for which 
the TOU industry accounts for the highest percentage of borrowers – and in the case of 
P.E.I. the highest percentage of $OS.  For all industries except RES and for all Size 
Buckets, we observe that QC and ON account for the highest concentration of borrowers 
and $OS.  For the RES industry, N. & L. accounts for the highest concentration of 
borrowers while AL accounts for the highest concentration of $OS.  In addition, we 
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observe that AL is the province/territory with the highest concentration of borrowers in 
the >$5,000,000 Size Bucket and YK is the province/territory with the highest 
concentration of $OS in the >$5,000,000 Size Bucket.  In turn, P.E.I. and N.W.T. are the 
provinces/territories with the lowest concentrations of borrowers and $OS, respectively.  
A brief note should be made on the sparseness of observations in the Northwest 
Territories and Nunavut, Yukon, and P.E.I. regions. 
 
Subsection 2.3.5. Portfolio at a Glance: Historical Tracking 
 
This subsection traces the development of the Financing Company portfolio over the 
period starting in 1997 and ending in 2010.  Table 2.7 provides annual distributions of 
borrowers and $OS across industries.  Figure 2.6 describes the evolution of borrowers 
and $OS over the evaluation period.  In both, the concentrations of borrowers and $OS 
we observe that the MAN industry has had a continuing dominant role in the Financing 
Company portfolio.  In addition, we note that the concentration of borrowers and $OS in 
the MAN industry grew from 1997, reaching a peak of 27%, in terms of the number of 
borrowers, in 2005 and a peak of 36%, in terms of $OS, in 2004.  Over the same period, 
the Financing Company portfolio witnessed significant decreases in its concentration in 
the TOU and SOP industry; while the BUS, NBUS and CON industries witnessed 
growth, most significantly in terms of the concentration of borrowers in those industries.   
 
These movements in industry concentration and overall portfolio riskiness can be 
partially attributed to over-riding policy drives predominant throughout the 1995 to 2005 
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period.  On the one hand, the Financing Company engaged in a persistent policy of 
intervention and support to the continuously deteriorating economic conditions in 
southern Ontario’s auto parts manufacturing sector.  That policy translated into a growth 
of over 150% of the Financing Company’s Ontario – Manufacturing portfolio over that 
period.  On the other hand, shifting internal policy directives regarding the Financing 
Company’s financing of realty, along with the elevated volatility experienced by the 
Financing Company portfolio – and the overall Canadian economy – in the Supplier of 
Premises and reality sectors led to a decrease of exposure in that sector.  As can be seen 
in Figure 2.4, these policy shifts – had significant effects on the Financing Company’s 
regional diversification across Canada.   
 
In Table 2.8 and Figure 2.7 we observe the evolution of the Financing Company’s 
borrower and $OS distribution across Risk Ratings over the 1997-2010 sample period.  In 
both cases we observe a gradual increase in the proportion of the Financing Company 
portfolio assigned to borrowers in the RRs of 1 to 4 while simultaneously observing a 
decrease in the proportion of borrowers and $OS held in the RRs of 5 to 8.  The most 
stark decreases were those for the 7 RR in terms of both $OS and number of borrowers 
with 1997 concentrations of 28% and 22%, reaching a peak of 30% in 2000 and 26% in 
1998, and ending at 13% in 2010 for the number of borrowers and $OS, respectively.  
Overall, we observe a general migration in the credit quality of the portfolio with growth 
in both the number of borrowers and the $OS in the 1-4 RR and decreases in the 
concentrations of borrowers and $OS in the 6-8 RRs.  Of note is the significant increase 
in the proportion of borrowers in the 9 RR over the sample period.  As can be seen in 
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Table 2.8, the proportion in the number of borrowers in the 9 RR rose from 1% in 1997 to 
12% in 2010, reaching a peak of 14% in 2008. 
 
Observing the evolution of the Financing Company portfolio by Size Bucket, as in Table 
2.9 and Figure 2.9, we note the historical predominance of the $250,000 - $1,000,000 
Size Bucket in terms of number of borrowers, which accounted for 35% of the portfolio, 
on average over the evaluation period.  In terms of $OS, this predominance only holds at 
the beginning of our observation period.  We observe a steep decline in the percentage of 
$OS in the $250,000 - $1,000,000 Size Bucket while simultaneously observing a steep 
rise in the $OS of the >$5,000,000 Size Bucket.  This rise in the $OS concentration in the 
>$5,000,000 Size Bucket, as well as the moderate rise in the $3,000,000 - $5,000,000 
Size Bucket, is accompanied by a sustained, albeit low-level, increase in the 
concentration of borrowers in those Size Buckets. 
 
 
Section 2.4. Historical SME Default Rates  
 
Following the dimensions highlighted in the preceding section, we are able to segregate 
our obligor default data along lines suitable for the modeling of the portfolio loss 
distribution.  In our development and application of various portfolio credit risk models, 
it is these factors (or risk measures) – default rate level, volatility, correlations, along 
with the dollar exposure and number of obligors in each industry – that we will use in 




Subsection 2.4.1. Default Rates by Risk Rating 
 
Table 2.10 and Figure 2.10 provide a description of default rates segmented by Risk 
Rating over the evaluation period starting in January 1997 and ending in December 2010.  
Table 2.10 shows an average default rate of 4.6% for the portfolio as a whole, as well as 
monotonically increasing average PDs for RRs 1 to 9.  Specifically, we observe an 
average default rate of 0.7% for the 1 RR and one of 12.7% for the 9 RR.  However, 
while this monotonicity holds on average over the evaluation period, we observe that for 
RR 1 to 6, significant “breaches” can be noted at various years throughout the time series.  
Between the 6 to 9 RRs, we observe consistent monotonicity in the realized default rates.  
For all RRs we observe a spike in the realized default rates observed in the 2008-2009 
period.  Examining these default rate spikes in relation to the average default rate for each 
Risk Rating, we observe that in addition to a general sensitivity to the 2008-2009 
macroeconomic environment, we can qualify that sensitivity by Risk Rating.  
Specifically, we observe that maximum default rates for the 2 – 6 RRs occurred in the 
2008-2009 period, while for other RRs maximum annual default rates occurred in the 
years 1997 and 1998, a period not necessarily associated with an adverse macroeconomic 
environment.  This suggests an elevated sensitivity among 2 to 6 RRs while lower 
sensitivity may exist for the safest and riskiest borrowers. 
 
Figure 2.10 allows us to observe similar patterns in the behaviour of default rates for the 
3 and 4 RRs, and perhaps to a lesser degree for the 2 and 5 RRs.  In addition, default rates 
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for the 6 to 8 RRs appear to follow similar patterns.  For the 1 RR we observe both high 
volatility and a lack of similarity in pattern when compared to other Risk Ratings.  We 
suspect this may be due to these safer borrowers’ greater ability to absorb shocks in the 
macroeconomic environment – thereby generating patterns differing from those of riskier 
borrowers.  Defaults among these safer borrowers can thus be generally related to 
idiosyncratic factors as opposed to common macroeconomic ones.  For the 9 RR we 
observe extremely elevated default rates for years prior to 2001.  We suspect this elevated 
default rate may be due to a retro-active internal re-rating processes initiated by the 
Financing Company for years prior to 2001 in which borrowers known to have defaulted 
may have re-rated to the highest risk rating for those years.   
 
Table 2.13 provides correlation values for the Risk Rating default rates over the 
evaluation period.  Strong correlations of 81% and 90% are observed between the 4 RR 
and the 3 and 5 RRs, respectively, as well as between the 7 RR and the 6 and 8 RRs – 
equal to 81% and 82%, respectively.  The 9 RR exhibits negative correlations with the 1 
RR and 5 RR, which is also negatively correlated with the 8 RR.  These correlation 
values reflect the similarity in patterns observed in Figure 2.10.  In addition, Table 2.13 
provides a measure of the correlation between the default rates of each RR and that of the 
overall default rate.  These values indicate that the 6 and 7 RRs show the strongest 
correlation to the overall default rate, while the 1 RR exhibits negative correlation with 





Subsection 2.4.2. Default Rates by Industry 
 
Segmenting the default rate data by Industry, Figure 2.11 and Table 2.11 indicate a 
significant increase in default rates across almost all industries coinciding with the 2008-
2009 economic slowdown.  Historically the BUS and MAN industries manifest the 
highest average default rates over the evaluation period, while the SOP industry 
manifests the lowest average default rate – equal to half the portfolio-wide average.  In 
terms of volatilities, we observe that the SOP industry has the highest observed volatility, 
while NBUS has the least volatile default rate, along with that for the MAN industry.  
This observation is made more interesting by the fact that the MAN and NBUS industries 
are on opposite ends of the average default rate spectrum, with the NBUS industry having 
the second lowest average default rate.  Figure 2.11 allows us to observe some patterns 
for the annual default rates of industries, and through it we observe that NBUS and OTH 
industries share very similar patterns of annual default rates.  This, we speculate, could be 
due to the high degree of heterogeneity in those industries.  Similar patterns can be 
observed for the BUS and SOP industries, even while these industries represent the 
riskiest and least risky industries, respectively, in our portfolio.  We suspect that this 
similarity in pattern may be due to internal Financing Company policies aimed at 
adjusting for the riskiness in both of these industries over the evaluation period.   
 
Table 2.14 provides the default rate correlation matrix for our industries over the 
evaluation period.  Overall, we observe positive correlations between almost all 
industries with some exceptions noted for the TRS and SOP industries (as well as a 
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negative correlation between the OTH and RES industries).  The highest correlation 
recorded is that between the SOP industry and the BUS industry (91%), while the lowest 
correlation recorded is that between the TOU and SOP industries (1%).  In addition Table 
2.14 provides the correlation between each Industry’s default rate and that of the overall 
portfolio.  As such, the MAN industry shows highest correlation with the overall default 
rate, equal to 92% - this is due to the predominance of the MAN industry in the 
Financing Company portfolio. 
 
The highest default rates attained by the portfolio are in the Business Services sector 
(10.1%) in 1998 and (9.9%) in 1997.  The lowest default rates are mostly found in the 
Supplier of Premises industry, with the portfolio-wide lowest being (0.5%) for that 
industry in 2008 (the presence of this portfolio-wide low point in a year with otherwise 
exceptional spikes in default rates is peculiar).  Contrary to the case of default rates by 
Risk Rating (see Subsection 2.4.1), we find that not all industries exhibited elevated 
default rates in the 2008-2009 macroeconomic recessionary period.  Specifically, we 
observe that for all industries except the BUS, RES and SOP, spikes in the default rate 
are observed in the 2008-2009 period, with the largest increase in default rates relative to 
the annual average default rate occurring in the TRS (approximately 70% increase), WHS 
(approximately 40% increase), and RET (approximately 40% increase).  In general, we 






Subsection 2.4.3. Default Rates by Size Bucket 
 
Table 2.12 provides an interesting result in showing monotonically decreasing average 
annual default rates with Size.  For borrowers in the ≤ $100,000 Size Bucket we observe 
an annual default rate of 8.3%.  This value decreases to 1.2% for the >$5,000,000 Size 
Bucket, a value equivalent to approximately 25% of the portfolio-wide average of 4.6%.  
We observe the lowest default rate volatility for the smallest and riskiest Size Bucket (≤ 
$100,000) while the least risky Size Bucket (>$5,000,000) exhibits the highest volatility.  
Figure 2.12 graphically illustrates the default rates by Size Bucket over the evaluation 
period.  As can be seen in Figure 2.12 and Table 2.12, the default rates for our Size 
Buckets show strong ordering so that the rank of riskiness by Size Bucket remains 
constant throughout the evaluation period with very few exceptions.  Spikes in default 
rates are observed for all Size Buckets except the $1,000,000 - $3,000,000 and 
>$5,000,000 Size Buckets over the 2008-2009 period.  Table 2.15 gives the default rate 
correlations over the evaluation period.  In addition to the correlation between each Size 
Bucket default rate, we also observe in Table 2.15 the correlation between each Size 
Bucket’s default rate and that of the overall portfolio.  The strongest correlation observed 
between Size Buckets is 69% between the $100,000 - $250,000 Size Bucket and the 
$3,000,000 - $5,000,000 Size Bucket.  Negative correlations are observed between the ≤ 
$100,000 Size Bucket and the $3,000,000 - $5,000,000 and >$5,000,000 Size Buckets, as 
well as between the $250,000 - $1,000,000 and >$5,000,000 Size Buckets.  In addition, 
the >$5,000,000 Size Bucket is the only one to manifest a negative correlation with the 
portfolio-wide default rate.  Meanwhile the $250,000 - $1,000,000 Size Bucket shows the 
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strongest correlation with the portfolio-wide default rate, equal to 86%; as with the case 
of the industry default correlations (see Table 2.14), we attribute this to the $250,000 - 
$1,000,000 Size Bucket being the historically predominant one in the Financing 
Company portfolio. 
 
Across all Size Buckets we observe elevated annual default rates over the 2008-2009 
macroeconomic recessionary period, with the degree of elevation the most pronounced 
(at approximately 50%) for the $100,000 - $250,000 and the $3,000,000 - $5,000,000 
Size Buckets.  In addition, we observe elevated annual default rates for all Size Buckets, 
except the >$5,000,000 Size Bucket, during the 1998 calendar year. 
 
 
Section 2.5. Loans Portfolio Stylized Facts 
 
In this chapter we have carefully analyzed the unique underlying risk characteristics of 
the Financing Company performing loans portfolio.  Our analysis has revealed an SME 
portfolio with sufficient depth to allow for a granular analysis of the credit risk 
characteristics of Small and Medium Enterprises borrowers within a portfolio context.  
This granularity thus opens the door to the study of SME credit risk not as a homogenous 
body, but as a layered heterogonous one in which credit risk behaviour may vary among 
different classes of borrowers. For the Financing Company portfolio, small borrowers – 
small even by the standards of Small and Medium Enterprise – have been shown to play a 
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dominant role, and exhibited a high risk profile when compared to the rest of the 
portfolio. 
 
To conclude, we highlight the Financing Company loans portfolio’s distinguishing 
characteristics through the following stylized facts: 
 
1. Large Number of Small Borrowers – the Financing Company’s loans portfolio is 
composed of a large number of small $OS borrowers, with approximately 55% of 
borrowers owing the Bank $150,000 or less (see Table 2.1), and approximately 
50% of borrowers classified in Size Buckets of $250,000 or less, (see, e.g., Table 
2.2), as of March 2009.  The cumulative $OS of those borrowers highlighted in 
both cases above accounts for less than 10% of the overall portfolio $OS. 
 
2. High $OS Concentration Among Top Borrowers – In addition to the large number 
of small borrowers, the Financing Company portfolio also contains a small 
number of large borrowers whose cumulative $OS accounts for a large percentage 
of the overall portfolio $OS.  In particular, we note that for the March 2009 
portfolio, the top 10% of borrowers (by $OS) account for approximately 60% of 
overall portfolio $OS (see Table 2.1), while the top 3% of the Financing 
Company borrowers account for approximately 25% of the overall portfolio $OS 





3. Manufacturing Dominant Industry in the Portfolio – As of March 2009, the 
Manufacturing industry has the highest concentration of borrowers and $OS, 
accounting for approximately a quarter of all borrowers and a third of all $OS in 
the portfolio (see, e.g., Table 2.3). 
 
4. Québec and Ontario Largest Regional Concentrations – Combined, these two 
provinces account for 60% of borrowers and 64% of overall portfolio $OS (see, 
e.g., Table 4.0) – with Manufacturing being the predominant industry in those two 
geographical regions. 
 
5. Small Borrowers Riskier Than Large Ones (Part 1) – As of March 2009, the ≤ 
$100,000 Size Bucket is the only Size Bucket in which borrowers in the 8-9 Risk 
Ratings accounted for the majority, in both numbers and $OS.  The proportion of 
borrowers in the 8-9 Risk Ratings is monotonically decreasing with increasing 
Size Buckets (see Table 2.2).   
 
6. Small Borrowers Riskier Than Large Ones (Part 2) – We observe monotonically 
decreasing average default rates with increasing Size Bucket, such that the 
smallest Size Bucket (≤ $100,000) exhibits average default rates approximately 
twice those of the overall average, while the largest Size Bucket (>$5,000,000) 
exhibits average default rates approximately one quarter those of the overall 
average (see Table 2.12).  In addition, we observe that default rate volatilities are 
generally increasing with Size Bucket so that the smallest Size Bucket has default 
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rate volatilities approximately equal to that of the overall default rate, while the 
largest Size Bucket has default rate volatilities approximately four times those of 
the overall default rate (also see Table 2.12). 
 
7. Supplier of Premises the Least Risky Industry – The Supplier or Premises industry 
exhibits the lowest average annual default rate, approximately equal to half that of 
the overall portfolio-wide average default rate.  The Non-Business Services 
industry exhibits the second lowest average default rate, as well as one of the 
lowest default rate volatilities – in contrast to the Supplier of Premises industry, 
which has the highest default rate volatility (approximately four times that of the 
overall default rate volatility).  The Non-Business Services industry shares its low 
default rate volatility with the Manufacturing industry (see Table 2.11 and Figure 
2.11). 
 
8. Business Services and Manufacturing Most Risky Industries – The Business 
Services and Manufacturing industries account for the highest average default 
rates among industries.  However, we observe a divergence in the volatility of 
each industry’s default rate volatility, with Manufacturing exhibiting one of the 
lowest default rate volatilities and the Business Services industry exhibiting a 





9. Default Rates react to Macroeconomic Environment to Varying Degrees – 
Observing the Financing Company annual default rates by Size Bucket and Risk 
Rating, we note significant elevations in the default rates for all segregations in 
periods of macroeconomic stress.  Observing the Financing Company annual 
default rates by Industry, we observe a significant degree of divergence in the 
default rates over such periods of macroeconomic stress, with default rates in the 
Transport and Storage industry and the Wholesale industry appearing to show the 
highest sensitivity to stressed macroeconomic conditions. The Supplier of 
Premises, Business Services and Resources industries show the lowest sensitivity.  
For almost all segments we observe elevated default rates in 1998. 
 
10. Segments Exhibit Negative Correlation – We observe negative correlations 
between the safest and riskiest borrowers, as well as between the smallest and the 
largest borrowers.  In particular, we observe negative correlation between 
borrowers in the 1 and 9 Risk Ratings.  In addition, we observe negative 





Chapter 3. Small and Medium Enterprises under Basel II 
 
The Basel II Capital Accords marked an important step in the regulatory recognition of 
SMEs as borrowers who have divergent credit risk characteristics from those of their 
Corporate counterparts; see, for example, Hennek and Truck (2006), Altman and Sabato 
(2005), Dietsch and Petey (2004) and Jacobson, Linde, and Roszbach (2005).  This 
recognition was reflected in both the Standardized Approach, as well as the Internal 
Ratings Based method, which allows banks to input internally measured components of 
credit risk into the risk capital measurement mechanism for banks’ banking book 
exposures.  This regulatory capital mechanism, also referred to as the risk-weighting 
function is based on asymptotic approximations of existing models for portfolio credit 
risk in use at financial institutions; see Gordy and Howells (2006).  For a review of the 
Basel II risk-weighting function, see, for example, BCBS (2005); for a review of broadly 
applied commercial portfolio credit risk models see Crouhy, Galia, and Mark (2000).   
 
In addition to internally measured components, the risk-weighting function incorporates 
pre-calibrated risk components and adjustments which play a crucial role in determining 
final capital requirements and allocations. For SME exposures, these pre-calibrated 
components have been set to values that effectively reduce the capital required for SMEs 
with respect to their Corporate counterparts.  Specifically, the Basel II Accords allow for 







ii. Almost exclusively unrated by external agencies, SME borrower loans 
classified as Corporate exposures generally warrant a 100% risk weight.  
These borrowers will also, in general, exhibit elevated risk profiles, so that 
for an externally rated Corporate borrower loan with a comparably elevated 
risk profile, a higher risk weight of 150% could be applied; see BCBS 
(2006a, p. 23). 
 
iii. Basel II allows for the classification of SME borrower loans under the Retail-
Other asset class, with a 75% risk weight, given some restrictions; see BCBS 
(2006a, p. 23). 
 
Internal Ratings Based Approach 
 
i. For SMEs in the Corporate asset class, a size-based adjustment can be 
applied within the risk-weighting function to lower capital charges through 
lower asset correlations; see BCBS (2006a, p. 64). 
 
ii. Within the Corporate asset class, SME properties such as shorter terms 
(maturities) and higher PDs generally lend themselves to lower capital 
charges within the Internal Ratings Based Approach framework; see BCBS 
(2006a, p. 64). 
 
iii. For SMEs in the Retail asset class, Size and Term-to-Maturity have no 
impact on capital charges, however, lower overall capital charges are 
obtained through lower overall asset correlations; see BCBS (2006a, p. 77). 
 
In this Chapter we use the unique characteristics of the Financing Company portfolio of 
SME borrowers to measure and explore the effects of the various adjustments and 
assumed relations within the Basel II framework.  Given the broadly pre-calibrated nature 
of the Basel II capital charge mechanism, we are able to disassemble the Basel II IRB 
mechanism and apply each assumption or pre-calibrated relationship individually, 
thereby assessing its impact on the Financing Company required capital calculation.  This 
exercise will be referred to as the Partial Implementation exercise.  The results of this 
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exercise provide a useful benchmark against which portfolio credit risk relationships and 
models may be compared.  An in-depth review of the Basel II IRB risk weighting 
function is found in BCBS (2005); for the Canadian implementation of Basel II as 
dictated by the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, see OSFI (2011). 
For an interesting review and analysis of the development of the Basel II IRB framework, 
from an SME capital charge perspective, throughout the consultative period see Hennek 
and Truck (2006); for the comprehensive final version of the Basel II Accord see BCBS 
(2006a), and; for a review of the history of the Basel Accords and the international 
banking regulatory structure see Hull (2010) and Jorion (2002).   
 
Chapter 2 presented a general abundance of default data in the Financing Company’s 
historical portfolio.  Here we construct additional segmentations to those observed in 
Chapter 2 and use them to explore the SME relationships modeled in Basel II.  In 
particular, we use dual segmentations to estimate probabilities of default for various Size 
and Risk Rating segmentations.  In Chapter 4 this work is extended to the estimation of 
asset and default correlations, and ultimately capital charges based exclusively on 
internally-calibrated measures of SME credit risk. 
 
More specifically, Chapter 3 is organized as follows: In Section 3.1 we focus on the 
Basel II IRB approach to the treatment of SME exposures and examine the divergence in 
the analysis of SME borrowers as compared to their larger, less risky Corporate 
counterparts.  In addition, we describe the Basel II Accord’s Pillar 1 treatment of credit 
risk, including two broad methods, the Standardized Approach (SA) method and the 
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Internal Ratings Based (IRB) method.  A detailed analysis of the risk-weighting function 
proposed under the IRB approach is conducted, including the theory on which it is based, 
the functional form in which it is presented and used, and the underlying practical 
assumptions it makes about the behaviour of borrowers and credit risk components.  In 
addition, we highlight some practical and conceptual differences in the treatment of 
SMEs as either Retail or Corporate borrowers.   
 
Having adequately described the treatment of credit risk and SME credit risk in 
particular, we turn our attention to an implementation of the Basel II credit risk 
treatments on the Financing Company portfolio.  In Section 3.2 we build on the work 
done in Chapter 2 by adding dual-dimension segmentations to our portfolio estimation of 
probabilities of default.  In Section 3.3 the Basel II IRB model is applied to the Financing 
Company portfolio in sequential manner, allowing for analysis of the assumptions made 
in the Basel II framework and their impact on an SME portfolio.  Given the particular 
nature of the Financing Company portfolio, we are thus able to not only test many of the 
assumptions made about the behaviour of SME credit risk components and the 
relationships between them, but also establish a standardized benchmark for the capital 
needed to meet the credit risk inherent in the Financing Company portfolio.  Finally, 







Section 3.1. The Basel II Capital Accords Credit Risk Framework 
 
In the following subsections we detail the Basel II IRB framework for credit risk capital 
requirements as presented in BCBS (2006a) and tailored to the Canadian financial sector 
in OSFI (2011).  Our discussion of Basel II deals exclusively with its application to 
banking book loans – with special emphasis on loans to SME borrowers, such as those 
found in the Financing Company portfolio.   
 
In particular, we note that the Basel II modeling of banking book credit risk relies on two 
broad approaches for the modeling of banking book credit risk: the Standardized 
Approach (SA) – discussed in Subsection 3.1.1 and; the Internal Ratings Based (IRB) 
Approach – for which two implementations, the Foundation (FIRB) and the Advanced 
(AIRB) are permitted, depending on a bank’s ability to meet supervisory standards for 
each – discussed in Subsection 3.1.2.  Our discussion of these two IRB implementations 
will focus on the internal risk-weighting formula, which we will be analyzed in detail in 
Subsection 3.1.3. 
 
Under the IRB approach, exposures classified under the Corporate and Retail asset class 
are subjected to the Corporate asset class IRB risk-weighting function.  Within this 
function, loans to SMEs benefit directly from favourable treatment through size-
adjustments reducing the overall capital requirement, all other things equal; see BCBS 
(2006a, p. 64).  Under both the SA and IRB methods, SMEs eligible to be classified as 
Retail exposures require less regulatory capital as compared to the Corporate asset class, 
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all other things equal.  This is evident from the risk weights assigned under the SA 
method and the calibration of the risk-weighting function under the IRB method. 
 
In the following, we survey the key features of the Standardized Approach and the 
Internal Ratings Based Approach, as presented in Part 2, Sections II and III, of BCBS 
(2006a), and explore the IRB risk weight function in greater detail.  Our discussion of the 
IRB risk-weighting function will serve as a bridge to the single-factor model presented in 
Chapter 4.  Together, Sections 3.1 and 3.2 will form the foundation of our 
implementation of the Basel II framework on the Financing Company portfolio in 
Sections 3.3, and, subsequently, our ability to test the assumptions on the behaviour of 
SME borrowers within this framework in Chapter 4. 
 
Subsection 3.1.1. Basel II Credit Risk Models – Standardized Approach 
 
The Standardized Approach assigns risk weights to exposures according to exposure 
classification.  For Corporate borrowers these risk-weights rely almost exclusively on 
external credit ratings provided by credit rating agencies recognized by national 
supervisory bodies, see BCBS (2006a, p. 23).   
 
Table 3.1 provides the SA risk weights for exposures under the Corporate and Retail 
asset class.  Given the overwhelming predominance of unrated borrowers among SMEs, 
we expect that most SME borrowers classified under the Corporate asset class obtain SA 
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risk weights of 100%.  Alternatively, SME borrower exposures classified as Retail – 
Other, are accorded a risk weight of 75%, see BCBS (2006a, p. 23).    
 
In order to calculate capital charges for a given portfolio under the SA approach, 
exposures are multiplied first by the corresponding risk weight and second by the 
minimum regulatory capital requirement.  Under Basel II that minimum total regulatory 
capital requirement is set at 8%, while the Canadian regulator has set it at 10%; see, in 
particular, footnote 8, OSFI (2011, p. 7).  In this Thesis, the calculation of portfolio 
capital requirements under the SA method will use the Basel II minimum capital ratio of 
8% so that for each loan we multiply the corresponding $OS and SA risk weights by 8% 
to generate capital charges for that loan.  In Section 3.3 capital charges under the SA 
method are presented, alongside capital charges from other Basel II implementations; see 
in particular Table 3.8. 
 
Subsection 3.1.2. Basel II Credit Risk Models – IRB Approach 
 
Our review of the Basel II IRB risk-weighting model closely follows the presentation 
given in BCBS (2005) in describing the underlying mathematical framework and 
economic basis of the model and its individual components. 
 
The Basel II IRB framework provides a comparable, standardized measure of portfolio 
credit risk across a large number banks varying in size and makeup.  This assignment is 
accomplished through a risk-weighting function for the estimation of portfolio credit risk 
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capital requirements; see BCBS (2006a, pp. 52-119).  The functional form of the risk-
weighting function allows for the input of certain internally estimated credit risk 
components in the calculation of an exposure’s portfolio credit risk capital requirement, 
while other components and credit risk relations are generated from BCBS pre-
calibrations; see, for example, BCBS (2005, pp. 9-11).   
 
Specifically, the IRB risk-weighting function allows banks, meeting the necessary data 
requirements, to input internally measured banking book exposures’ PDs (in both the 
AIRB and FIRB implementations) as well as their LGDs, EADs, and Maturities (in the 
AIRB implementation).   
 
A pre-calibrated risk component of particular significance to SMEs within the risk-
weighting function is the asset correlation.  The asset correlation used in the risk-
weighting function describes the sensitivity of a given credit exposure to overall 
economic conditions and therefore, by extension, to the behaviour of other credit 
exposures in the portfolio; see BCBS (2005, pp. 12-15).  The more sensitive an exposure 
is to possible downturns in the economy, the higher the likelihood that it will default as a 
result of them.  The presence of highly sensitive exposures in a bank’s portfolio increases 
the likelihood of a high number of defaults and losses in the event of a downturn.  Our 
work in Chapter 4 will ultimately center on the estimation of asset correlations with a 
framework comparable to that of the IRB approach presented in this Chapter.  The SME 




In addition to the inclusion of the above credit risk component, the Basel II IRB risk-
weighting function captures the effects of several credit risk relationships as adjustments 
to SMEs’ sensitivity to the overall state of the economy.  These pre-calibrated 
adjustments are such that an SME’s risk of default, under the framework, arises largely 
due to idiosyncratic factors – which elevate its riskiness – but which are less related to 
systematic factors in the economy, especially when compared to larger corporate 
borrowers, BCBS (2005, p. 12).  This emphasis on idiosyncratic risk factors in SMEs as 
opposed to systematic factors thereby reduces SME contributions to portfolio unexpected 
losses.  In this Subsection we will explore the mechanics of these relationships as 
modeled under Basel II.  In particular, in this Thesis we will study the relationship 
between SME borrower size and capital requirement as defined under the Corporate asset 
class IRB formula, and compare our results to the Retail specification which does not 
include this relationship. 
 
Another phenomena captured by the IRB risk-weighting function is that of increased 
riskiness with increased maturity.  Specifically, a maturity-dependent adjustment of the 
measured risk for the maturity of a given exposure such that the longer the maturity and 
the lower the PD, the higher the risk of a potential deterioration in the quality of the 
borrower BCBS (2005, pp. 9-11). In Jacobson, Linde, and Roszbach (2005), the authors 
note that SMEs may benefit from reduced capital charges under the Basel II IRB 
approach due to lower maturities as compared to corporate loans.  Our study of SME 
borrower characteristics and capital charges within a Basel II framework will provide 
further empirical evidence of this phenomenon.  Finally, the IRB risk-weighting function 
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provides for an inverse relationship between asset correlation values and PD.  Our work 
in this Thesis will directly test this assumption. 
 
Subsection 3.1.3. Basel II Credit Risk Models – IRB Risk Weight Function 
 
In Vasicek (2002) a natural extension of the Merton (1974) asset value model to a 
specific asymptotic single risk factor (ASRF) portfolio credit risk model is given; see 
BCBS (2005, pp. 3-6) and Appendix B.  A necessary condition of this extension is that 
the portfolio on which the resultant ASRF model is applied must contain a large enough 
number of obligors such that the idiosyncratic risks associated with each obligor is 
diversified away and the only significant risks affecting portfolio losses are systematic; 
BCBS (2005).  Building on Vasicek (2002), Gordy (2003) showed that the ASRF model 
can be additive in the capital charges to the exposures in the portfolio to which it is 
applied, and that it is uniquely portfolio invariant.   
 
As such, the ASRF model presents regulators with a model that is applicable across a 
variety of portfolios with relative ease, and therefore forms the underlying basis of the 
IRB risk weighting function.  This resultant IRB risk weight function, see BCBS (2006a, 
p. 64), is given by: 
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where, (K) represents the percent capital charge in excess of EL; (PD) is the average 
Probability of Default defined over a given segment; (LGD) is the downturn Loss Given 
Default; (R) is the asset correlation, or the single factor weighting; (N[]) is the 
cumulative distribution function (CDF) for a standard normal variable, and (N
-1
[]) is the 
inverse CDF of a standard normal variable; (M) is the loan Term-to-Maturity; and b(PD) 
is a smoothed regression maturity function, such that the slope of the adjustment function 
with respect to (M) decreases as the (PD) increases – specifically:  
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Within this functional form, the IRB capital framework is thus able to provide the 
required capital amount using a small set of parameters. In particular, the PD, internally 
calculated and specified under Basel II according to risk grade, is a central focus of IRB 
methodology and will be discussed extensively in Section 3.2.  As can be seen in 
Equation (3.1), the degree to which an obligor is sensitive to an extreme realization of the 
systematic factor is determined through the asset correlation (R).  The pre-calibrated asset 
correlations presented in the IRB framework are specified according to a series of pre-
defined asset classes, defined according to banking book exposures exhibiting divergent 
characteristics.  They include Corporate and Retail exposure asset classes, each of which 
defines specific assumptions and relationships modelled into the pre-calibrated asset 
classes.  Discussion of the asset correlation conventions in Basel II will form an integral 
part of this Chapter, as well as this Thesis as a whole, with further discussion and testing 




For the Corporate asset class, Equation (3.3) provides the asset correlation, as found in 
BCBS (2006a, p. 64):   
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where (S) is the borrower size as measured by sales (applicable to Corporate SME 
exposures). 
 
The calibration of Equation (3.3) takes into account two systematic dependencies.  The 
first dependency modeled in Equation (3.3) is the positive relationship between asset 
correlations and firm size, and is applied in the shape of a size-adjustment applicable to 
exposures deemed to be SMEs under the Corporate asset class.  Specifically, borrowers 
with annual sales ranging between $6.25m and $56.25m, as specified in OSFI (2011, p. 
149), receive a negative adjustment ranging between 4% and 0%.  Borrowers with sales 
of $6.25m or less obtain a size adjustment of 4% while those with $56.25m or more 
receive no adjustment.  While the BCBS puts forward both intuition and empirical 
evidence as justification for this relationship, there is a concession that the empirical 
evidence supporting it is not conclusive, BCBS (2005, p. 12).   
 
The second dependency is the inverse relationship between PD, or the riskiness of the 
borrower, and asset correlations.  The underlying intuition supporting this relationship is 
that the more risky the borrower, the higher the likelihood that his default is due to 
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idiosyncratic factors than to a realization of the systematic factor - as such, the borrower 
exhibits a decreased overall correlation to the systematic factor, BCBS (2005, p. 12).  
 
Therefore taking into account these two systematic dependencies within the asset 
correlation framework, two limits on the asset correlations are established.  For non-SME 
Corporate exposures asset correlations are set between 12%, corresponding to a PD of 
100%, and 24%, corresponding to a PD of 0%. For SME Corporate exposures, these two 
limits then become 8% (for 100% PD) and 20% (for 0% PD). 
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Equation (3.4) presents the asset correlation equation under the Retail-Other exposure 
treatment to which borrowers classified as SMEs can be subjected; see BCBS (2006a, p. 
77).  For a borrower to be eligible for Retail-Other specification, a financial institution’s 
exposure to that borrower may not be greater than $1.25m, OSFI (2011, p. 40).  A quick 
comparison of Equations (3.3) and (3.4) reveals the absence of a size adjustment for SME 
borrowers.  For the so-called Retail-SME asset class, asset correlation limits are set to 
3%, for 100% PD, and 16%, for 0% PD.  These lower limits are a reflection of empirical 
and intuitive evidence suggesting that idiosyncratic factors play a larger role in the 
default behaviour of retail borrowers.   
 
In addition to the absence of a size-asset correlation relationship in Equation (3.4), we 
also observe a distinction in the calibration of the relationship between asset correlation 
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and PD.  Specifically, we note that the Corporate asset class correlation and the Retail-
Other asset class correlation functions are based on an exponential weighting function 
with a “k-factor” set to 50 for Corporate exposures and 35 for Retail-Other exposures. 
This k-factor determines the pace of decrease of the asset correlation with respect to the 
PD such that given the above calibrations, the asset correlation decreases quicker for 
Corporate borrowers as opposed to Retail borrowers.  The resultant relationship between 
PD and asset correlation can be seen in Figure 3.1 which plots the two asset correlation 
functions across PDs, excluding – in the case of the Corporate asset correlation function – 
any size adjustments therein.  A steeper slope is evident for the Corporate asset 
correlation function, as well as higher correlation values when holding PDs constant. 
 
Finally, the asset correlations derived for the Retail asset class are applied to the IRB 
risk-weighting function given in Equation (3.3) with the exclusion of the Maturity 
adjustment (last bracket on the right-hand side of the equation).  The maturity adjustment 
found in Equation (3.1), and detailed in Equation (3.2), reflects empirical and intuitive 
evidence as to the riskiness of long-term credit exposures as opposed to short-term credit 
exposures.  In addition, the maturity adjustment includes a recognition of the higher 
potential for low risk (low PD) exposures to deteriorate as opposed to high risk (high PD) 
exposures which can be considered to have already deteriorated.  A standard maturity of 
2.5 years is assumed and adjustments are smoothed via the statistical regression 




The Basel II IRB framework therefore presents two specifications for SME asset 
correlations and capital charge allocation, and thus two conceptual frameworks for SME 
behaviour in default.  Under the Corporate asset class, SME asset correlations are highly 
sensitive to PD values, and can range between 8% and 20%, depending on Size (as well 
as PD).  Capital charges for SMEs under this specification can be increased in longer 
maturities.  Under the Retail asset class, SME asset correlations are measured 
independently of Size; asset correlations are still inversely related to PDs but compared to 
Corporate exposures this relationship is significantly dampened.  Asset correlations are 
lower than those for SMEs classified as Corporate exposures and range between 3% and 
16% (depending on PD), and capital charges are not determined by maturity.   
 
Within a portfolio of SME borrowers, these two conceptual frameworks are distinguished 
by the $1.25m Retail-SME eligibility threshold.  By segmenting our portfolio into 
homogenous subportfolios by Size and Risk Rating, and explicitly measuring the asset 
correlations in our SME portfolio, our work in Chapter 4 will directly test these 
assumptions and conceptual frameworks on the behaviour of asset correlations.  To do so, 
we will use a comparable model to that used in the Basel II IRB approach to measure 
patterns in asset correlations among SME borrowers.  In Section 3.3 we will implement 
various forms of the IRB risk-weighting function given in Equation (3.1) and present 






Section 3.2. Key Components of the Basel II IRB Approach SME  
 
In Section 3.2 dual segmentations are applied to the data in the calculation of 
probabilities of default.  The application of dual segments to our data provides us with a 
useful convention in that it allows for the formation of homogenous segments of SME 
borrowers on which research on credit relationships and characteristics can be 
undertaken.  The significant depth of the Financing Company portfolio differentiates this 
data from other studies in which this dual segmentation has been applied to aggregated 
data sets; see, for example Dietsch and Petey (2004) and Duellman and Scheule (2003).  
In Chapter 4 we extend the work undertaken in this Section by using the dual 
segmentation convention to measure explicitly asset and default correlations from our 
SME data.. 
  
Our estimates of PDs within Risk Rating – Size Bucket segments reconfirm overall 
patterns in PDs delineated in Chapter 2, namely those of increasing PD with Risk Rating 
and decreasing PD with Size.  In Subsection 3.2.1 we introduce a correspondence 
between our Size Buckets and sales-based measures of Size used in Basel II and related 
literature.  Our data work in this Chapter will be extended in Chapter 4 wherein our 
estimation of internally-calibrated asset correlations will result in more extensive data 
requirements than those found in Basel II.  Specifically, as seen in Section 3.1, Basel II 
requires that financial institutions using the IRB approach enter internally measured 
values for the probability of default.  Data requirements for this estimation are generally 
limited to an estimation period of at least five years; see, in particular, BCBS (2006, p. 
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102).  Given that best practice measures call for the use of weighted averages in 
generating the PD from default rates, there is no need for significant populations of 
defaults in each segment for which PD estimates are generated.   This is not the case 
when estimating asset and default correlations.  The more strenuous data requirements 
encountered in Chapters 4 and 5 will force us to collapse the Risk Ratings and Size 
Buckets with the lowest numbers of defaults into more heavily populated amalgamated 
Risk and Size Groups.  When needed, results presented in this Chapter will be replicated 
along Risk and Size Group dimensions defined in Section 4.2. 
 
As in Chapter 2, the Financing Company historical defaults are compiled from January 
1997 to December 2010, covering a period of 14 years; see Section 2.4, Table 2.10 and 
Figure 2.10 for further discussion.  In addition to the single segmentation by Risk Rating 
or Size Bucket, for the purposes of this exercise, we prepare the data presented in Chapter 
2 along dual segmentations of Size Bucket and Risk Rating.  As before, internal 
Financing Company Risk Ratings of 1 (least risky) to 9 (most risky) were used, along 
with Size Buckets ranging from ≤$100,000 to >$5,000,000.  In order to properly identify 
the discussion as pertaining to either the single segmentation or the dual segmentation of 
the data, we will generally use the “overall” adjective when referring to the single 







PD Estimation for Dual Segmentations 
 
Table 3.3 gives the estimated PD by Size Bucket and RR.  These figures, on the overall 
or single segmentation level, correspond to the weighted average annual default rate 
values calculated in Chapter 2 and presented in Tables 2.10 and 2.12.  Figure 3.2 gives a 
visual representation of the data found in Table 3.3.  Specifically, we observe that the 
overall Financing Company PD is equal to 4.6%.  As expected, PDs generally increase 
with RR, such that the RR with the lowest PD is the 1 RR (0.7%) and the RR with the 
highest PD is the 9 RR (12.7%).  In terms of Size, we observe that overall, the PD 
decreases monotonically with Size Bucket, so that the highest PD is found to be 8.3% for 
the smallest Size Bucket (≤$100,000) and the lowest PD is found to be 1.2% for the 
largest Size Bucket (>$5,000,000).  These overall values correspond to the average PD 
values given in the second last rows of Tables 2.10 and 2.12. 
  
Both of these patterns, that of the positive relationship between PD and RR and that of 
the negative relationship between PD and Size are generally observed within Risk 
Ratings and Size Bucket segmentations.  By way of confirmation, we note that the lowest 
PD by Risk Rating and Size (0.2%) is found in the largest and safest (>$5,000,000 - 1 
RR) segment.  We note that this “lowest PD” is still significantly higher than the 
minimum PD of 0.03% stipulated in the Basel II IRB approach; see BCBS (2006, p. 67).  
In general, exceptions to the patterns noted above are limited, within RRs, to Size 
Buckets of $3,000,000 or more – for example, we note that the highest PD by Risk 
Rating and Size (14.3%) is found in the  $1,000,000 - $3,000,000 Size Bucket (9 RR), 
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thereby breaking the pattern of increasing PD by decreasing Size.  The next highest PD is 
(13.2%) in the smallest (≤$100,000) and riskiest (9 RR) segment with all other PDs 
following the pattern.  These exceptions may be generally attributed to low default and 
healthy borrower counts in the larger Size Buckets.   
 
Direct comparisons with other research is challenging in that in many cases the size 
granularity differs and in our cases the standard measure of size differs.  Conducting the 
same exercise, Dietsch and Petey (2004) find three broad categories of SMEs as defined 
by size, each with particular risk characteristics.  Defining their Size Buckets by turnover, 
they find that small (or very small) firms with turnover less than €1m can be 
characterized, by their estimated PDs, as being less risky than medium-sized SMEs with 
turnover of €1m to €7m.  In addition, these medium-sized SMEs are found to be riskier 
than larger SMEs with turnover of €7m to €40m, thereby forming an inverse-U shape of 
PDs in relation to Size.  
 
Table 3.2 includes a broad one-time mapping from the Financing Company Size Buckets 
to average annual sales per borrower over data collected from 2009 to 2011.  The Table 
shows that on average, the Financing Company borrower sales amount to approximately 
$5m, while those of small borrowers (in Size Buckets of $250,000 or below) amount to 
$3.6m annually.    Two broad borrower Size Buckets, that of the $1,000,000 - $5,000,000 
Size Bucket and that of the >$5,000,000 Size Bucket are identified with annual sales 
figures greater than $6.25m – the formal threshold below which borrowers receive a 
maximum size-based reduction of capital charge.  This mapping therefore corresponds to 
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the broad brush strokes with which we approach the calibration of the AIRB model with 
respect to the size adjustment, keeping in mind that our implementation would, in most 
cases for borrowers in Size Buckets of $1,000,000 or more, result in a higher size 
adjustment than that available using annual sales figures by borrower.  In later 
terminology, the impact of loan Term-to-Maturity on Basel II capital requirements will 
be evaluated under Cases 6a and 6b. 
 
As previously noted, Dietsch and Petey (2004) find that PDs vary with Size. As is clear 
from the discussion above, this result corresponds to our findings which show significant 
variations in PDs across Size, even within RRs.  In fact, our findings indicate that Size 
plays a bigger role the lower the RR, so that less risky companies are much likelier to 
default if they’re small, while for riskier companies size plays a smaller role in 
determining their PD.   
 
From Table 3.3 we can show that the ratio of PDs for the ≤$100,000 Size Bucket to those 
for the >$5,000,000 Size Bucket gradually decreases from approximately 13 for the 1 RR 
and 11 for the 2 RR, to the range 5 – 6 for the 3 – 7 RRs, and finally to 2 for the 8 – 9 
RRs.  To ensure that our results are not being biased by the low default counts in the 
>$5,000,000 Size Bucket, we conduct the same exercise using the ≤$100,000 and 
$250,000 - $1,000,000 Size Buckets.  The results confirm our initial findings and show a 
ratio of approximately 6 for the 1 RR, decreasing to a range of 2 – 3 for the 2 – 7 RRs, 




We extend our analysis and segmentation to the industry level.  Table 3.4 provides the 
PD for Industry-RR segments; see Figure 3.3 for a visual representation.  Overall, we 
observe that the BUS and MAN industries exhibit the highest PD.  In addition, we 
observe that while the pattern of increasing PD with RR is upheld for all industries, 
exceptions are most notably observed for the 2 RR – wherein a drop in PD is observed 
when compared to the 1 RR.  Observing the data by segment, we note that the highest 
PDs are observed in the MAN-9 RR segment (15.4%) and the WHS-9 RR segment 
(14.0%).  For most Risk Ratings, the BUS industry exhibits the highest PDs while the 
SOP industry exhibits the lowest PDs.   
 
For completeness we explore the PD of the Industry-Size segments.  Table 3.5 shows that 
the ≤$100,000 Size Bucket in the MAN industry exhibits the highest PD (10.3%), 
followed by ≤$100,000 Size Bucket in the WHS industry.  Generally, we observe that for 
most industries, PDs decrease with increasing Size.  We note that for the >$5,000,000 
Size Bucket the OTH, RES and TRS industries exhibit data deficiencies and so are 
assigned overall >$5,000,000 Size Bucket average PDs in Table 3.5.  Figure 3.4 provides 
a visual representation of PDs by Industry and Size Bucket. 
 
Summarizing results for Size and RR segments, we write:   
 
1. PDs are observed to be generally decreasing with Size when controlling for credit 
quality, as well as overall.   
 
2. The lower the RR, the bigger a role Size plays in defining the riskiness of the 
borrower: The discrepancy between small and large SME borrowers’ probability 




Finally, we note that the data time series used in our exercise is considerably longer that 
than used in Dietsch and Petey (2004), which was measured over the years 1995 to 2001 
for French borrowers and 1997 to 2001 for German borrowers.   
 
 
Section 3.3. Full and Partial Implementation of Basel II  
 
In the following we implement the Basel II Standardized Approach and IRB approach for 
the modeling of portfolio credit risk, as described in Section 3.1, under various 
assumptions.  Our objective is to show explicitly the effects of the various components 
and relationships in the IRB framework on the Financing Company SME portfolio 
correlations and capital charges.  To do so, we define our various implementations cases 
along with their specific assumptions.  For each case the overall portfolio capital charge 
is calculated and presented, along with a breakdown of capital charges by Size Bucket.  
This allows for direct comparisons between the various cases both at the overall level and 
by segment.  In addition, we calculate average asset correlations obtained under each 
implementation case for our Risk Rating and Size Bucket segments.  This comparison 
reveals a significant discount in Basel II capital charges as they pertain to the smallest 
borrowers. 
 
The data used to calculate the capital figures in the subsequent Subsections is comprised 
of the Financing Company portfolio, including internally calibrated PDs and LGDs, as 
described in Chapter 2.  In Subsection 3.3.1 we define the various implementations 
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performed in this Section.  In Subsection 3.3.2 average asset correlations are calculated 
while in Subsection 3.3.3 overall capital charges are presented and contrasted.  Capital 
charges by Size Bucket segment are discussed in Subsection 3.3.3 and Subsection 3.3.4 
presents conclusions for the Chapter. 
 
Subsection 3.3.1. Defining the Basel II Cases  
 
We start with an implementation of the Standardized Approach (SA), in which Corporate 
and Retail credit exposure risk-weight lookup tables – see, for example, Table 3.1 – are 
used to classify loans in the Financing Company portfolio.  As discussed in Subsection 
3.1.1, capital charges are calculated by multiplying the risk-weighted asset by 8%.  For 
the IRB approach, we implement the FIRB and the AIRB approaches under various 
cases.  
 
We proceed by delineating our implementations as the follows: Cases 1a and 1b present 
the FIRB implementation with the internally calibrated maturities for Case 1a and a 
maturity of 2.5 years for Case 1b; Case 2 presents the full AIRB implementation on the 
Financing Company portfolio; Case 3 presents what we refer to as the “naïve” 
implementation of the AIRB approach, classifying all of our exposures as Corporate 
exposures and withholding any maturity or size adjustments; Case 4 applies a size 
adjustment to the “naïve” implementation; Case 5 applies Retail – Other classifications, 
where applicable, to the “naïve” implementation, and Cases 6a and 6b in which the 
maturity adjustment is applied to the “naïve” implementation, using a maturity ceiling of 
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5 years (as per Basel II) in the former and no ceiling in the latter.  For a review of Basel II 
calibrations see BCBS (2005).  Cases 7a and 7d apply Case 3 and 5 specifications, 
respectively, to PDs calibrated for dual segmetnations of Risk Rating and Size Bucket. 
 
Our choice of cases focuses primarily on the treatment of Basel II IRB assumptions on 
credit characteristics and, in particular, how they relate to SMEs; see (i) – (iii) in the 
introduction to this Chapter.  Results for this exercise are generated using partial 
implementations of Equation (3.1), as well as Equations (3.2) and (3.3), for loans 
classified as Corporate, and Equation (3.4) for loans classified as Retail-Other; see 
Subsection 3.1.3.  Capital charges are calculated on the loan level and then aggregated by 
segment (e.g., RR-Size segments).  Results are presented as dollar-weighted percentages 
of aggregated exposures ($OS) for each segment, as well as for the overall portfolio. 
 
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 present asset correlations under the various cases described above, 
allowing for an incremental description of Basel II asset correlation construction for the 
Financing Company SME portfolio.  In addition, the use of PD calibrations taking into 
account borrower Size allows for comparisons with Basel II calibrations in which asset 
correlation relationship with Size is explicitly modelled.  In Chapter 4 we take this 
analysis further by presenting asset correlations calibrated from internal data with no pre-
specified relationships.  Table 3.8 presents capital charges under the various cases and 
allows for the independent observance of the effects of the various adjustments and 
treatments under the IRB framework.  Through Table 3.8 our work establishes the 
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portfolio credit risk characteristics of the Financing Company portfolio as compared to a 
benchmark value provided by the Basel II pre-calibration of risk components.   
 
Recall that under the AIRB approach the components are all internally measured, while 
under the FIRB approach only the PD is internally measured.  This signifies that under 
the FIRB the LGD is externally calibrated – Canadian banks are required to use the same 
measure of maturity as under AIRB – see OSFI (2011, p. 161).  Cases 1a and 1b (the 
Foundation IRB cases), use pre-set fixed LGDs of 45% for secured loans, and 75% for 
unsecured loans along with internally estimated PDs by Risk Rating.  For all other cases, 
the Financing Company downturn LGDs of 73% and 41% were used to obtain risk 
capital charges. Note our choice of pre-set fixed LGDs uses a more conservative 
interpretation of Basel II guidelines than the portfolio-wide use of 45% would; see OSFI 
(2011, pp. 152-153) for details.  No assumptions are made on the type of collateral used. 
 
Subsection 3.3.2. Average Asset Correlations under various Basel II cases 
 
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 present average asset correlations by Risk Ratings and Size Bucket 
segment under various implementations. Average asset correlations for each segment are 
calculated as straight averages across all loans in a given segment.  In particular, we 
observe average asset correlations for Cases 2 to 5, encompassing the full AIRB model 
implementation (Case 2), the naive model implementation (Case 3), the partial size-based 
adjustment implementation (Case 4) and the Retail-Other asset class implementation 
(Case 5), as well as for Case 7a which repeats the exercise in Case 3 using dual segment 
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PDs (by Risk Rating and Size Bucket) calibrated in this Chapter; see Section 3.2 and 
Table 3.5.    
 
In particular, Table 3.6 provides an incremental description of Basel II IRB asset 
correlations through our partial implementation exercise.  Starting with Case 3, we 
observe our “base case” or “naive” asset correlations, based on the Corporate asset 
correlation function given in Equation (3.3) - excluding size adjustments – and PDs 
calibrated by Risk Rating.  Overall, we observe decreasing asset correlations by Risk 
Rating (and, by extension, PD), and increasing asset correlation with Size.  This second 
pattern is attributed to the presence of an inverse relationship between asset correlation 
and PD in Equation (3.3) and the predominance of high risk borrowers in the smaller Size 
Buckets – thereby allowing those Size Buckets to benefit from the inverse PD 
relationship; see Table 2.2A and Section 2.2 for further descriptions of borrower 
distributions by Risk Rating and Size Bucket. 
 
The inclusion of the size adjustment in Case 4 yields asset correlations identical to those 
in Case 2 for borrowers in Size Buckets greater than $1,000,000.  The inclusion of size 
adjustments in Case 4 yields increasing asset correlations with increasing Size at the 
segment level such that borrowers in Size Buckets of $1,000,000 or less benefit from a 
maximum correlation discount of 4 percentage points while borrowers in the >$5,000,000 
Size Bucket benefit from a size-based asset correlation discount of only 1.2 percentage 
points.  The application of the Retail-Other asset classification for qualifying borrowers 
in Case 5 results in asset correlations identical to those of Case 2 for borrowers in Size 
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Buckets of $1,000,000 or less.  Combining these asset correlations with Case 4 asset 
correlations for borrowers in Size Buckets greater than $1,000,000, we obtain the Case 2 
results.   
 
As expected, Case 2 correlations for borrowers in Size Buckets of $1,000,000 or less, 
generally eligible for Retail-Other treatment, range between 3% and 12% and are flat 
across Size Buckets.  Borrowers in Size Buckets greater than $1,000,000, and treated 
under the Corporate asset class, show increasing asset correlations with Size.  In both 
cases the relationship between asset correlation and PD is maintained, however, we 
observe greater relative discrepancy among smaller borrowers for which the maximum 
asset correlations (found under RR 1) are four times those of the minimum correlations 
(found under RR 9).  For larger borrowers, that relative discrepancy is on the scale of two 
times.  This result, consistent with Basel II IRB specifications discussed in Section 3.1, 
can be contrasted with our findings in Section 3.2.1 which showed that the relative 
riskiness of borrowers is dampened by increasing Size.  The correlation patterns 
presented in Case 2 represent the mixture of Basel II pre-calibrated asset correlation 
relationship as they are applied to various segments of our SME portfolio. 
 
Table 3.7 once again presents average asset correlation results for Cases 2 and 3, 
alongside average asset correlations obtained from the application of Case 3 and Case 5 
specifications to PDs calibrated by Risk Rating and Size Bucket under Cases 7a and 7d, 
respectively.  The integration of the Size dimension on the calibration of PDs results in 
several patterns on asset correlations.  Comparing asset correlations under Case 7a to 
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those under Case 3, we observe the emergence of patterns by Size within Risk Ratings. 
Overall, average asset correlation values are higher for all Risk Ratings while the two 
smallest Size Buckets exhibit lower asset correlations.  This pattern is generally repeated 
with the ≤$100,000 and $100,000 - $250,000 Size Buckets exhibiting lower asset 
correlations under Cases 7a and 7b and all other Size Buckets exhibiting generally higher 
asset correlations, when compared to Cases 3 and 5, respectively.   
 
As in Case 3, the underlying dynamics driving these patterns are the PD levels within 
Risk Rating – Size Bucket segments relative to overall Risk Rating PD levels; see Table 
3.3.  Comparing to asset correlations under Case 2 we observe that internal calibrations 
incorporating Size generally amplifies the decreasing relationship between PD and asset 
correlations, resulting in greater discrepancies in asset correlation by Size.  In Chapter 4 
the Basel II assumption of decreasing asset correlations with PD will be removed and we 
will calibrate asset correlations from internal data without pre-set assumptions on 
behaviour and relationship with other credit risk factors. 
 
Subsection 3.3.3. Overall portfolio capital charges under various Basel II cases 
 
Instead of using the standard 2.5 year maturity (M) as specified in Basel II we follow the 
OSFI convention and use minimum of the actual loan maturity and 5 years in Case 1a.  In 
Case 1b, internal estimates for the average PD were used while Basel II estimates are 




As expected the use of higher values for maturity generates higher capital requirements 
for the portfolio.  Table 3.8 allows us to observe a decrease of 1.4% in the overall capital 
requirement for the portfolio as a percent of the total portfolio $OS due to the fixing of 
maturities at 2.5 years, as observed in the difference between Cases 1a and 1b. 
  
Case 2 presents the implementation of the AIRB approach and indicates an immediate 
drop in the required capital amount, as compared to Case 1a, from 8.8% to 8.1%.  This 
result is not unexpected given that the change implemented is one of replacing one set of 
LGD figures (the pre-calibrated Basel II set) with another, lower value set (internally 
calibrated).  In both cases the same maturity and size adjustments are maintained, 
alongside Retail-Other classifications.   
 
In Case 3, we withhold any maturity or size adjustments in our calculation of capital 
charges.  Internally measured PD and LGD are used in conjunction with the Corporate 
claims risk-weighting function.  As a result – and as a base of comparison for other 
cases/implementations – a “base-case” required capital value of 8.5% is achieved, a value 
0.4 percentage points greater than that obtained under a full AIRB implementation, i.e., 
Case 2.   
 
In Case 4, the application of the size-adjustment to the Corporate claims asset correlation 
function results in a decrease in the required capital of 1.6 percentage points as compared 
to the “naïve” implementation.  The application of the Basel II size-adjustment to the 
Financing Company portfolio is based on a calibration of the Financing Company Size 
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Buckets to average annual sales for those borrowers with sales figures.  Table 3.2 shows 
that for all borrowers in the Financing Company portfolio, across all Size Buckets, 
average annual sales figures are less than $62.5m, thereby qualifying them for a size 
adjustment.  In addition, for borrowers in Size Buckets of $1,000,000 or less annual sales 
figures are such that those borrowers qualify for a maximum reduction in asset 
correlation of 4%.  The resultant decrease is generally anticipated given that 
approximately 75% of the Financing Company loans qualify for the maximal size 
adjustment, and 100% of the Financing Company loans are subject to some size 
adjustment resulting in lower asset correlations and thus, portfolio capital requirements 
two percentage points lower than those obtained in the “naïve” implementation. In 
Subsection 3.3.3 we will examine in capital allocations by Size Bucket as well as average 
PDs across Risk Ratings and Size Bucket segments. 
 
In Case 5, the Financing Company Size Bucket classifications, based on a borrower’s 
maximum commitment to the Financing Company at the time of his last authorization, 
along with the borrower’s $OS as of March 2009, are used to determine eligibility for 
classification under Retail–Other exposure.  Facilities to borrowers classified within Size 
Buckets of $1,000,000 or less, with $OS of $1.25m or less, qualify for treatment as 
Retail–Other exposures.  For the Financing Company portfolio, this classification applies 
to 75% of loans and 79% of borrowers.  The Retail-Other classification entails a 
reduction in the asset correlation limits of 8% and 24% under the Corporate exposure 
asset type to limits of 3% and 16%.  The resultant decreases in the capital requirements 
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can therefore be quantified as 1.6 percentage points as compared to the “naïve” 
implementation of the IRB model (Case 3).   
 
Case 6 details the effects of the maturity adjustment.  In Case 6a we implement the 
maturity adjustment while maintaining a maximum maturity of 5 years (or 60 months).  
This matches the implementation in Case 2 and the broad maturity assumption implicit in 
the Basel II methodology.  Case 6b allows for the maturity to vary to its fullest without a 
ceiling of 5 years.  Implemented in isolation (i.e., no size or retail treatments) on the 
whole portfolio we observe a 3.7 percentage point increase in the required capital (as 
compared to Case 3) for Case 6a and an increase of 11.7 percentage points for Case 6b.  
Table 3.2 provides a breakdown of maturities (in months) for the Financing Company 
portfolio and shows that loans to smaller SME borrowers generally have significantly 
shorter terms as compared to loans to larger SME borrowers.   
 
Our study of Size effects is enhanced by the use of internal calibrations by both Size and 
RR, and these results support our initial findings.  Case 7a maintains the Case 3 
specifications but uses PDs calibrated by RR and Size Bucket, while Case 7d uses the 
same PD calibration along with Case 5 specifications for borrowers eligible for Retail-
Other treatment.  Comparing overall capital charges, we observe a 1.6 percentage point 
drop under Case 7d as compared to Case 7a.  This drop matches that of Case 5 as 




Thus far, results as given in this Subsection have described capital charges as they pertain 
to the overall portfolio.  These results have centered on generally expected mechanics 
within Basel II, as applied to the Financing Company portfolio.  In particular, we observe 
that the removal of maturity and size adjustments, as well as the withdrawal of the Retail-
Other classification, results in higher portfolio capital charges.  In addition, we observe 
that all Financing Company borrowers qualify for size adjustments while 75% qualify for 
the maximal adjustment.  Table 3.2 demonstrates that large SME borrowers do in fact 
exhibit longer loan terms, and by extension higher Basel II capital charges, as compared 
to smaller borrowers, thereby supporting the assertion of Basel II maturity-based benefits 
to smaller borrowers – see (b.ii) in the introductory note to this Chapter and Jacobson, 
Linde, and Roszbach (2005).  In turn, we observe that approximately 75% of loans and 
79% of borrowers qualify for complete exclusion from the maturity adjustment through 
qualification for Retail-Other classification.   
 
Additionally, we observe that the application of Size-based adjustments, whether through 
the Corporate asset class asset correlation function, as in Case 4, or through the pre-
calibrated overall asset correlation range of the Retail-Other asset class, presents a 
significant decrease in capital charges.  To gain a better understanding of these changes 







Subsection 3.3.4. Capital charges under various Basel II cases by Size Bucket 
 
In Jacobson, Linde, and Roszbach (2005) the notion that SMEs are less risky than 
Corporate loans is challenged.  The authors argue that SMEs should not be accorded 
special treatment (reduced sensitivity to systemic risk; i.e., reduced asset correlations) 
under the Basel II IRB approach, and note that in most cases, SMEs not only have higher 
Expected Loss figures, but also higher Unexpected Loss or Value at Risk figures as well.  
In this Section our central interest has been to test the tenets under which SME capital 
charges are calculated given two alternative conceptual frameworks for the behaviour of 
defaulting SME borrowers.  These tests will underline the assumptions in the two 
conceptual frameworks under study, and calculate their impacts on capital charges and 
asset correlations.  In Chapter 4 these results will be compared against internally 
calibrated asset correlations and capital charges.  
 
In addition to overall results, Table 3.8 also allows for a breakdown of the results by Size 
Bucket so that for each Bucket, the average capital charge is displayed.  In particular, 
Table 3.8 allows us to observe several patterns and patterns in the calculation of capital 
charges across borrower Size Buckets.   
 
Taking the same approach as in Subsection 3.3.2 we attempt to explain patterns in Basel 
II AIRB (Case 2) capital allocation by Size Bucket through a sequential review of our 
partial implementations.  Specifically, we start by observing capital charges under Case 
3, wherein a pattern of decreasing capital charges with increasing Size Bucket is 
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immediately clear.  This pattern matches that of significantly decreasing PDs with 
increasing Size in Table 3.3, and moderately increasing asset correlations in Table 3.6.   
 
As expected, the application of the size-adjustment in Case 4 yields significant capital 
charge deductions for the smallest borrowers.  Specifically, we observe a drop in capital 
charges of 3.9 percentage points for borrowers in the ≤$100,000 Size Bucket, decreasing 
to 0.5 percentage points for borrowers in the >$5,000,000 Size Bucket.  This discrepancy 
in size-based deductions yields an alternate capital charge allocation in Case 4 when 
compared to Case 3 in that we now observe an uptick in capital charges for the largest 
borrowers as compared to those in the $3,000,000 - $5,000,000 Size Bucket.  Segmenting 
our portfolio into borrowers in Size Buckets of $1,000,000 or less and borrowers in Size 
Buckets greater than $1,000,000, we can then classify two capital allocation patterns: 
Specifically, we observe decreasing capital charges with Size for the smallest borrowers 
and a U-shaped pattern in capital charges for larger SME borrowers due to a dissipation 
of Basel II size-based asset correlation reductions.  As can be seen in Table 3.8, this 
pattern will be repeated under all cases in which the size adjustment is applied – 
including Cases 1a, 1b and 2.  We will return to this interesting characteristic of the Basel 
II capital allocation framework in Chapter 4. 
 
The application of the Retail-Other capital treatment to eligible borrowers results in large 
drops in capital charges to borrowers in Size Buckets of $1,000,000 or less when 
compared to Case 3.  As in Case 4, these capital charge deductions are decreasing with 
Size, with a maximum deduction of 9.5 percentage points for borrowers in the ≤$100,000 
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Size Bucket, decreasing to a capital deduction of 5 percentage points for borrowers in the 
$250,000 - $1,000,000 Size Bucket, and 0 percentage points for larger borrowers.  Cases 
6a and 6b present capital charges including an adjustment for loan term maturity.  As 
discussed in Section 3.1, this adjustment increases with loan term and decreases with PD; 
see Equation (3.2).  In Case 6b, wherein maturities are not capped, we observe decreasing 
capital charge increases, over Case 3, with increasing Size.  This result corresponds to 
our finding of increasing loan term maturities with increasing Size.  Case 6a presents 
generally flat capital charge increases, of approximately 4 percentage points, across Size 
Buckets.  This result can be traced to the imposition of a maximum term maturity of five 
years in Case 6a.  Another interpretation can be found in an examination of this increase 
in capital charges as a percentage of Case 3 capital charges.  This comparison yields an 
increase percentage change, from 25% for the smallest borrowers to 50% for the largest. 
 
Turning to capital charge results under the SA implementation, two flat levels of capital 
charges are observed, with capital charges of 6.0% applied to borrowers in Size Buckets 
of $1,000,000 or less and charges of 8.0% applied to larger borrowers.  In Cases 1 and 2, 
borrowers are once again segregated into two groups, with smaller borrowers in Size 
Buckets of $1,000,000 or less receiving lower capital charges than their larger 
counterparts.  However, instead of flat capital charges across the two groups, we observe 
distinct patterns in each group.  For the smaller borrowers, we observe decreasing capital 




Finally, Table 3.9 presents Case 2 capital charges by Risk Rating and Size Bucket 
segment.  Results show U-shaped capital charges such that capital charges for borrowers 
in Size Buckets of $1,000,000 or less have decreasing capital charges with increasing 
Size and borrowers in Size Buckets greater than $1,000,000  have increasing capital 
charges with Size.  These two patterns are generally repeated within each Risk Rating, as 
well as overall, and provide a decent summary of the discussion in this Subsection.  
Capital charges will be further explored in Chapter 4 using internally calibrated asset 
correlations and probabilities of default.  
 
 
Section 3.4. Summary of Basel II Partial Implementations 
 
Our review of Basel II approaches to portfolio credit risk focused on the prudential 
guidelines’ treatment of SME borrowers.  Specifically, we observed that SME borrowers 
were accorded significant discounts in capital charges as programmed into the Basel II 
portfolio credit risk frameworks.  These discounts were quantified by our use of a partial 
implementation exercise in which specific assumptions and calibrations in the Basel II 
framework were toggled on and off.  Proceeding in such a manner we were able to 
establish capital charge sensitivities to certain assumptions as compared to natural capital 
benchmarks.  Two benchmarks against which we compare resultant capital charges are 
the full Basel II AIRB implementation (Case 2) and the naïve implementation of the 




In particular, we find that the removal of almost all Basel II pre-calibrations, as under 
Case 3, yields very large increases in capital charges to the smallest borrowers and 
accords the largest borrowers significant discounts, as compared to Case 2.  In addition, 
we find that the application of Case 3 results in significant change of size-based capital 
charge patterns as compared to Case 2.  Staring from Case 3 and working our way back 
to Case 2, we attribute these changes largely to the use of two different treatments, the 
Retail-Other and the Corporate asset class treatments, on our portfolio of SME borrowers.  
In particular, we find that the introduction of the Retail-Other classification (as in Case 5) 
yields, for the smallest borrowers, a reduction of capital charges from 16.6% to 7.1% - 
levels consistent with Case 2.  For larger borrowers, we find that the introduction of size-
based adjustments to asset correlations for the Corporate asset class yields a reversal of 
capital charge patterns so that the largest borrowers are allocated capital charges higher 
(6.9%) than most smaller borrowers (ranging from 6.3% to 6.8%).  Case 2 capital charges 
are finally obtained by accounting for increased capital requirements for longer loan 
term-to-maturities. 
 
A central objective of this Thesis is to determine which of the two benchmarks outlined 
above, and their associated contradictory capital charge patterns, more closely 
approximates reality as observed in the Financing Company portfolio of SME borrowers.  
This objective is pursued in Chapter 4 through the estimation of a single factor asset 
correlation model, as done in Section 4.3.  In Chapter 5, this analysis is enhanced by the 
use of an alternate model in which correlations are explored through single- and multi-




Finally, and in conjunction with our determination of SME capital charge patterns, our 
work in this Thesis will also seek to estimate SME credit portfolio correlations and 
thereby test which of the Basel II SME asset correlation settings most closely 
approximates those found in a real-world SME loans portfolio.  Namely, our work in this 
Chapter revealed two settings for SME asset correlations.  The first setting, obtained 
under the Retail-Other treatment, SME borrower asset correlations show no relation to 
borrower Size and show significantly lower sensitivities to borrower PDs, as well as 
generally low overall values.  This setting nevertheless yields a pattern of decreasing 
capital charges with increasing Size.  In the second setting, obtained under the Corporate 
asset class treatment, Size and PD relationships with asset correlation play a more 
prominent role, such that capital charges form a U-shaped pattern with increasing Size.   
 
Presented in this way our results allow us to underscore two broad frameworks for the 
study of portfolio credit risk: patterns in capital charges across various size segments in 
our SME portfolio, and; asset (and default) correlations patterns and levels that operate 





Chapter 4. An Asset Value Model for Portfolio Credit Risk  
 
In Chapter 3 we saw that Basel II presented a generally lower capital charge for SMEs.  
However, this lower capital setting for SME borrowers, and in particular, the mechanisms 
through which it has been implemented, has come under scrutiny in the portfolio credit 
risk modelling and management literature.  For example, Jacobson, Linde, and Roszbach 
(2005) and Dietsch and Petey (2004) test some of the SME assumptions made in Basel II 
on specially constructed data sets of aggregated credit portfolios.  Despite the breadth of 
these data sets, however, the time series over which probabilities of default and 
correlations are measured have a generally restricted span. 
 
Chapter 2 presented a general abundance of default data in the Financing Company’s 
historical portfolio.  Here we construct additional segmentations to those observed in 
Chapter 2 and use them to explore the SME relationships modeled in Basel II.  In 
particular, we use dual segmentations to estimate probabilities of default and correlations 
for various Size and Risk Rating segmentations.   
 
This depth of SME default data is then used in a calibration exercise wherein explicit 
segmentations of borrowers according to size and credit quality allow for direct tests of 
Basel II pre-calibrations and assumed relationships.  This work is similar both in spirit 
and technique to that of Dietsch and Petey (2004).  We use the internal calibration 
methods of the Gordy (2000) single-factor portfolio credit risk model to measure asset 
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correlations by risk and size segment, and explore the relationship between correlations – 
and by extension portfolio credit risk charges – along these borrower dimensions.   
 
The use of this technique is doubly informative given the genesis of the Basel II IRB 
model as an implementation of work by Merton (1974), Vasicek (2002), and Gordy 
(2003).  In addition, the estimation of asset correlations under various calibrations within 
a single-factor credit risk framework provides an easily implementable and comparable 
avenue along which to explore SME portfolio credit risk portfolio characteristics.  To that 
end, our results in this Chapter demonstrate that for the Financing Company SME 
portfolio, the relationship between asset correlation and size, as well as those between 
asset correlation and probability of default, can differ to a large extent from those pre-
calibrated in the Basel II portfolio credit risk mechanism.   
 
In estimating asset correlations, greater emphasis is placed on the data quality of the time 
series over which defaults are counted.  In particular, it becomes imperative that the 
default series be adequately populated, with both healthy and defaulted borrowers, such 
that an accurate understanding of default behaviour in a given segment is achievable.  To 
that end we introduce several amalgamations of our previously defined Risk Ratings and 
Size Buckets, refered to as Risk Groups and Size Groups.  The aim of these amalgamated 
groups is to bolster our estimation of correlations and their relationship with other credit 
characteristics among SME borrowers.  In order to ensure an unbiasedness in our 
construction of Risk Groups we present several definitions and use cross comparisons 




Having estimated asset correlations reflective of the SME credit characteristics found in 
the Financing Compnary portfolio, we apply them in the estimation of the portfolio credit 
risk as defined by the value-at-risk (VaR) and Economic Capital (EC) – or Credit-VaR 
(CVaR) – at a given confidence level. 
 
In particular, EC values are generated in both asymptotic and non-asymptotic 
implementations of a single-factor framework; here asymptotic refers to a portfolio with a 
large number of borrowers such that idiosyncratic risks are assumed to be sufficiently 
diversified so as not to contribute to portfolio risk.  This approximating asymptotic 
portfolio loss distribution is shown to hold even if borrower exposures are not uniform 
but with a large number of borrowers not one or a few of which are significantly larger 
than the rest Vasicek (2002)..  The asymptotic framework is directly comparable to a 
stripped down – or naïve – version of the Basel IRB model which is itself based on an 
asymptotic single factor model; Gordy (2003) showed that the asymptotic single factor 
model employed in the regulatory capital mechanism is uniquely able to provide a 
portfolio invariant framework for capital calculation, a necessary condition for regulators 
looking to apply a consistent standardized model across varying financial institutions.  
The non-asymptotic implementation uses Monte Carlo simulations to generate and 
allocate capital charges while taking into account explicit idiosyncratic risks present in 
the portfolio.  The juxtopostion of these asymptotic and non-asymptotic implementations 
within the same framework yields an interesting comparison and discussion of the 
“granularity effect” due to the application of an asymptotic model to a finite real-world 
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SME portfolio.  This granularity effect has been broadly discussed and dealt with in 
Gordy and Lutkebohmert (2007), BCBS (2006b), Tarashev and Zhu (2007), and other 
notable papers.  Tarashev and Zhu (2007) perform an analysis similar to that performed 
in this paper.  
 
Our analysis in this Chapter therefore focuses on two central aspects of portfolio credit 
risk modelling while using Basel II minimum capital regulations as a backdrop.  The first 
is the estimation of correlations as they relate to credit events in an SME portfolio.  The 
second focus of this Chapter is on capital charges generated by an SME portfolio using 
internally estimated asset correlations.    
 
Our results here will show that, contrary to Basel prescriptions, asset correlations can not 
be shown to increase with probability of default, nor can they be shown to strictly 
increase with size within SME segments.  These results compare starkly with findings of 
a generally increasing relationship between asset correlations and PDs in Dietsch and 
Petey (2004), Duellmann and Scheule (2003) and Gordy (2000) and a decreasing 
relationship in Lopez (2004) and, of course, BCBS (2006a).  For the relationship with 
Size, these results, in their general rejection of decreasing asset correlations with 
decreasing Size, run counter to the relationship programmed into the Basel II Corporate 
exposure class IRB function for SME borrowers, while the lack of a programeed 
relationship for the Retail-Other asset class suggests the recognition of a potential 
absence of such a relationship for the smallest borrowers.  Following Duellmann and 
92 
 
Scheule (2003), we frame our results on Size patterns with several hypotheses on the 
relationship found in the literature.  
 
In addition to these patterns, asset correlations estimated in this Chapter will also be 
characterized by generally low values.  However, these  values correspond in scale to 
those found in the literature.  Frye (2008) and Chernih, Henrard, and Vanduffel (2010) 
demonstrate that asset correlations derived from loss data – such as that employed here – 
consistently generate values to scale with those found in this Chapter, while asset 
correlations derived from market equity data generally produces asset correlation values 
on scale with those applied within Basel II.   
 
Applying these correlations within a single factor portfolio credit risk framework, we 
explore capital charge patterns along risk and size segmentations.  Our results will show 
that the overall value of measured asset correlations can have a significant impact not 
only on the overall portfolio capital charge but also on capital charge patterns by 
segment.   
 
In order to test and adjust for the results obtained with internally calibrated asset 
correlations, we apply a log odds adjustment to estimated asset correlations rendering 
their overall portfolio value on par with that obtained in Basel II.  Our results show that 
for asset correlations at the scale of those found in Basel II,  SME capital charges by Size 
should display a decreasing pattern.  As a final note, however, we echo Duellman and 
Scheule (2003, p. 21) and observe that macro-prudential factors, as well as micro-
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prudential ones, play an important role in the preset calibration of Basel II parameters and 
capital charges.  In this Thesis, these factors, e.g., the avoidance of pro-cyclical effects 
and the encouragement of looser credit conditions for small borrowers, are not considered 
as we focus on the micro-prudential factors reflected in the credit characteristics of an 
SME portfolio. 
 
More specifically, Chapter 4 is organized as follows: In Section 4.1 we expand on the 
asymptotic single factor origins of the IRB risk weighting function, examined in Chapter 
3 and Appendices A and B, and introduce a single factor model used for the estimation of 
SME correlations in our portfolio.  In addition, a Monte Carlo simulation procedure is 
built around the model allowing for the non-asymptotic estimation of portfolio credit risk 
for our portfolio.  In Section 4.2 we build on the work done in Chapters 2 and 3 by 
adding alternative dual-dimension segmentations.  These segmentations are used in the 
estimation of PD, PD volatility and both asset and default correlations.  Correlations here 
are estimated using the model introduced in Section 4.1.  In Section 4.3, PD and 
correlation estimates derived in Section 4.2 are applied in both the asymptotic and non-
asymptotic single factor models.  The results, presented in this way, provide an 
interesting avenue of study when compared to each other and the results obtained in 







Section 4.1. A Single Factor Model for Portfolio Credit Risk 
 
Recalling Section 3.1, Equation (3.1) can be reformulated as:  
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and,        .  Equation (4.2) is commonly referred to as the Vasicek distribution or 
function, as given in Equation (B.7).  In Appendix B, a full derivation of Equation (4.2) is 
given.  As previously noted, the Basel II IRB model is based on the Vasicek (2002) 
asymptotic approximation of the single risk factor model based on Merton (1974).  In this 
Chapter we use the underlying Merton (1974) framework in two capacities: as a model 
for the estimation of portfolio credit risk loss distributions; and as a tool for the 
measurement and estimation of default correlations within a given credit portfolio.   
 
In the first capacity, and in contrast to Chapter 3, we present the IRB risk weighting 
function as an asymptotic version of a single factor asset value model (AVM) for the 
determination of portfolio credit risk.  In this asymptotic framework idiosyncratic risks 
are assumed away.  We also present the framework as a non-asymptotic single factor 
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asset value model for portfolio credit risk in which a Monte Carlo simulation procedure is 
used to generate portfolio loss distribution, and in which systematic and idiosyncratic 
risks in the portfolio are explicitly modelled; see Subsection 4.1.1. 
 
In the second capacity, we use the framework, as presented in Gordy (2000), along with 
internally estimated PDs and PD volatilities, to non-parametrically estimate internally-
calibrated asset (and, by extension, default) correlations for our SME portfolio; see 
Subsections 4.1.2 and 4.2.2.  These correlations and their relationship to other credit risk 
measures and factors (e.g., PD, Size, etc…) are then evaluated and compared to values 
and relationships programmed into the Basel II IRB framework; see Section 3.1.  We 
compare results generated using the internally calibrated correlations and both the 
asymptotic and non-asymptotic versions of this framework; see Section 4.3.   
 
More specifically, asset correlation values, estimated by borrower segment, denote the 
dependence of borrowers in a given segment to a single underlying latent factor.  
Borrowers in different segments are allowed to have divergent dependencies on the same 
single factor, while borrowers in the same segment share the same dependence.  
Segments are defined along Risk and Size dimensions.  Proceeding in this manner, we are 
able to test Basel II assumptions on the relationship between asset correlation values and 
Size, and asset correlation values and riskiness (as represented by the segment PDs). 
 
Having generated our internally calibrated asset correlations, we define a non-asymptotic 
single factor model for portfolio credit risk.  The internally calibrated asset correlations 
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are used within this framework and a Monte Carlo simulation procedure is used to 
generate a portfolio loss distribution for our portfolio of SME borrowers.   
 
In Subsection 4.3.2, we input the internally estimated asset correlations from Subsections 
4.2.2 and 4.2.3 into an asymptotic single factor model.  The capital charges generated 
within this asymptotic framework are contrasted against those obtained in the simulation-
based non-asymptotic framework.  This comparison technique provides us with an 
estimate of the capital estimation error, in an SME setting, due to the application of the 
asymptotic framework to a real-world portfolio of finite granularity.  This work is similar 
in technique to that used in Tarashev and Zhu (2007).   
 
Finally, in addition to a comparison of overall capital charges for the portfolio, we 
examine two simple and commonly applied capital allocation schemes within our non-
asymptotic framework and compare them to the allocations under the asymptotic 
framework.  In order to ensure efficient comparability, allocation schemes are applied to 
the same simulation-based VaR value. 
 
Our results will indicate that the portfolio characteristics of a real-world portfolio with 
SME characteristics – high PD, low correlation values – may display a higher granularity 
effect when asset correlations are estimated from default data.  In addition, we will find 
that single exposure size is an important factor in determining capital charges, one that is 
not properly accounted for in some analytical and asymptotic allocation schemes; see, for 
example, Heitfield, Burton, and Chomsisengphet (2006).  In particular, we will challenge 
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the inclusion of size effects through correlation parameters, as is done in the Basel II IRB 
framework. 
 
Subsection 4.1.1. Internal Estimation of Asset Correlations 
 
In this Subsection we present the asset correlation estimation methods used in Gordy 
(2000).  In that paper the author proposes a calibration technique that allows for the 
common calibration of a single factor asset value model and a single factor 
implementation of the CreditRisk
+
 framework; see Credit Suisse (1997).  As such, the 
single factor model presented below plays several important roles in this Thesis.  On the 
one hand, it establishes the estimation technique used in Chapter 4 for the internal 
estimation of asset correlations for an SME portfolio.  This is doubly informative, not just 
as a stand alone model, but also as a basis for comparison with other studies such as 
Dietsch and Petey (2004) who also use this technique towards the estimation of SME 
correlations.  
 
On the other hand, this model and calibration method serves as a bridge to an alternative 
model for portfolio credit risk, as found in Chapter 5’s presentation of the CreditRisk+ 
framework.  Given the above, we now turn to the single factor asset value model 
presented below; for a review of the underlying mathematical and concentual concepts 




For a given segment (  ) of borrowers sharing some common characteristic, e.g., same 
RR, we define for each borrower (i) the standard normal latent factor      , such that: 
 
            √(     
 )                                               (4.3) 
 
where x is the systematic factor,    is the idiosyncratic factor and each is an independent 
standard normal variate.  Characterising the systematic factor as being representative of 
the state of the economy, borrowers’ dependence on the business cycle can be measured 
by the weighting     on x.  Given two borrowers from two different segments, (  ) and 
(  ), the covariance between their latent factors is then defined as: 
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Borrower, (i)’s status at the end of a given time horizon is set to default if: 
 
     √(     
 )     
  ( ̅  )                                         (4.5) 
 
where    ( ) denotes the inverse cumulative standard normal distribution function and 
 ̅   is the unconditional, or long-term, probability of default for segment (  ).   
 
In contrast to the Merton (1974) asset value model’s dependence on externally measured 
asset correlations in the determination of default correlations, the single latent factor 
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model relies on conditional default rate dynamics to determine asset correlations – see, 
for example, Dietsch and Petey (2002) and Dietsch and Petey (2004) – and, by extension, 
default correlations. Following Gordy (2000), and using Equation (4.5), borrower (i)’s 
probability of default conditional on a realization of the single systematic factor is given 
by: 
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with the joint probability of default for two borrowers (i) and (k) in the same segment 
(  ) is then given by:  
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Having explicitly established a link between our single factor latent variable model and 
the Vasicek distribution through Equations (4.2) and (4.6), we now use Equation (4.7), to 
define the variance of the conditional probability of default as a function of the asset 
correlation and the unconditional probability of default.  Then, using the method 
proposed in Gordy (2000), and our empirically calibrated unconditional probability of 
defualt and conditional probability variance we will estimate the representative asset 
correlation for segment (  ),    




Specifically, we write the variance for the conditional probability of default  (  ) ( ) as 
the following:  
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Given the assumptions of standard normality for the latent variables        and       , and 
the correlation    
 , based on Equation (4.4), the unconditional expectation in Equation 
(4.8) is given by: 
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so that:  
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Here we assume serial independence for the systematic factor realizations and conditional 
independence between borrower defaults; Dietsch and Petey (2004).  To calculate (   
 ), 
we first calculate the conditional variance    [ (  ) ( )] as a function of the data-
derived unconditional variance    [ (  ) ], the average number of healthy borrowers in a 
given segment  (  ) across the beginning of one year periods, and the unconditional 
probability of default for that segment, ( ̅  ); see, for example, Dietsch and Petey (2002, 
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Given the joint probability of default found in Equation (4.9), we can calculate the default 
correlation (DC) between two borrowers in the same segment (  ) as:  
 
     
       (   ( ̅  )  
  ( ̅  )    
 )   ̅  
 
( ̅   (   ̅  ))
                           (    ) 
 
Default correlation results will serve as a basis for comparison to default correlations 
calculated in Chapter 5 according to various segments.  
 
To estimate the unconditional probability of default and the conditional probability of 
default variance we use the methods described in Chapter 2 on the portfolio using the 
segmentation to be presented in Section 4.2.  Applying Equation (4.10) the representative 
asset correlation is then estimated for each segment.   
 
Subsection 4.1.2. The Single Factor Portfolio Credit Risk Model 
 
The question of credit portfolio allocations is an integral part of any economic capital 
methodology and is a continuing focus of research in the field, see, for example Mausser 
and Rosen (2008), Heitfield, Burton, and Chomsisengphet (2006) and Garcia, 
Alderweireld, and Leonard (2006).  In this Subsection we elaborate on the portfolio loss 
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distribution generating mechanism described in the introduction to this Section.  This is 
done through a discussion of the value-at-risk (VaR) and EL figures and their allocation 
to obligors in the portfolio.   
 
We use a Monte Carlo simulation method to draw realizations of the single systematic 
factor x, as well as realizations of the idiosyncratic factor   , for each borrower (i).  For 
each previously defined segment (e.g., Risk and Size) the corresponding internally 
estimated asset correlation is used to define the movement of the latent factor of a 
borrower in that segment according to the systematic factor and that borrower’s randomly 
generated idiosyncratic factor.  Default is assigned to borrower (i) if Equation (4.5) is 
found to hold.  Taking the exposure as given and multiplying by a given LGD a loss is 
calculated for a given loan.  Aggregating across borrowers we obtain a portfolio loss for a 
given draw of the systematic factor x.  Portfolio EC values are derived over 150,000 
simulations, the 99.9% VaR and the portfolio EL.  For each loan, capital is allocated 
according to average VaR contributions as measured across 300 realizations of a 99.9% 
VaR.  For each segment, EC values are given as the dollar-weighted average across all 
loans for borrowers in that segment.  EC values are presented along with the percentage 
change in EC in going from an asymptotic implementation to a simulation-based 
implementation. Taking the 99.9% VaR of the portfolio loss distribution and subtracting 
the portfolio EL yields an Economic Capital or risk capital charge for the portfolio.  The 
portfolio EL is calculated as the sum of the individual obligor ELs.   
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see, for example, Mausser and Rosen (2008. Pg 691).  Taking Equation (4.12), we then 
proceed by simply repeating our simulation procedure; for each execution, we save the 
     run, maintaining our realized obligor loss under an (      ) simulation.  For 
each obligor, we then average over our realizations and obtain a set of (  
    ) such that:  
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Section 4.2. PD and Asset Correlation Estimation for SME Segments 
 
In Chapter 2 we constructed Risk Ratings and Size Buckets that largely reflected the 
status quo within the Financing Company SME loans portfolio.  Organizing our portfolio 
along these credit risk dimensions, we were able to obtain a breakdown of portfolio 
segments, in terms of borrower and $OS distributions, as well as default rates over time 
by segment; for borrower and $OS distributions by RR and SB see Tables 2.2, for default 
rate time series and average rates by RR and SB see Tables 2.10 and 2.12, respectively. 
 
In Chapter 3, it was shown that these time series of default rates, along with loan $OS 
and estimates of LGD, were adequate for providing the necessary inputs needed for Basel 
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II IRB capital charge estimation.  Specifically, as noted in Section 3.2, Basel II requires 
that at least five years of default rate data be available in specifying probabilities of 
default by risk grade; see BCBS (2006, p. 102).  For the Risk Ratings specified in 
Chapter 2, recall, the average PD is calculated as the weighted mean of default rates over 
our sample period of 12 years.  This method represents industry best practice and is 
widely applied in the literature; see, e.g., Standard & Poor's (2011, p. 2) and Dietsch and 
Petey (2002, p. 311).   
 
In Chapter 4, we seek to calibrate the Merton-type asset value model (AVM) – an 
asymptotic implementation of which is used in the Basel II IRB approach; see, for 
example, Section 4.1 – to the internal data of the Financing Company.  This calibration 
involves the estimation of asset correlations for various segments of our portfolio, and 
will, in turn, provide us with empirical evidence on the SME credit risk relationships 
outlined in the Basel II IRB approach and programmed into functions defining the asset 
correlation for the Corporate and Retail asset classes; see Section 3.1.2 and, in particular, 
Equations (3.1) to (3.5).   
 
To that end, we move away from the Risk Ratings defined in Chapter 2 and organize our 
borrowers into four Risk Groups (RGs) according to Risk Rating:  Low Risk (comprising 
RRs 1-3); Medium Risk (comprising RRs 4-5); High Risk (comprising RRs 6-7); and 
Very High Risk (comprising RRs 8-9).  Collectively, these Risk Groups will be referred 
to as RGs.  Our definition of the RGs is primarily driven by the need to have significant 
numbers of default in every year of our default rates in order to obtain robust estimates of 
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default rates volatilities and, by extension, correlations.  As such, the Low Risk RG 
aggregates across the most RRs in order to garner enough defaults every year to render 
the data series suitable for analysis.  To ensure that our work doesn’t suffer from biases in 
the construction of RGs, we propose various constructions of adequately populated RGs 
and present PD and correlation results obtained for each of these alternative Risk and 
Size groupings.  These alternative groupings and their associated auxiliary Tables will be 
referred to extensively throughout the remainder of this Section. 
 
In addition, we define four Size Groups according to the Size Buckets over which they 
are aggregated.  Given the high populations of defaults among the smallest borrowers, the 
focus of the Size Group definitions will be on the largest borrowers in the portfolio.  To 
that end, we define the following Size Groups: the ≤$100,000 Size Group; the $100,000 - 
$250,000 Size Group; the $250,000 – $1,000,000 Size Group; and the ≥$1,000,000 Size 
Group, comprised of the $1,000,000 – $3,000,000, $3,000,000 – $5,000,000, and 
≥$5,000,000 Size Buckets.  Auxiliary Tables present alternative definitions of the largest 
SG alongside results by PD and correlation.  Auxiliary Tables will also include results for 
the original RRs and SBs defined in Chapter 2. 
 
Our work will show that for SME borrowers, relationships between asset correlation and 
Size and PD cannot be accorded simple linear attributes.  As seen in Chapter 3, this 
property among SME borrowers finds some support in the formulation of asset 
correlations in Basel II under the Retail-Other asset class, as well as support from the 
persistence of contradictory empirical evidence and hypotheses on these relationships in 
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the data in the literature; see, for example, BCBS (2005) and Duellman and Scheule 
(2003).  Our results will show low overall values for asset correlations for SMEs.  These 
results are in line with other literature in which asset correlations are estimated from 
default data; see Chernih, Henrard, and Vanduffel (2010) and Frye (2008).   
 
Whether due to calculation methodology or to underlying data type, quality or quantity, 
the presence of low asset correlations is not uncommon in the literature; see papers cited 
above.  When comparing to prudentially conservative regulatory asset correlation values, 
these low asset correlations can be a source of glaring incongruity.  In this Section we 
will present an ad hoc asset correlation boosting methodology, the application of which 
follows similar exercises in the literature; see, for example, Dietsch and Petey (2002). 
 
In Subsection 4.2.1 we construct our Risk and Size Groups and estimate probabilities of 
default using dual segmentations.  In Subsection 4.2.2 we apply the methodologies 
presented in Subsection 4.1.1 to estimate asset and default correlations overall for the 
portfolio as well as by Risk and Size Group segments.  In Subsection 4.2.3 we present an 
ad hoc asset correlation boosting methodology. 
 
Subsection 4.2.1. PD Estimation by Risk and Size Groups 
 
To construct our Risk and Size Groups we evaluate the number of defaults in the Risk 
Ratings and Size Buckets, both at the overall single dimension level and as segments of 
each other in a dual dimension setting.  Overall, our analysis indicates that sufficient 
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populations of default are attainable when the 1 to 3 Risk Ratings are collapsed into one 
another, forming the 1-3 Risk Group, and when the 8 and 9 RRs are collapsed into one 
another, forming the 8-9 RR.  We also find that, overall, the ≤$100,000, $100,000 - 
$250,000, and $250,000 - $1,000,000 Size Buckets have sufficient populations of 
defaults.  For the larger Size Buckets, we find that sufficient populations of default are 
attainable when the $1,000,000 - $3,000,000, $3,000,000 - $5,000,000, and >$5,000,000 
Size Buckets are collapsed into one another. 
 
Turning to Risk Rating – Size Bucket segments, we observe that an amalgamation of the 
4 and 5 Risk Ratings, into the 4-5 Risk Group, yields sufficient defaults by Risk Group – 
Size Group segment.  Our final five Risk Groups are therefore given by the 1-3 Risk 
Group, the 4-5 Risk Group, the 6 and 7 Risk Groups (Ratings) individually, and the 8-9 
Risk Group.  Our final four Size Groups are given by the ≤$100,000, $100,000 - 
$250,000, and $250,000 - $1,000,000 Size Groups (Buckets) and the >$1,000,000 Size 
Group. 
 
Table 4.1 provides probability of default estimates, along with PD variance and 
normalized standard deviations under the newly defined Risk Groups and Size Groups.  
For comparative purposes, Table 4.1A provides similar measures and statistics for the full 
range of Risk Ratings and Size Buckets presented in Chapter 2.  Going the other way, we 
reduce our RGs to three, as opposed to the 9 RRs and the 4 RGs defined above, by 




Overall, PDs are shown to increase monotonically with Risk Group such that PDs for the 
1-3 RG and the 8-9 RG are equal to 1.30% and 8.75%.  PDs by overall Size Group are 
shown to decrease monotonically as Size increase.  We therefore observe PDs for the 
smallest borrowers equal to 8.32% and PDs for the largest borrowers equal to 2.37%.  
This pattern in default rates by Size is not surprising given the distributions of borrowers 
by Risk Rating in each Size Group and Bucket; see, specifically, Table 2.2A. 
 
Observing our data by RG-SG segment, we observe that overall RG patterns are observed 
in all SGs.  We similarly observe a repeat of overall Size patterns in all RGs except the 8-
9 RG where a U-shape pattern is observed, such that, unlike other RGs, we observe an 
increase in the relative riskiness of borrowers in the >$1,000,000 Size Group as 
compared to those in the $250,000 - $1,000,000 SG.  This U-shape for the largest riskiest 
borrowers may be reflective of a willingness to tolerate elevated risk characteristics 
among smaller borrowers while acknowledging the severe circumstances under which a 
larger borrower would find himself in the elevated risk grouping.  Put another way, high 
PDs among larger borrowers in the 8-9 RG may be reflective of deteriorating financial 
conditions among those borrowers while decreasing PD patterns with increasing Size 
among other borrowers in the 8-9 RG may be reflective of the risk appetite at or near 
authorization for smaller borrowers.  These results are supported by findings in Table 
4.1A for the 8 and 9 RRs. 
 
In addition to results for the original Risk Ratings and Size Buckets, we present results 
for various alternative Risk and Size groupings.  In particular, we add the >$250,000 Size 
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Group, amalgamating the $250,000 - $1,000,000 and the >$1,000,000 Size Groups; as 
well as adding the 6-7 Risk Group.  Results for these additional Risk and Size Groups are 
presented in Table 4.1B and show supporting results.  In the case of the Size-based PD 
patterns in the 8-9 RG, we observe that the amalgamation of the $250,000 - $1,000,000 
and the >$1,000,000 Size Groups results in strictly decreasing pattern, without the up tic 
found in the >$1,000,000 Size Group in Table 4.1.  In Table 4.1A we present PD result, 
PD variance and PD normalized standard deviations under the original Risk Rating and 
Size Bucket segments defined in Chapter 2 and find that pattern results by segment lose 
their monotonicity but maintain overall patterns. 
 
In the next section we use the PD, PD variance and normalized standard deviation 
estimates of the segment-specific default rate time series to estimate asset and default 
correlations.  These estimates can be observed in the bottom panels of the Tables 
discussed above.   
 
Subsection 4.2.2. SME Single Factor Model Correlations by Risk & Size Group 
 
In Subsection 4.2.2 we use the single factor model described in Subsection 4.1.1 and our 
unique data set to challenge Basel II assumptions on the credit risk behaviour of SME 
borrowers.  Namely, we test the validity of a negative relationship between PD and asset 
correlation for SMEs throughout the IRB framework, as well as the positive relationship 
between borrower Size and asset correlation for the Corporate asset class.  Implicitly our 
estimates of SME asset correlations may be interpreted as a reflect on the lower Basel II 
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settings of asset correlations for SME borrowers – e.g., asset correlations in the range of 
3% to 16% for SMEs under the Retail-Other asset class as opposed to asset correlations 
in the 8% to 24% range for borrowers in the Corporate asset class; see Section 3.1.  
However, we cite work presented in Frye (2008) and Chernih, Henrard, and Vanduffel 
(2010) that may cause pause on that comparability.  
 
Size and Risk Groups present homogenous sets of borrowers for which representative 
asset correlations can be estimated.  We follow in the steps of Dietsch and Petey (2002, 
2004) and apply non-parametric internal calibration techniques found in Gordy (2000) to 
the Financing Company default rates and portfolio.  For the Size and Risk Group 
segments, Table 4.2 depicts the internally calibrated Financing Company SME asset and 
default correlations using the data presented in Table 4.1.  As in Section 4.2.1, we present 
results both on the overall level and the segment level, unlike Section 4.2.1, however, we 
do not find the presence of strong relationships between asset correlation and either RG 
or SG. 
 
Specifically, we observe an overall portfolio asset correlation of 0.34%, the lowest 
observed value in our portfolio.  For the overall RGs, we do not observe evidence of 
either monotonically increasing or decreasing patterns of asset correlation with PD.  
Specifically, we observe the lowest asset correlation values at the 8-9 RG (0.93%) and 
the 1-3 RG (0.98%), while the highest asset correlation values are observed at the 4-5 RG 
(1.49%) and the 7 RG (1.30%).  In Tables B.5 and B.6, asset and default correlation 
results are presented for the 6-7 RG and the >$250,000 Size Group, among others, 
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respectively.  For the overall RGs, results using the 6-7 RG show an inverse-U pattern in 
asset correlations, so that the two lowest values at the 1-3 RG and the 8-9 RG are 
maintained.  Under the full set of Risk Ratings and Size Buckets defined in Chapter 2, 
Table 4.2A asset correlations show no relationship with PD values at the overall RR 
level. 
 
For the overall SGs, we do not observe a pattern in asset correlation by Size over the four 
fixed SGs.  In particular, we observe the highest asset correlation for the $100,000 - 
$250,000 SG (0.77%) and the lowest asset correlation in the ≤$100,000 SG (0.34%).  
Once again turning to alternative SG segmentations in Tables B.4 and B.6, we observe an 
inverse-U pattern over three SGs in Table 4.2C, while no discernible evidence of a 
pattern is visible over the six SBs presented in Table 4.2A. 
 
Controlling for Size, and observing results horizontally across Table 4.2, we do not 
observe any discernible patterns in asset correlation with respect to PD among RG-SG 
segments.  This result is confirmed in Table 4.2B, in which the 6 and 7 RGs are 
amalgamated, for the three smallest borrower SGs, and emphasized by  the reversal of the 
only PD pattern that does appear: For the largest borrowers in Table 4.2, those in the 
>$1,000,000 SG, we observe a U-shaped pattern, while in Table 4.2B, wherein the two 
largest SGs are replaced by the >$250,000 Size Group, an inverse-U pattern for the 




Controlling for RG we examine asset correlation results vertically by RG-SG segment in 
Tables 4.2 and B.5.  In both Tables 4.2 and B.5, the 1-3 RG displays the opposite pattern 
to that found for the majority of other RGs, namely that of a U-shaped relationship 
between asset correlation and Size.  In Table 4.2C this combination of patterns is upheld 
over the three SGs evaluated with the 6-7 RG providing an alternative, increasing, pattern 
over SGs.     
 
Empirical work in Gordy (2000, p. 134), using the same framework used here in Chapter 
4, estimates asset correlations for various S&P risk grades and shows an increasing 
relationship with increasing PD.  In Dietsch and Petey (2002, p. 312) the authors evaluate 
asset correlations in an AVM framework across risk grades while controlling for Industry.  
Their results indicate a uniquely inverse-U pattern across risk grades, this pattern is 
characterized as generally increasing given low borrower counts in the highest risk grade.   
 
In Dietsch and Petey (2004, p. 780), SME asset correlations are evaluated over 
aggregated data sets of borrowers in France and Germany using three SME Size 
groupings and eight risk grades.  Results indicate a generally increasing pattern with 
increasing PD, overall, but no strict relationship - within Size groups the results show 
even less homogeneity in pattern.  Examining results by overall Size, the authors observe 
decreasing asset correlations with increasing Size over the three SME Size groups.  
Examining results by Size and PD segments, the authors observe a mixture of patterns; 




Lopez (2004, p. 273) finds evidence of decreasing asset correlations with increasing PD 
at the overall level for datasets of borrowers worldwide, in the US, Japan, and Europe.  
These results find some support when controlling for Size, however, a universally 
monotonic relationship is not clear; see Table 4, Lopez (2004, p. 275).  Examining 
overall results by Size, the author finds evidence of strictly increasing relationship across 
all geographically-defined portfolios; see Table 3, Lopez (2004, p. 274).  This result is 
upheld when controlling for PD; see Table 4, Lopez (2004, p. 275). 
 
Our results fail to confirm the presence of strict relationships between asset correlations 
and either PD or Size.  Taken in conjunction with low overall asset correlation values and 
comparing to Basel II IRB asset correlation settings under the Corporate and Retail asset 
classes, it is possible to say that our evidence resembles the latter more than former.  This 
assertion is bolstered by the lack of Size-adjustment in the Retail-Other setting, the lower 
overall asset correlation values, and the decreased sensitivity of asset correlation to PD.  
Nevertheless, our results maintain a general break with Basel II precepts.  In Chapter 5 
we present the CreditRisk
+
 framework for the estimation of portfolio credit risk and 
implied values of default correlation.  We will examine default correlation results 
obtained in this Subsection within the context of a comparison of these results with those 




In the following paragraphs we present a review of theoretical and empirical evidence on 
the relationships between asset correlations and both PD and Size as found in Duellman 
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and Scheule (2003, pp. 3-6).  The aim of this review is not to present new material but to 
use the existing material to enrich the results presented in this Chapter. 
 
 
More on the relationship between SME asset correlations and PD 
 
In Duellman and Scheule (2003) a brief outline of two theoretical arguments for the 
relationship between asset correlations and PD is presented.   
 
In the first argument, it is proposed that borrowers with elevated sensitivities to 
macroeconomic developments may choose more conservative capital structures, thereby 
reducing overall riskiness.  This theory then indicates that borrowers with higher asset 
correlations may display lower probabilities of default.   
 
In the second argument, it is proposed that if an increase in a borrower’s credit risk is 
initiated by idiosyncratic events, then the relative importance of idiosyncratic risks to 
systematic risks increases. 
 
More on the relationship between SME asset correlations and Size 
 
Duellman and Scheule (2003) present three tentative explanations for the presence of 
discrepancies in asset correlations by borrower size.  The first explanation, referred to as 
the “business sector argument” presents size discrepancies as proxies for varying 
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dependencies across industries.  Here, asset correlations are seen as a measure of 
dependence on a global business cycle.  This argument is bolstered by variances in 
predominant borrower sizes across industries.  More specifically, if highly cyclical 
industries are dominated by large borrowers and less cyclical industries are dominated by 
small borrowers, then we should expect that smaller borrowers to display lower asset 
correlations than larger borrowers. 
 
In Duellman and Scheule (2003), three sectors considered to be highly cyclical (recall 
they use German data) are presented: manufacturing; construction; and automotive, along 
with three sectors considered less cyclical: transport & communication services; health & 
financial services; and other public & personal services.  In the case of the first three, 
SMEs account for a small (approximately 15%) percentage of borrowers, while in the last 
three SMEs account for a significant percent of borrowers (between 30% and 40%). 
 
The second explanation presents large borrowers as better diversified firms as compared 
to their smaller counterparts.  This better diversification reduces idiosyncratic risks 
among large borrowers, thereby increasing their correlation to systematic risks relative to 
smaller borrowers.  This hypothesis is contested by Roll (1988) which presented 
empirical work suggesting that small firms displayed higher diversification than larger 
borrowers.  
 
Contrary to the first two hypotheses, the third hypothesis, referred to as the “financial 
accelerator” hypothesis, suggests that asset correlations are in fact inversely related to 
116 
 
borrower size.  The hypothesis, put forward in Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and 
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996) holds that smaller borrowers’ reliance on bank 
loans for financing, as compared to larger borrowers who can access capital markets, 
renders them more vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks and their effects on credit-
market conditions.  In particular, empirical work in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 
(1996) suggests this negative relationship between borrower size and asset correlation 
holds even when controlling for industry.  This effect may be mitigated, however, by the 
presence of strong bank-borrower relationships ensuring the availability of credit even 
periods of economic downturn, Duellman and Scheule (2003, pg. 21) and von Kalckreuth 
(2001). 
 
Subsection 4.2.3. Boosted SME Single Factor Model Asset Correlations 
 
The Basel II IRB framework reviewed in Section 3.1 provides for asset correlations 
ranging from 3% (applied to Retail-Other exposures; see Equation (3.4) for details) to 
30% (applied to the High Volatility Commercial Real Estate (HVCRE) asset class; see 
BCBS (2006a, p. 66) for details).  For SMEs, the range maximum is reduced to 20%; see 
Subsection 3.1.3.  Compared to these prudential regulatory levels, internally calibrated 
asset correlations derived in this Chapter within a single factor framework appear to be of 
a significantly lower level.  This discrepancy in the overall level of internally calibrated 
asset correlations and those found in the Basel II regulatory framework retains a sharp 
focus both in the academic literature and practical implementations of portfolio credit risk 




In particular, Chernih, Henrard, and Vanduffel (2010) review asset correlation results 
found in the literature and segregate them by source data type.  Their survey – replicated 
in Table 4.3 – suggest that the type of source data (i.e., default data vs. market-based 
equity data) may play a significant role in the setting of overall asset correlation levels; 
see Table 1 and Table 2 in Chernih, Henrard, and Vanduffel (2010, p. 53).  Citing this 
work, Frye (2008) observes that the maximum asset correlation obtained with observed 
defaults as the source data, is approximately 10%, with that figure dropping to 2.3% for 
some studies; see, for example, Hamerle, Liebig, and Roesch (2003b).  This maximum 
figure of 10% asset correlations, when estimated over default data, compares to a 
minimum of 10% asset correlations when estimated over equity data, and is attributed to 
observed and conceptual differences in the underlying data; see Frye (2008).  In addition, 
working with both default data, based on the observed number of defaults, and loss data, 
derived from provisions data, Duellman and Scheule (2003) show the default data 
provides the lowest overall levels of asset correlation. 
 
Commenting on low asset correlation levels obtained in their respective studies, Dietsch 
and Petey (2004) and Duellman and Scheule (2003) suggest that the use of aggregated 
data may engender some over-diversification within their data sets and therefore be a 
possible source of low correlation values.  Dietsch and Petey (2004) also suggest their 
shortened time series as a potential source of reduced asset correlations due to the lack of 




In contrast, our research benefits from the use of non-aggreagted data, specific to one 
institution targeting high-risk SME borrowers.  In addition, we benefit from a time series 
with 12 years of data.  Despite our longer time series, however, we observe that the 
period covered is comprised of a prolonged period of economic growth along with low 
volatilities in our observed default rates.  In particular, Table 4.4 compares normalized 
default rate volatilise obtained in our study with those observed in Standard & Poor's 
(2011) over the period 1981 to 2010.  As can be seen in Table 4.4, Financing Company 
normalized default rate volatilities are considerably lower than those observed over the 
Corporate defaults studied in Standard & Poor's (2011).  The presence of lower 
volatilities may be a significant contributor to low asset correlation values. 
 
While the 2008 - 2010 period added volatility to our data, the tameness of the Canadian 
2001 - 2002 economic slowdown may explain lower asset correlations compared to other 
studies.  Hamerle, Liebig, and Roesch (2003b) segregate their data into country and 
industry and estimate asset correlations using three models.  Results for Canada reveal a 
maximum observed asset correlation of approximately 0.6% as found in the Agriculture 
sector; see Exhibit 2 in that paper, pg 22.  For the Canadian Manufacturing and Services 
sectors, two sectors that together make up approximately half of the Financing 
Company’s lending portfolio (see, for example, Tables 2.5A and 2.5B), the authors 
estimate asset maximum asset correlations of approximately 0.3%.  These results 
compare to roughly equivalent results for France, maximum asset correlations of 




Finally, the asset correlation estimation algorithm described in Subsection 4.1.1 
corresponds to that found in Gordy (2000) and Dietsch and Petey (2004).  Duellman and 
Scheule (2003) estimate asset correlations within a similar single factor framework using 
three algorithms, the third of which most closely resembles that used in this Chapter, and 
shows that this method provides for the highest values as compared to other algorithms.  
In comparison, Gordy and Heitfield (2002) find that this methodology presents the 
greatest degree of inefficiency when compared to more restricted methodologies. 
 
Possible solutions in dealing with this phenomenon of low asset correlations may include 
the choice of time periods in which one or more full economic cycles are represented; the 
choice of high (or maximal) volatility periods, or the application of ad-hoc 
“conservatism” adjustments to the estimated correlations using external data which may 
provide required characteristics.   
 
Asset correlation boost retaining observed relationships between SME borrowers 
 
We perform an ad-hoc conservatism factor adjustment to the low level of asset 
corrlations obtained in our estimation.  This exercise is similar to that in Dietsch and 
Petey (2002) wherein an SME portfolio credit risk model is designed and estimated from 
SME default data.  Given findings of low overall asset correlation values, averaging 
approximately 2%, the authors input Basel II IRB asset correlations equal to 20% for 





In this Subsection, we take the average asset correlations across all loans in the portfolio 
under the Partial Implementation cases described in Subsection 3.3.2; specifically, see 
Table 3.6.  For Cases 2, 3 and 4 average asset correlations are found to equal 7.5%, 
15.0% and 11.3%, respectively.  Next, a bounded log odds ratio adjustment is applied to 
all segments such that the overall estimated asset correlation of 0.34% is equal to pre-
specified value.  For example, suppose that we want to adjust our estimated segment asset 
correlations {       } such that the overall asset correlation A is equal to some value B, 
subject to the condition that no segment asset correlation {       } is less than some 
lower boundary value L or greater than some upper boundary value U.  The applied 
adjustment to each segment asset correlation would then be given by the following: 
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The idea of these boosts, ultimately, is to provide internally measured asset correlations 
that can be practically applied within a prudentially concordant portfolio credit risk 
framework.  An important aspect of this practicality is the level at which asset 
correlations are set with respect to the international regulatory requirements presented in 
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Basel II and reviewed in Section 3.1.  To that end, we use 3% and 30% as the lower and 
upper bounds, respectively, in our adjustment.  Another important aspect is the 
embodiment of the credit characteristics in the patterns and relative differences of asset 
correlations among different segments of borrowers in an SME portfolio.  Our work up to 
Subsection 4.2.2 focused on the latter, in this subsection we addressed the former and 
presented a simple and common method for the augmentation of asset correlation levels 
to those present in the nationally applied regulatory frameworks.   
 
Table 4.7 presents the results of our boost by Risk and Size Group segmentations.  In 
both cases, the overall portfolio asset correlation is adjusted to the average asset 
correlation obtained in the full AIRB implementation (Case 2), equal to 7.4%; see 
Subsection 3.4.1.  As we will see later in this Chapter, the effects of this boost on the 
resultant loss distribution are non-negligible.  Capital charge results using these boosted 
values are given in Section 4. 3.  The boosted asset correlations presented in Table 4.7 
range between 9.0% (for the 7 – >$1,000,000 SG segment) and 18.6% (RR 4-5 – SG 
$250,000 - $1,000,000 SG segment).  As discussed above, patterns observed in 
Subsection 4.2.2 are maintained. 
 
RG- and SG-based Partial Implementation Average Asset Correlations 
 
Before moving on capital charge results we present an abridged restatement of Table 3.6 
under RG and RG-SG calibrations of our PDs.  Specifically, Table 4.12 presents restated 
average asset correlations under Cases 2, 3 and 7a.  Results are presented by RG and SG 
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segments and show the same patterns observed in Table 3.6.  In Table 4.12 the Corporate 
asset class specification is now applied to one RG (>$1,000,000) so that under Case 2, 
controlling for RG, we observe identical asset correlations for the smallest three SGs – 
treated under the Retail-Other asset class – and a significantly  higher average asset 
correlation for the largest SG.  Restated average asset correlations are found to be 
generally lower than those calculated in Chapter 3. 
 
Comparing results in Table 4.7 to those in Case 2 of Table 4.12 we find, as expected, a 
lack of Basel II-imposed patterns in our internally calibrated results.  In addition, we find 
that for the vast majority of SG and RG segments, internally-calibrated boosted asset 
correlations are higher than the average asset correlation in Case 2.  Exceptions to this 
observation occur in the RG 7 – >$1,000,000 SG segment (in which we find the lowest 
boosted asset correlations, recall) and the overall >$1,000,000 SG.  Table 4.13 presents 
discrepancies between internally-calibrated boosted asset correlations and Case 2 average 
asset correlations as ratios of the former to the latter.  Table 4.13 shows that the greatest 
discrepancies occur for smaller borrowers with high PDs, reflecting Basel II pre-
calibrations, with the most closely matched asset correlations are those for the 
>$1,000,000 SG. 
 
Subsection 4.2.4. Summary of PD and Asset Correlation Results  
 
In this Subsection we review the results obtained in Subsections 4.2.1 to 4.2.3, 
categorizing results as relating to Probability of Default and Asset Correlation, both 
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boosted and not boosted.  In addition, we present some quick results on the corresponding 
estimated Default Correlations.  Results on internally calibrated Financing Company 
SME Probabilities of Default by Risk and Size Group are found in Tables 4.1, and B.1 to 
B.3; results on internally calibrated Financing Company SME asset and default 
correlations are found in Table 4.2, and B.4 to B.6; while, results on boosted Financing 
Company SME asset and default correlations are found in Table 4.7. 
 
Results for Probabilities of Default 
 
1. Probabilities of Default increase with overall RG and within all RG-SG segments 
when controlling for Size. 
 
2. Probabilities of Default decrease with overall SG. This result holds within all Risk 
Groups except riskiest, RG 8-9, and is potentially indicative of alternative risk 
appetites in different Size Groups.   
 
Results for Asset Correlations 
 
1. Estimated asset correlations are much lower than those found in Basel II, such 
that all segments exhibit asset correlations lower than the Basel II programmed 
minimum of three percent. This is not uncommon in the literature; possible 
explanations may include reduced default rate means and volatilities over the time 
period of measurement, and the use of default data versus other sources such as 
loss data or market-based data. 
 
2. Our results suggest that asset correlations are closer in value and behaviour to 
those found in Basel II IRB Retail-Other specification as opposed to those found 
in the Corporate asset class specifications for SMEs.  Specifically, we find that 
there is no fixed relationship between asset correlations and Size, nor is there a 
fixed relationship between PD and asset correlation.   
 
3. These results run counter to the Size-asset correlation relationship programmed 
into the Basel II IRB Corporate asset class risk-weighting function, and the PD-
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asset correlation relationship found in both the Retail-Other risk-weighting 
function.   
 
4. Boosted asset corrlations maintain the patterns observed in the internally-
calibrated SME asset correlations, but are adjusted to average asset correlations 
obtained under Case 2, or the full Basel II AIRB implementation. 
 
Results for Default Correlations 
 
1. Internally calibrated default correlations show an increasing pattern with 
increasing Probability of Default, overall.  When controlling for Size this pattern 
is harder to discern and is only found to hold under the $100,000 - $250,000 SG.  
 
2. Similarly to asset correlations, internally-calibrated default correlations show an 
inverse-U pattern with Size.  This pattern holds at the overall level and when 
controlling for RG. 
 
3. Boosted default correlations display similar patterns to internally calibrated 
default correlations reviewed above. 
 
 
Section 4.3. Internally Calibrated Single Factor Model Capital Charges 
 
In Section 4.3 we calculate capital charges for the Financing Company portfolio using the 
internally-calibrated asset correlations derived in Subsection 4.2.2 and the boosted asset 
correlations calculated in Subsection 4.2.3, in contrast to the pre-calibrated values 
presented in Basel II and applied in Section 3.3.  The use of PDs and asset correlations 
estimated along the dual segmentations presented in Section 4.2 will directly incorporate 
Size as a measurement dimension.  This exercise will provide further insights on the 
credit characteristics of SME borrowers as based on a real-world SME portfolio and as 
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compared to the SME settings programmed into the Basel II regulatory capital 
mechanisms. 
 
Our results will show that the full Basel II implementation (Case 2, as defined in Chapter 
3) may suffer from misallocation of capital.  This is especially evident in comparison to 
an internally calibrated simulation-based implementation of the single factor AVM on our 
SME portfolio.  Specifically, we observe that smaller SMEs are severely undercharged 
under Basel II while larger SME borrowers have a significant surplus in capital charges.  
These results are amplified when Size is explicitly used as a dimension in PD and asset 
correlation calibration.   
 
Internally-calibrated capital charges are calculated using two single factor models.  The 
first is the asymptotic single factor model derived in Appendix B and evaluated in 
Section 4.1 as the basis for the IRB risk weighting function.  This model is essentially the 
Case 3 model implemented with internally calibrated asset correlations instead of those 
programmed into the IRB Corporate risk weight function.  The second model is the 
asymptotic single factor model’s non-asymptotic counterpart, introduced in Subsection 
4.1.2, in which a Monte Carlo simulation procedure is included for the estimation of a 
portfolio loss distribution.  In this model, the internally-calibrated asset correlations are 
used to generate loss scenarios for the portfolio, the portfolio capital charge is then 
calculated as the value-at-risk figure at the 99.9% confidence interval less the Expected 




The ensuing comparison between results from identically-calibrated asymptotic and non-
asymptotic models allows for the study of the approximation error generated by the 
application of an asymptotic model to a finitely grained portfolio.  This effect, better 
known as the granularity effect, has been a source of research since the introduction of 
the Basel II accord’s IRB risk weight function.  In particular, BCBS (2006b) reviews 
model-based methods for the measurement and mitigation of granularity effects, as 
presented in Gordy and Lutkebohmert (2007), Emmer and Tasche (2003), and Vasicek 
(2002).  Our study of the granularity effect is similar in style to that conducted in 
Tarashev and Zhu (2007).   
 
Our results will that show low overall asset correlation values can have serious impacts 
on a portfolio’s measured granularity effect, so that even finely granular portfolios will 
display significant underestimation of overall portfolio capital charges when idiosyncratic 
risks are not explicitly modelled – to our knowledge this is the first explicit link between 
asset correlation values and granularity effects in the literature.   
 
Results generated in this Chapter, will also shed light on the allocations of capital to 
borrowers of different Size under asymptotic and non-asymptotic implementations of the 
single factor framework.  We will show that an asymptotic model and allocation scheme 
cannot conceptually account for significant idiosyncratic risks among the largest SME 
borrowers.  This result is shown to dissipate with elevated asset correlation values.   
 




We start by defining the Cases that we will implement. These will be less involved than 
the Cases defined in Chapter 3 and will focus on two calibrations of SME asset 
correlations, those along the single dimension RG, and those along the dual dimension 
RG-SG. 
 
Continuing from Section 3.3, we recall Case 7a as the naïve model used in Case 3 but 
using PDs calibrated along the RG-SG dual segmentations of Chapter 4.  This 
implementation allows for a direct comparison with Case 3 in which Size was not a 
dimension accounted for in the PD calibration, we will only present an asymptotic 
implementation of this Case.  Case 7b represents the first fully internally-calibrated 
implementation of the single factor asset value model (AVM) in both its asymptotic and 
simulation-based forms.  Case 7b takes us from the naïve model implementation of Case 
7a – in which Corporate asset class correlations are maintained, along with a negative 
relationship with PD – to a fully calibrated model in which internally-calibrated asset 
correlations are used.  As in Case 7a, a dual RG-SG segmentation is used.  Recall, PD 
values are presented in Table 4.1 and asset correlation values in Table 4.2, both are 
derived in Section 4.2.  Case 10 uses the same single factor AVM framework used in Case 
7b with calibrations of PD and asset correlations by Risk Group alone.  Both Case 10 and 
Case 7b will be implemented in both their asymptotic and simulation-based forms. 
 
Results generated in the asymptotic cases are derived as in Section 3.3, at the individual 
loan level, using Equation (4.2), the loan $OS and LGD, and subtracting the loan EL – as 
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discussed in Section 4.1.  Excluding pre-calibrated asset correlation and maturity 
adjustments, this is equivalent to the Basel II IRB risk weighting formula presented in 
Equation (3.1).  Results are aggregated by segment and presented as dollar-weighted 
averages of capital charges as a percent of $OS.  In the simulation-based implementation 
of the single factor model, portfolio capital charges are generated for the portfolio as a 
whole and then allocated back to obligors. 
 
For comparative purposes, we regenerate Tables 3.6 to 3.8 under the Risk and Size 
Groups defined in Section 4.2.  Average asset correlation results for the Basel II partial 
implementation exercise using RGs and SGs are given in Table 4.5 while capital results 
are given in Table 4.6.  In Table 4.7 boosted asset correlations, and corresponding default 
correlations, are given according to the methodology presented in Section 4.2.3, the PD 
and internally-calibrated asset correlations of presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, and the 
restated average asset correlations of Table 4.5.   
 
In the following Subsections we will present Financing Company portfolio capital 
charges derived using internally-calibrated PD and asset correlation values, both boosted 
and not boosted, under asymptotic and simulation-based implementations of the AVM.  
Jumping straight to a comparison of boosted capital charges with Basel II (Case 2) 
charges, Subsection 4.3.2 discusses capital charges generated under simulation-based 
implementations with boosted asset correlation values calibrated under RG (Case 10) and 




Subsection 4.3.2. Internally Calibrated Capital Charges versus Basel II  
 
In this Subsection we will compare internally calibrated simulation-based capital charges 
using boosted asset correlations calibrated to RG-SG segments, to Basel II (Case 2) 
capital charges.  Our results will show a lower capital charge of 7% as compared to 8.2% 
under Basel II.  In addition, observing capital charges by overall SG, we note that 
internally-calibrated capital charges display a strictly decreasing pattern with increasing 
Size, as opposed to the Basel II U-shaped pattern in capital charges by Size.  This 
decreasing pattern has particularly strong implications for the smallest SME borrowers 
who, under the internal calibration, receive capital charges equal to up to three times 
those under Basel II.  By contrast, capital charges for the largest SME borrowers are 
approximately half what they would be under Basel II.   
 
In order to adequately assess the impact of using internally calibrated asset correlations in 
the calculation of capital charges we turn again to Case 2, the full AIRB implementation.  
In Table 4.6 we observe that the use of Retail-Other asset classification results in 
significantly lower capital charges to the smallest SME borrowers as compared to their 
larger SME counterparts.  Specifically, we observe that the smallest borrowers, those in 
the ≤$100,000 Size Group, are charged approximately three quarters the capital assigned 
to the largest SME borrowers, those in the >$1,000,000 Size Group.  This discount in 
capital charges is enhanced by the negative relationship between asset correlations and 
PD, the positive relationship between asset correlations and Size, and the presence of 




In Case 3, recall, the use of the Retail-Other classification is dropped, as are Size and 
Maturity effects, however, the Corporate asset class correlation function’s inverse PD 
relation is maintained.  This implementation reveals a sharp increase in capital charges to 
smaller SMEs so that the smallest borrowers are charged over twice the capital of the 
largest SME borrowers. 
 
Table 4.8 presents capital charges by Risk Group and Size Group under Cases 2, 7b and 
10, while Table 4.9 presents cross ratios of segment capital charges across Cases.  
Examining results by overall RG in Table 4.8 and using tabulated ratios in Table 4.9, we 
observe that for all RGs except the riskiest (RG 8-9), borrowers generally obtain a 
reduction in capital charges varying between 50% and 10%.  For borrowers in the 8-9 
RG, capital charges are increased by 70%.  Examining results by RG-SG segment we 
observe that the highest surcharges are generally applied to those borrowers most 
benefitting from Basel II pre-calibrations, namely, the smallest and riskiest borrowers.  
Specifically, the highest surcharge observed is one of 280% for the 7 RG – ≤$100,000 
SG segment while the highest capital reduction observed is one of 60% for the 1-3 RG – 
> $1,000,000 SG.   
 
These results, obtained in Case 7b and compared to Case 2, take into account Size as a 
dimension in the calibration of PDs and asset correlations, and use a simulation-based 
model and allocation scheme to obtain capital results.  Case 10 presents a case in which 
Size is not a dimension in calibration, and show an underlying base for results observed 
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above.  Namely, we observe that overall portfolio capital charges under Case 10 are 
identical to those of Case 2, and equal to 8.2%.  For the smallest borrowers, overall SG 
capital charges are 30% higher under the boosted asset correlations implementation of 
Case 10 when compared to the Basel II implementation.  For borrowers in the largest 
Size Group, this result is reversed so that the largest borrowers, as an overall group, 
receive a discount of 30% to capital charges.   
 
Examining results by overall RG, we observe discounts ranging between 20% and 30% 
for all RGs except RG 8-9.  For the riskiest borrowers we observe a surcharge of 10% 
over Basel II capital charges.  Additionally, we observe, under both Case 10 and Case 7b, 
and for all RG – SG segments as well as overall, a greater dispersion in capital charge 
results as compared to Base II (Case 2).  Specifically, we observe a range of capital 
charges from 3.6% (RG 1-3 – SG > $1,000,000) to 24.8% (RG 8-9 – SG ≤ $100,000) 
under Case 7b and 4.6% (RG 1-3 – SG > $1,000,000) to 21.1% (RG 8-9 – SG ≤ 
$100,000) under Case 10.  This compares to capital charges ranging from 3.5% (RG 1-3 
– SG $250,000 - $1,000,000) to 13.2% (RG 8-9 – SG > $1,000,000) under Case 2. 
 
Our exercise in this Subsection compared capital charges under prudentially high pre-
calibrated asset correlations (i.e., Case 2) to internally calibrated capital charges adjusted 
to prudential levels.  Our use of Size as an explicit calibration dimension provided an 
alternative to pre-calibrated relationships in Basel II.  Our comparison showed that pre-
calibrations in Basel II provide discounts to smaller borrowers that are not reflective of 
their true relative riskiness, while providing a surcharge of capital to larger SME 
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borrowers.  We use a RG calibration of PD and asset correlation parameters in order to 
gauge the relative impact of internal calibrations and Size dimensionality in those 
calibrations.  Our results show that the use of internal calibrations of parameters, 
removing pre-specified Basel II calibrations, yields the underlying changes observed 
while the addition of the Size dimensionality amplifies these underlying reversals.  
 
These results are dependent on the specifications of the bounded asset correlation boost, 
such that if we were to use an upper bound of 20% asset correlation we would obtain 
different capital levels, but we expect that the patterns and overall results obtained in this 
Subsection would be maintained; see Subsection 4.2.3. 
 
Subsection 4.3.3. Asymptotic versus Simulation-based Single Factor Model 
 
In order to study the various aspects of the difference in Case 2 and the simulation-based 
results presented above, we study results obtained under an asymptotic implementation of 
the single risk factor model and the simulation-based implementation shown above.  This 
exercise is carried out on both boosted and non-boosted model calibrations, and is linked 
to granularity effects studied in the literature.  In particular, granularity effect results 
derived in this Subsection are compared to results presented in BCBS (2006b) and Gordy 
and Lutkebohmert (2007).   
 
Our results show that when low asset correlations are used, the asymptotic 
implementation of the single factor model can lead to significant undercapitalization.  On 
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a segment level, we also observe misallocation of capital when asset correlations are low, 
such that smaller borrowers are overcharged under the asymptotic model and larger 
borrowers are undercharged.  These effects are generally dissipated with boosted asset 
correlations and, to our knowledge, are the first indication  
 
A Brief Review of Granularity Effects 
 
A common measure of single name exposure concentration, the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) is calculated as the sum of the squared exposure shares in the portfolio.  A 
value of zero for the HHI is indicative of full or infinite granularity, while a value of one 
indicates monopoly.  According to BCBS (2006b, pp. 9-10) EU exposure rules dictate 
that the maximum HHI in a bank’s banking book portfolio be 0.0156.  For such a 
portfolio the granularity effect is measured at 13% to 21% when compared to a perfectly 
granular portfolio.  However, it should be noted that the HHI is best suited to portfolios 
displaying heterogeneity in exposure size and little else, with the HHI becoming 
unreliable as a measure of granularity when applied to portfolios heterogeneous in credit 
characteristics such as PD, LGD and default correlations, see BCBS (2006b, p. 10).  In 
particular, Gordy and Lutkebohmert (2007) note that the granularity adjustments can be 
found to generally increase with increasing PDs in the portfolio, so that the lower credit 
quality portfolios generally encompass a greater approximation error in the application of 




In their study of the granularity effect on corporate loans portfolios, Gordy and 
Lutkebohmert (2007) observe an increase of 1.5% to 4% in VaR for large portfolios 
(4000 exposures or more) and an increase of 4% to 8% in small portfolios (1000 to 4000 
exposures).  In addition, the authors calculate the basis points addition to EC as 0.018% 
for a reference portfolio of 6000 homogenous exposures, with a PD of 1%, an LGD of 
45%, and an HHI of 0.00017; see Table 3, Gordy and Lutkebohmert (2007, p. 16).   
 
Our results will indicate that asset correlations, rather than PDs (which are unaffected by 
our boosts) are the primary actors in increasing the granularity effect from minimal levels 
of 2% to 4%, to levels of 6%.  We measure the Financing Company HHI at 0.00017 
when measured across loans, and 0.00024 when measured against borrower exposures.  
Given our portfolio of over 35,000 exposures and over 25,000 borrowers, we observe that 
our results for a comparable segmentation (RG) to that used in other studies place us just 
above the range observed in Gordy and Lutkebohmert (2007). 
 
Low SME portfolio asset correlation values can generate significant Granularity Effects 
 
Tables 4.10 to 4.13 provide the capital charge for Risk and Size segments under both the 
simulation-based and the asymptotic implementations of the single factor model, using 
RG-calibrated asset correlations and PDs – Table 4.10 and 4.12 – and RG-SG calibrated 
asset correlations and PDs – Tables 4.11 and 4.13.   In Tables 4.10 and 4.11, internally 
estimated asset correlations are used; in Tables 4.12 and 4.13 boosted asset correlations 
are input into the two implementations.  EC results are compared across implementations 
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in each Table, along with the granularity effect obtained under implementations using the 
estimated and boosted asset correlations (bottom panels of Tables).   
 
Granularity effect results reveal that given low asset correlations, there can be significant 
underestimation of capital charges when an asymptotic model is applied to a real-world 
granular portfolio of SME borrowers.  Specifically, Tables 4.10 and 4.11 reveal capital 
surcharges of 6% when idiosyncratic risks are explicitly modelled, as in the simulation-
based approach, as compared to asymptotic implementations.  This granularity effect, 
however, is significantly mitigated when boosted asset correlations are used to generate 
EC results; see Tables 4.12 and 4.13.  Specifically, we observe capital surcharges of 3% 
and 4% for the “boosted” implementations of Cases 10 (RG-calibration) and 7b (RG-SG 
calibration), respectively.   
 
In addition to overall granularity effect results, Tables 4.10 to 4.13 allow us to observe 
granularity effects by Size and Risk Group.  Specifically, in Tables 4.10 and 4.11 we 
observe that when correlations are low the impact of idiosyncratic effects is specific to 
the largest borrowers, such that these borrowers’ contribution to portfolio riskiness (as 
measured by the EC) may be severely underestimated in asymptotic implementations.  
These effects are mitigated by the use of boosted asset correlations; see Tables 4.12 and 
4.13. 
 




In Section 4.3 we used the internally calibrated PDs and asset correlations estimated in 
Section 4.2 and applied them within asymptotic and non-asymptotic frameworks of the 
single factor asset value model discussed in Section 4.1.  These results were compared to 
each other and to the Basel II partial implementation capital charge results obtained in 
Section 3.4.  Our main results are as follows: 
 
1. Basel II Capital Charges Can Distort Capital Allocations for SMEs: A fully 
calibrated internal model for SME portfolio credit risk will reveal significant 
misallocation of capital under Basel II.  This misallocation is manifested in 
significant capital charge discounts to the smallest SME borrowers and significant 
capital surcharges to the largest SME borrowers. 
  
2. Granularity Effects are Amplified by Low Estimated Asset Correlation Values: 
The use of low asset correlation values (see Subsection 4.3.3) can play a 
significant role in the generation of approximation errors due to the application an 
asymptotic framework, such as that found in the Basel II IRB approach, to a real-
world finite portfolio.  Intuitively, this result is explained by the predominance of 
idiosyncratic risks in portfolios with low dependence on systematic factors and 
the lack of accounting for these idiosyncratic factors in asymptotic frameworks.   
 
 
Section 4.4. Conclusion 
 
In Chapter 4 we applied a dual segmentation system to the Financing Company database 
of Canadian SME loans.  This dual segmentation differed in two ways from the 
segmentations presented in Chapter 2 and used in the Basel II implementations of 
Chapter 3.  The first difference was the application of this dual segmentation to the 
estimation of portfolio correlations, and not just probabilities of default.  This application 
of the data drives the second difference, which is the re-definition of some Size and Risk 
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Groups to ensure robust estimation.  Presented in this way, our work with the data in this 
Chapter underscored the minimal data requirements under Basel II as compared to the 
exigent data requirements when estimating the credit risk relationships and properties for 
an SME portfolio.  Our work in Chapter 4 therefore allowed us to explore the credit risk 
characteristics of this distinct group of borrowers, and test the assumptions made on them 
in the Basel II framework.  For both the estimation of portfolio credit risk and the 
estimation of correlations within our SME portfolio, a single factor asset value model was 
used. 
 
On the relationship between asset correlation and Size, our results showed that the simple 
increasing relationship pre-calibrated into the Basel II framework could not be supported 
empirically for SME borrowers.  Similarly to the literature, our internally calibrated asset 
correlations were significantly lower than those found in Basel II.  While arguments for 
over-diversification as a potential root of low asset corrlation values do not apply in our 
case, we suggest that the use of default data – as opposed to market data – may be linked 
to our finding of low asset correlation values.  Reservations on the overall value of asset 
correlations do not take away from patterns estimated across credit quality and size.  
Taken as a whole, our resuts on asset correlations for SME borrowers reveal low overall 
values, and no significant relationship with Size and PD.  This results points to settings 
for SME borrowers closer to those found in the Retail-Other treatment of Basel II rather 
than the Corporate asset class treatment.  Maintaining these patterns, or lack thereof, we 
apply a widely used ad hoc bounded log odds adjustment to boost asset correlation values 




Internally estimated asset correlations were applied in the estimation of capital charges on 
our portfolio of SME borrowers, within a single factor model, implemented both in its 
asymptotic and simulation-based forms.  This comparison of simulation-based and 
asymptotic internally-calibrated models reveals significant underestimation of portfolio 
capital charges when asset correlation values are low.  In addition, the underestimation of 
capital charges due to the application of an asymptotic framework to a large real-world 
finite SME portfolio was found to be concentrated on larger borrowers.   
 
Internally estimated asset correlations were also applied following a boost to their values 
to bring them to Basel II consistent levels.  This boost could be presented as conservatism 
factor.  Capital charge results using boosted asset correlations showed the dissipation of 
the granularity effect observed in implementations using low asset correlation values.  To 
our knowledge, these results are the first to empirically link asset correlation value to the 
approximation error obtained from applying asymptotic models to finite real-world 
portfolios.  
 
Finally, comparing boosted internally estimated capital charges to Basel II capital charges 
we find evidence of significant Basel II capital allocation distortions to SME borrowers, 
such that the smallest SME borrowers receive significant capital charge discounts and the 
largest SME borrowers receive a capital surcharge.  This is especially true in cases in 
which SME borrowers were treated under two regimes, Retail-Other and Corporate.  
These capital misallocations were traced directly to asset correlation settings.  
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Chapter 5. SME Economic Capital under CreditRisk+ 
 
In this Chapter we present CreditRisk
+
, an analytical model which, in its basic form, 
brings together two sources of uncertainty to generate a loss distribution for a portfolio of 
credit exposures.  These two uncertainties can be summarized as the uncertainty 
surrounding default rates and the uncertainty surrounding the distribution of exposures in 
the portfolio over which default would occur. 
 
The basic form of the model allows for both a single sector and a multiple independent 
sectors implementation, with the latter allowing for the inclusion of idiosyncratic risks 
among obligors.  A major factor of consideration in the previous Chapter, in this Chapter 
we put the issue of idiosyncratic risks in the portfolio aside and focus, instead, on the 
introduction of inter-sector correlations in our portfolio and their impact on EC.  Here, 
inter-sector correlations are defined as correlations between borrowers in different sectors 
while intra-sector correlations are defined as the correlations between borrowers in the 
same sector.  The study of multi-factor frameworks for portfolio credit risk, and their 
comparison to single factor frameworks, highlights and challenges a major assumption in 
the Basel II IRB framework, that of a single risk factor.  Our results in this Chapter aim to 
shed light on EC impacts due to this assumption. 
 
In particular, Chapter 5 estimates portfolio credit risk capital charges using various 
implementations of the CreditRisk
+ 
framework.  Along with the Single Sector and 
Multiple Sectors implementations described in the CreditRisk
+ 
documentation; see Credit 
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Suisse (1997), we implement an extension to the CreditRisk
+
 framework allowing for the 
inclusion of inter-sector correlations; as presented in Akkaya, Kurth, and Wagner (2004) 
and Burgisser, Kurth, Wagner, and Wolf (1999).  These correlations are calibrated from 
the Financing Company data, maintaining the SME portfolio internal calibrations that 
characterize this Thesis.  When referring to the CreditRisk
+
 implementations as presented 
in Credit Suisse (1997), we will generally use the terms “original” or “basic” CreditRisk+, 
otherwise we will use the terms CreditRisk
+
 on its own, prefixing it with “simulation-
based” or Multiple Correlated Sectors when necessary. 
 
Chapter 3 of this Thesis explored the model underlying the regulatory capital framework 
advanced under Basel II, while Chapter 4 presented a simulation-based single factor asset 
value model, calibrated along various SME default rate segmentations.  Economic 
Capital results were thus generated for the Financing Company under a single factor 
model fully calibrated from internal Financing Company data.  In Chapter 5 we use the 
“actuarial-type” framework of the CreditRisk+ model to once again calculate portfolio 
credit risk Economic Capital based purely on SME data derived from the Financing 
Company portfolio; for a complete description of the CreditRisk
+
 model see Credit Suisse 
(1997), for a comprehensive review of academic literature on the CreditRisk
+
 framework 
and extensions to the framework see Gundlach and Lehrbass (2004), and for a review of 
CreditRisk
+
 implementations from a prudential benchmarking perspective see Avesani, 




In its Single Sector implementation, CreditRisk
+
 provides a framework comparable to the 
single factor model explored in Chapter 4.  In Chapter 6 a comparison between the two 
models, as well as the Basel II AIRB model presented in Chapter 3, is conducted wherein 
we examine the resulting portfolio Economic Capital charges, as well as the EC charges 
by segments.  In Chapter 5, we pursue an industry-based Multiple Sectors and Multiple 
Correlated Sectors implementations of CreditRisk
+
, comparing the resultant Economic 
Capital figures to those obtained in a single sector setting.  This analysis reveals over- 
and under-estimations of Economic Capital in relation to the assumptions of single or 
multiple, whether independent or correlated, risk factors in a portfolio.  This work closely 
resembles that undertaken in Lesko, Schlottmann, and Vorgrimler (2004) and bears some 
similarities to exercises in Tarashev and Zhu (2007).  In addition, we draw references 
from BCBS (2006b) wherein the question of multi- and single-sector assmuptions’s 
impacts on EC is tackled. 
 
A continuing focus of this Thesis is the behaviour of different borrower size-segments in 
our portfolio of SME borrowers.  As such, we examine Economic Capital and default 
correlation results generated in this Chapter according to Size segments.  As with 
Chapters 3 and 4, our analysis is enhanced by a data dual-segmentation system 
incorporating Size as a dimension of parameter measurement. 
 
Chapter 5 is divided as follows: Section 5.1 provides a brief introduction and summary of 
the original analytical CreditRisk
+
 model.  Section 5.2 presents the Multiple Correlated 
Sectors implementation, and; Section 5.3 presents results for the Single Sector, Multiple 
142 
 
Sectors, and Multiple Correlated Sectors implementations as well as comparative results 








 model relies on statistical techniques, first developed in the actuarial 
sciences, to model the loss distribution for a portfolio of credit exposures.  The model 
quantifies the risk of default without making any assumptions on the causes of default.  
This differs from the asset value model wherein the cause of default is specified as a drop 
in asset value below some default barrier; see, for example, Gupton, Finger, and Bhatia 
(1997).   
 
In this Section we assume the reader has a general knowledge of the workings of the 
model and only highlight some pertinent aspects, a full derivation of the CreditRisk
+
 
model can be found in Credit Suisse (1997), Crouhy, Galia, and Mark (2000) and 
Gundlach (2004).    
 
Subsection 5.1.1. The Original CreditRisk+ Framework 
 
Consider, once again, a portfolio of N obligors in which every obligor (i) has been 
assigned a Probability of Default (PD) over a given time horizon T (say one-year).  This 
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reflects the probability that the customer’s status, at the end of the one year horizon will 
be either defaulted or performing.  This two-state scenario can be depicted through the 
use of a Bernoulli distributed indicator variable,     (     ): 
  
   {
 if firm   is in default at time  
 otherwise
         (    )                    (   ) 
 
In its most basic form, CreditRisk
+
 assumes that an obligor’s Exposure at Default (EAD) 
and Loss Given Default (LGD) are both given constants, and describes the loss of any 
obligor n through the Loss Variable: 
 
                                                                      (   ) 
 
such that the Expected Loss (   ) of obligor (i) can be expressed as the expectation of its 
corresponding loss variable (  ): 
 
     [  ]             (  )                                   (   ) 
 
For our portfolio of (N) obligors, this then allows for the definition of the Portfolio Loss 
as: 
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For a discrete random variable (Y), we define its probability generating function (pgf) as:  
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For our Bernoulli distributed default indicator for obligor (i), we write: 
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       (   )                          (   ) 
 
Working with this representation of   ’s pgf we can move from a Bernoulli setting to a 
Poissonian one at the heart of the analytically tractable solution that the CreditRisk
+
 
framework brings to the problem of credit portfolio loss distribution generation.  That 
transition results in the rewriting of Equation (5.6) as the pgf of a Poisson variable    
with intensity    :    
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For our portfolio of (N) independent obligors, in which the risk of default for each obligor 
(i) is now given by a Poisson variable   , we define our loss variable    as: 
 




where              is defined as the non-random Exposure for obligor (i).  
Therefore, maintaining our assumption of independent defaults in our portfolio, we can 
construct the portfolio loss distribution by defining the pgf of   : 
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Next, the portfolio loss distribution pgf can be written as: 
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We note here that the portfolio loss distribution is not Poisson distributed, due to the 
inclusion of the variability of (Ei), in contrast to the portfolio distribution of default 
events. 
 
Recall, the simulation-based AVM model of Chapter 4 presented borrower defaults as 
realizations of a normally distributed latent variable below some given default barrier.  In 
the single sector implementation, the latent variable was assumed to depend on a single 
systematic factor and an idiosyncratic shock, both generated from standard normal 
distributions.  Correlations between obligors were determined through common 
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dependence on the single systematic factor, and were calibrated from PD averages and 




 model, in contrast, does not place assumptions on the cause of default, 
instead borrower default probabilities are modelled to vary over time, increasing or 
decreasing with gamma-distributed latent systematic factors.  Borrowers’ probability of 
default sensitivity to, and co-movements with, the systematic factor thereby generates 
correlations in defaults, Gordy (2000, p. 119).  Whether calibrated to a single sector or a 
multi-sector analysis, the mean default rate stochasticity can be attributed to one or 
several background factors, each associated with a given sector.   
 
In both the Single Sector and the Multiple Sector case, the CreditRisk
+
 framework allows 
for a closed form solution for the loss distribution to be generated.  In particular, let our 
portfolio be divided into (K) sectors, each with a Gamma distributed risk factor with a 
long-term mean of    and a variance of   
 , Credit Suisse (1997, p. 42): 
 




     
   
 ⁄                              




Assuming that the default rate of each obligor depends on only one factor, obligors are 
assigned to the sector with which they are associated.  CreditRisk
+
 includes a more 
general framework in which obligors can be associated with more than one sector.  Under 
such a generalized framework, an obligor’s dependence on a given sector is represented 
with a given weighting, such that the sum of an obligor’s weights across the set of sectors 
should be less than or equal to one.   Finally, this framework allows for the inclusion of 
an idiosyncratic sector capturing the volatility in obligors’ default rates which may be due 
to idiosyncratic factors, as opposed to systematic ones; for more information on these 
aspects of the CreditRisk
+
 framework, the reader can refer to Section A.12 of Credit 
Suisse (1997). 
 
For each obligor (i) we introduce a series of sector weights {       } satisfying: 
 
∑    
 
   
                                                                         (    ) 
 
such that,         These weights, act as factor loadings, measuring obligor (i)’s 
sensitivity to each of the risk factors, while (    ) can be viewed as assigning a weight to 
an idiosyncratic sector with mean one and variance zero. 
 
For a given borrower (i) in Risk Rating (ζ), the probability of default, conditional on 
realizations of the systematic factor, is amplified or subdued according to a given 
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where   ̅̅ ̅̅     is the unconditional long term average probability of default for a given Risk 
Rating (ζ); see Gundlach (2004, pp. 16-17) and Gordy (2000, pp. 121-122).  In addition, 
we write:  
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For our portfolio of (N) obligors, we can now write our expected portfolio loss 
distribution conditional on the realization of our K sectors    {       } as: 
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In order to derive the portfolio loss distribution, we begin by deriving the pgf for obligor 
n conditional on  .  Analogously to equation (5.10), we write: 
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Our assumption of conditional independence then allows us to write: 
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Using the gamma distribution functional forms and integrating out X, we obtain: 
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Credit Suisse (1997, pp. 48-49) and Gundlach (2004, pp. 21-23) present the Panjer 
recursion used in the original CreditRisk
+
 for generating portfolio losses from the pgf; for 
alternative solution schemes see, for example, Gordy (2002), Haaf, Reiss, and 
Schoenmakers (2004), and Merino and Nyfeler (2004).  We will use the Panjer recursion 







What is left is the calibration of the sector factor parameters    and   .  Kluge and 
Lehrbass (2004, p. 317) observe that gamma distributed sector factors can be normalized 
to any desired expected value.  When obligor-specific default rate standard deviations are 
available, Credit Suisse (1997, pp. 51-52) shows that an appropriate and pragmatic 
calibration of the sector parameters can be undertaken as follows: 
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                      (    ) 
 
The settings in Equation (5.21) emphasise the importance of the distribution of borrowers 
across various PD-calibration segments within a given sector, as opposed to other 
outstanding sectoral characteristics; see Credit Suisse (1997, pp. 43).  When default rate 
standard deviations are not available, Credit Suisse (1997, pp. 44) suggests the use of a 
single fixed ratio for     ⁄  and suggests a value of order one in accordance with 
historical experience.  This fixed ratio setting, and specifically the unitary volatility ratio 
setting, is widely applied in the literature.  In Chapter 6 we explore the use and impact of 
these two calibration methods, on the loss distribution and resultant EC. 
 
Subsection 5.1.2. Incorporating Inter-Sector Default Correlations  
 
Akkaya, Kurth, and Wagner (2004) present a framework in which correlations between 
geographical or industry-specific sector factors can be integrated into the CreditRisk
+
   
framework while preserving the analytical solution method for the portfolio loss 
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distribution.  Their method builds on work in Burgisser, Kurth, Wagner, and Wolf (1999) 
and is accomplished through a moment matching method, as applied to the first and 
second moments of the CreditRisk
+
 generated loss distribution, as well as a pre-defined 
correlation matrix between the pre-defined sector factors. 
 
Specifically, Akkaya, Kurth, and Wagner (2004, p. 133) define the mean and variance of 
the Multiple Sector loss distribution as: 
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Under a Single Sector implementation the portfolio loss distribution variance can be 
defined as: 
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Here we’ve used the convention of defining the Single Sector risk factor variance as 
( ( )
 ) and the Single Sector portfolio loss distribution variance as (   ( )).  For the 
Multiple Sectors implementation, we extend the use of the notation proposed in 
Subsection 5.1.1.  In line with the CreditRisk
+
 framework assumptions on the Multiple 
Sector implementation, Equation (5.22) denotes a situation in which inter-sector 
correlations are set to zero.  Removing this restriction and allowing inter-sector 
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correlations to be different from zero, we obtain the following functional form for the 
portfolio loss distribution variance: 
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Proceeding with the moment matching method, Akkaya, Kurth, and Wagner (2004, p. 
135) suggest setting Equations (5.24) and (5.23) equal to each other and solving for  (  )
    
Specifically, we have: 
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Having derived the first and second moments, a single factor gamma distribution can be 
calibrated and a new loss distribution generated – as previously detailed in Subsection 
5.1.1. 
 
Subsection 5.1.3. Model Specification and Implementation 
 
Throughout Chapters 4 and 5, we maintain equivalent parameter calibrations.  To that 
end, we use the same parameter estimates as those presented in Table 4.1.  Economic 
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Capital calculations are made under Single Sector, Multiple Sector and Multiple 
Correlated Sectors implementations of the CreditRisk
+
 framework.  Sectors here are 
defined along the eleven Financing Company industries of Business Services (BUS), 
Construction (CON), Manufacturing (MAN), Non-Business Services (NBUS), Resources 
(RES), Retail (RET), Supplier of Premises (SOP), Tourism (TOU), Transport & Storage 
(TRS), Wholesale (WHS), and Other (OTH).   
 
 
Table 5.1 presents inter-sector correlations input into the Multiple Correlated Sectors 
implementation.  Distinguishing between correlations floored at zero and minimal 
correlation values between industries, we observe the lowest correlations between the 
BUS and OTH industries (6%), the RET and RES industries (5%), and the SOP and TOU 
industries (1%).  The highest correlations are observed between the BUS and SOP 
industries (91%), and the RET and TOU industries (80%). 
 
As in Chapter 4, we use Risk Group, as well as Risk and Size Group, calibrations of PDs 
and PD variations to generate capital results.  In the Single Sector implementation all 
borrowers are allotted to the same sector and correlations are calculated for the 
homogenous segments used for calibration; e.g., by Risk Group.  In the Multiple Sector 
implementation default correlations between borrowers in different industries are set to 
zero, and default correlations for borrowers within the same sector are calculated as in the 
Single Sector implementation; see Appendix C.    Given the zero inter-sector correlation 
restriction in the Multiple Sector implementation, we propose that correlations between 
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borrowers in different industries be implied from a comparison of Multiple Sector and 




framework intra-sector default correlations are intrinsically generated 
through analysis of risk factor volatilities.  As noted in Subsection 5.1.1, the calibration 
these sector volatilities can be undertaken through the use of obligor-specific default rate 
volatilities, available, in our case, on a single- and dual-dimension basis across various 
segments of our portfolio.  As such, and in reference to Equation (5.21), each obligor is 
assigned to a specific sector such that his sector weight is set to one for that particular 
sector.  In Chapter 6, this unitary weight setting is contrasted against the unitary 
normalized volatility setting briefly introduced in Subsection 5.1.1.  
 
We evaluate the credit risk over the Financing Company March 2009 performing 
portfolio, using Risk and Size Group segments as defined in Chapter 4.  In order to 
properly identify the discussion as pertaining to either the single segmentation or the dual 
segmentation of the data, we will, as before, use the “overall” adjective when referring to 
the single segmentation.  As in Chapter 2, Financing Company historical defaults are 
compiled from January 1997 to December 2010, covering 14 years (see Section 2.4 for 
further discussion).   
 
As noted above, our data is prepared in such a way as to maximize comparability with the 
methodology presented in Chapter 4.  As such, we proceed by segmenting our data by 
loan and documenting the loan $OS – this will serve as the exposure; the LGD – this is 
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set at either 41% or 73% depending on Security Coverage, see Subsection 3.3.1; the 
borrower industry code associated with that loan; the borrower Risk Group associated 
with that loan; the borrower Size Group for that loan, and; the calculated Exposure at 
Default – which we define as ($OS x LGD). 
 
Having specified our portfolio input data, and specified our “K” sectors as corresponding 
to our eleven industries, we now proceed with the banding process used in CreditRisk
+
.  
Specifically, we note that LGD-adjusted exposures are divided into exposure bands 
wherein the value of the individual exposures is approximated by an integer equal to the 
rounded value of the exposure given some Loss Unit; see, for example Crouhy, Galia, 
and Mark (2000, p. 110). 
 
Specifically, for some Loss Unit (F), obligor exposures are transformed such that:  
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In a multiple sector setting, and for a given sector (k), the maximum band value J
k 
is 
determined by evaluating the largest exposure as in Equation (5.26), and exposure bands 
are defined for   
( )
       .  Defining: 
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and allowing us to reformulate the portfolio loss distribution given in Equation (5.19) as: 
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In most implementations a unit of exposure (F) is chosen to be $10,000 unless stated 
otherwise.  The rounding procedure used in the banding process; see Equation (5.26), 
effectively discards all loans with $OS < $5,000.  In addition, for each loan, an 
adjustment is made to the (PD) so as to adjust for the approximation generated by the 
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banding process:      (      ) (    )⁄ ; see Bluhm, Overbeck, and Wagner (2003, 
p. 152).   
 
Having fully specified our data, the sector factor gamma distributions are calibrated and 
the portfolio loss distribution is generated using the Panjer Recursion.  Portfolio EC 
results are then calculated as the 99.9% loss distribution VaR less the portfolio EL.  For 
each loan, the VaR is allocated back using the procedures highlighted in Appendix C and 
the loan EL is subtracted to give us the loan EC.  Segment results are presented as the 
$OS-weighted average capital charges as a percent of total segment $OS. 
 
 
Section 5.2. Results 
 
Section 5.2 explores the calculation of Economic Capital charges using the analytical 
implementations of CreditRisk
+
.  We present results under RG and RG-SG calibrations.  
In Figures 5.1 and 5.2, Economic Capital allocations obtained under RG-SG calibrations 
are presented by Industry and Risk Group, and Industry and Size Group, respectively are 
presented for the three implementations.  In particular, the top panel of each Figure 
presents Single Sector implementation results; the middle panel presents Multiple Sector 
implementation results, and; the bottom panel presents EC allocations under the  Multiple 
Correlated Sectors implementation.  Figure 5.3 presents the analytically derived portfolio 
loss distributions under the three implementations and along the RG and RG-SG 
calibrations.  Specifically, the middle panel provides loss distributions for the three 
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implementations under the RG calibration, the bottom panel provides the loss 
distributions for the three implementations under the RG-SG calibration, and the top 
panel provides a combined plot of the other two panels. 
 
Economic Capital results for our three implementations are presented for Risk and Size 
Group segments in Tables 5.2A and 5.2B, with the former depicting results under RG 
calibrations and the latter under RG-SG calibrations.  Tables 5.3A and 5.3B present ratios 
of capital charges calculated in the various implementations for the portfolio segments 
presented in Table 5.2.  The top panel of Tables 5.3A and 5.3B present the ratios of EC 
charges obtained under the Single Sector implementation to those obtained Multiple 
Sector implementation; the middle panel presents the ratios for the Single Sector 
implementation as compared to the Multiple Correlated Sectors implementation, and; the 
bottom panel presents the ratios for the Multiple Correlated Sectors implementation as 
compared to the Multiple Sectors implementation.   
 
Similarly to Table 5.2, Tables 5.4 and 5.6 present EC capital charges under the various 
implementations.  Tables 5.5 and 5.7 present ratios corresponding to the segments 
presented in Tables 5.4 and 5.6, respectively.  By and large, our discussions will focus on 
the ratios of capital charges for various segments, with discussion of EC level results 
presented for completion.  Below we describe outstanding ratio results, focusing on EC 
charges generated under RG-SG calibrations, contrasting them against those obtained 
under RG calibrations; next we provide a detailed description capital results.  Our 




Our results, based on RG-SG calibrations, show a ranking of EC results such that the 
highest EC charges both, for the overall portfolio and its segments, is observed in the 
Single Sector implementation, followed by the Multiple Correlated Sectors 
implementation, and finally the Multiple [Independent] Sectors implementation.   
Additionally, results show that the inclusion of inter-sector correlations has a greater 
effect the smaller the borrower segment.  This result holds when controlling for either RG 
or Industry and therefore suggests greater sensitivity of smaller borrowers to systematic 
factors.  When setting inter-sector correlations to 100% this relationship is generally 
maintained when controlling for Risk Group and Industry.   
 
The inclusion of inter-sector correlations displays increasing EC impact with increasing 
RG, overall.  However, this relationship is not replicated consistently when controlling 
for Size or Industry.  These EC impact patterns are similarly observed when setting inter-
sector correlations to 100% as under the Single Sector implementation. 
 
Thus far we’ve described the impact on EC from the introduction inter-sector correlations 
and from the use of the single sector assumption, under an RG-SG calibration of the 
models.  Observing results under an RG calibration we note similar EC impact patterns as 
those presented above.  In addition, we note that while overall portfolio EC impacts under 
the RG-SG calibrations appear larger, segment-specific impacts are generally lower 
under the RG-SG calibration.  We propose that this may suggest that the use of RG-SG 
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calibrations may incorporate a small portion of the segment-specific effects observed in 
the RG implementation. 
 
Overall, our results show that under each implementation the positive monotonic 
relationship between capital charges and Risk Group is respected.  In addition, we 
observe that under almost all implementations, capital charges display a negative 
monotonic relationship with Size.  The exception to this relationship is found in the 
Multiple Sector implementation wherein a U-shaped effect is observed.  This Size-based 
U-shape relationship is reminiscent of results in Chapter 4 under internally estimated 
correlations.  
 
When controlling for Industry and Size, we observe that the positive relationship between 




Table 5.2 presents Economic Capital results by Risk and Size Group under the Single 
Sector, Multiple Sector and Multiple Correlated Sectors implementations. In Table 5.3 
these results are compared to each other through ratios of capital charges obtained in each 
segment under each implementation.   
 
Under RG calibrations, the Economic Capital charge for the Financing Company 
portfolio is calculated at 1.2% under the Single Sector implementation, 0.5% under the 
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Multiple Sector implementation and 0.9% under the Multiple Correlated Sectors 
implementation.  Under RG-SG calibrations, these overall portfolio capital charges are 
equal to 1.0%, 0.5% and 0.7%, respectively.  Observe that overall capital charges are 
higher under the RG calibration, this result matches those obtained in previous Chapters. 
 
Lesko, Schlottmann, and Vorgrimler (2004, p. 251) observe that under a unitary weight 
setting, and using the same Multiple Correlated Sectors methodology as that presented in 
Subsection 5.1.2, Burgisser, Kurth, Wagner, and Wolf (1999) obtained an increase of 
25% in the portfolio loss distribution standard deviation, translating into 20% increase in 
the 99.0% VaR.  Under equivalent settings, we find that the introduction of inter-sector 
correlations to the CreditRisk
+
 framework, as in the Multiple Correlated Sectors 
implementation, results in an increase in EC of 65% at the 99.9% confidence level when 
compared to the Multiple Sector implementations, this is equivalent to an increase of 17% 
in the VaR.  These results are roughly equivalent with those reviewed in Lesko, 
Schlottmann, and Vorgrimler (2004) and derived in Burgisser, Kurth, Wagner, and Wolf 
(1999). 
 
BCBS (2006b) presents a review of the potential impact of the single risk factor 
assumption to EC calculations.  Citing Duellmann and Masschelein (2006), BCBS 
(2006b) estimate an icnrease in EC, going from the most diversified case to the single 
sector case, equal to approximately 50%.  This compares  to values of approximately 
130% under the RG and RG-SG calibrations for our portfolio.  BCBS (2006b, p. 13) 
notes that the impact of the single risk factor assumption has been found to be positive or 
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negative, and is heavily dependent on exposure concentrations within a portfolio and 
correlations between risk factors.  
 
In Figures 5.1 and 5.2 we observe an outstanding characteristic of the implementations 
and their EC allocation in comparison to each other.  In particular, we observe that for the 
Multiple Sectors and Multiple Correlated Sectors implementations, EC allocations for the 
MAN industry are significantly elevated.  This marks a contrast with EC allocations 
observed under the Single Sector implementation wherein allocations by industry are 
generally uniform in shape.  This characteristic can be attributed to higher normalized 
standard deviation values for the MAN industry as compared to the Single Sector value.  
This will be discussed in greater detail below. 
 
Results by Risk and Size Group 
 
This nominal ranking of EC results (highest in Single Sector implementation; lowest in 
Multiple Sector implementation) is generally maintained for all segments.  Specifically, 
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 indicate that for every segment, a Multiple Correlated Sectors 
implementation of the CreditRisk
+
 framework results in higher capital charges than the 
Multiple Sector implementation; see bottom panel of Tables 5.3.  Given that the two 
implementations hold everything equal except the presence of inter-sector correlations – 
as defined in Table 5.1 – we can attribute the capital surcharge in the Multiple Correlated 
Sectors implementation with respect to the Multiple Sector implementation to inter-sector 
correlations.  Specifically, we observe in the bottom panel of Tables 5.3, an inter-sector 
163 
 
correlations capital surcharge of 65% over the independent sectors case under the RG 
calibration and 67% under the RG-SG calibration.  The middle panel of Table 5.3 shows 
an EC surcharge of 39% resulting from the imposition of a single sector as compared to 
multiple correlated sectors. 
 
Table 5.3 shows that for all RG-SG segmentations the nominal ranking of EC charges by 
implementation is maintained so that the highest EC charges are obtained in the Single 
Sector implementation, while the lowest are obtained in the Multiple Sector 
implementation.  In particular, Table 5.3 shows an increasing inter-sector correlation EC 
surcharge with increasing Risk and decreasing Size.  Specifically, under the RG 
calibration, we note that the highest inter-sector correlation EC surcharge (i.e., EC 
increase going from the Multiple Sector implementation to the Multiple Correlated 
Sectors implementation) is observed in the 8-9 RG for the ≤$100,000 Size Group 
(146%), while the lowest is observed in the 1-3 RG for the >$1,000,000 Size Group 
(39%).  Under the RG-SG calibration the equivalent figures, relevant for the same Risk 
and Size Group segments, are equal to 143% and 36%, respectively.  Observing capital 
surcharges in going from the Multiple Correlated Sectors implementation to the Single 
Sector implementation, we note a generally positive, but not necessarily monotonic, 
relationship with RG when controlling for Size. For the >$1,000,000 Size Group we 
observe lower surcharges than smaller borrowers. 
 
Comparing results across Risk and Size Group segments within implementations, we 
observe that, both, overall and for all Size Groups, and under all implementations and 
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calibrations, we observe increasing Economic Capital charges with increasing Risk.  
Under the RG-SG calibration, we note decreasing EC charges with Size for the Single 
Sector and Multiple Correlated Sectors implementations for Risk and Size Group 
segments.  An exception is observed in the 8-9 RG wherein we observe a U-shaped 
pattern for those two implementations.  For the Multiple Sector implementation the U-
shaped pattern of capital charges by Size is observed for all RGs; see Table 5.2B.  In 
addition, we observe a U-shaped pattern for all RG-calibrated implementations; see Table 
5.2A.     
 
Results by Industry and Risk Rating 
 
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 present Economic Capital results by Industry and Risk Group for the 
three CreditRisk
+
 analytical implementations.  As can be seen, under all implementations 
and calibrations, the positive monotonic relationship between Risk Group and Economic 
Capital is respected, both at the overall and the segment-specific level. 
 
In terms of overall capital charges by Industry under the RG calibration, we observe in 
Tables 5.4A, for the Single Sector implementation the highest capital charges are 
observed in the RES (1.5%) and SOP (1.4%) industries, while the industries with the 
lowest capital charges are the CON (1.1%) and WHS (1.1%) industries. Comparing the 
Single Sector implementation to the Multiple Sectors implementation we observe a 
shuffling of rankings.  In particular, we observe the highest capital charge under the 
Multiple Sectors implementation in the MAN industry (0.8%), whereas that industry was 
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allocated the third lowest capital amount under the Single Sector implementation.  The 
industries with the lowest capital charges are the OTH (0.2%) and CON (0.3%) 
industries.  For the Multiple Correlated Sectors implementation we observe the highest 
capital charges in the MAN (1.1%) industry and the lowest in the RES (0.6%).  Under the 
RG-SG calibration, we observe only slight differences to the Industry ordering observed 
under the RG calibration.   
 
Under both calibrations we observe that the introduction of inter-sector correlations has 
the smallest effect on the MAN industry, increasing capital charges by approximately 
25%; see Tables 5.5A and 5.5B.  Viewed another way, we can say that the introduction of 
inter-sector correlations has the greatest diversification effect on the MAN industry.  
Tables 5.5 show that the industry for which capital charges increase the most with the 
introduction of inter-sector correlations is the OTH industry, for which capital charges 
increase by approximately 220%.  This result is not entirely surprising as we would 
expect borrowers classified into this heavily mixed industry to exhibit stronger 
correlations with other industries than with each other. 
 
Results by Industry and Size Group 
 
Tables 5.6 and 5.7 present results by Industry and Size Group.  Results in Table 5.7 echo 
and extend some of the results observed in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 by showing generally 
decreasing capital charges by Size when controlling for Industry under the Single Sector 
and Multiple Correlated Sectors implementations while a U-shaped pattern is observed 
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under the Multiple Sectors implementation.  Examining results in the bottom panel of 
Tables 5.7, we observe that inter-sector correlations surcharges tend to decrease with 
increasing Size for all Industry-SG segments.   
 
Inter-Sector and Intra-Sector Correlations 
 
Our analysis of the various CreditRisk
+
 implementations allows for some commentary on 
the measurement of inter-sector correlations in the Financing Company portfolio.  
Specifically, we observe that on average, the presence of inter-sector correlations 
accounts for a significant portion of risk capital charges.  In particular, we observe that 
the inclusion of inter-sector correlation results in an increase in portfolio-wide capital 
surcharges of approximately 65% as compared to the case of independent sectors.  
Documenting our results by Size, we note that the impact of inter-sector correlations 
decreases monotonically with Size, so that the smallest borrowers exhibit the highest 
capital charge surplus due to inter-sector correlations, while the largest borrowers exhibit 
the lowest.  In addition, we observe that the impact of inter-sector correlations increases 
with RG and, by extension, PD.  As such, we find that the borrowers most affected by the 
inclusion of inter-sector correlations are those in the smallest Size Group and highest 
Risk Group.  Conversely, those least affected are those in the largest Size Group and the 
lowest Risk Group. 
  
Results in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 dealt exclusively with intra-sector (or intra-segment) 
correlations, so that for a uniform group of borrowers, correlations were measured at a 
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uniform level with respect to a single factor.  CreditRisk
+
 provides a framework through 
which intra-sector correlations are measured as shown in Equations (5.27). 
 
Recall, PDs and PD volatilities are calibrated either along RG or RG-SG dimensions 
while sectors are defined by Industries. Under the RG calibration and the Single Sector 
implementation default correlations are calculated based on the RG PD and the square of 
the single sector volatility ratio (  ⁄ ).  Under the Multiple Sectors implementation 
borrowers in different industries are completely independent so that their default 
correlation is zero; default correlations between borrowers in the same industry are 
dependent on the industry-specific ratio (    ⁄ ).   
 
Table 5.8 provides the relevant ratio for the Single Sector implementation as well as for 
the eleven Industry sectors under the Multiple Sector implementation.  The second 
column of Table 5.8 relates the relevant ratio to the implementation discussed in 
Subsection 5.4.1.  Recall that for this exercise we relied exclusively on RG-calibrations, 
columns three to seven give the intra-sector default correlation for borrowers in the 
corresponding RG segment.  As can be seen in Table 5.8, the SOP industry exhibits the 
lowest ratio (0.0433), while the MAN industry exhibits the highest ratio (0.0489).  
Returning to Table 5.4, we note that these ratio rankings correspond to the rankings of 






Section 5.3. Conclusion 
 
In this Chapter we introduced the CreditRisk
+
 framework for the calculation of portfolio 
credit risk.  We tested the effect of various implementations of the CreditRisk
+
 
framework on the capital calculation for our portfolio, using various calibrations and 
assumptions on the behaviour of SME borrowers.  Specifically, we used RG- and RG-SG 
calibrated PDs, along with sectors divided by Financing Company industry 
specifications, to calculate EC charges under Single Sector, Multiple Sectors and Multiple 
Correlated Sectors implementations of the analytical CreditRisk
+
 model.  For each 
obligor the sector weight was set to one for the industry to which the corresponding 
borrower is assigned, and zero otherwise, with all borrowers accorded a weight of one to 
the single sector in the Single Sector implementation.  Under the Multiple Correlated 
Sectors implementation default correlations between sectors were proxied by Financing 
Company default rate correlations between industries. 
 
Our results showed that the use of a Single Sector implementation can result in an  
overestimation of overall EC by approximately 40%, with the smallest and riskiest 
portions of the portfolio experiencing the highest degree overestimation.  Our results also 
indicated that the assumption of independence between borrowers, as in the Multiple 
Sectors implementation, results in a 65% underestimation of overall EC, with the 





Chapter 6. A comparative analysis of portfolio credit risk models on a portfolio of 
Canadian SME loans  
 
Thus far, the CreditRisk
+
 framework has been presented as an alternative structure to that 
found in the asset value model.  However, it can nonetheless be shown that CreditRisk
+
 
shares common conceptual and mathematical foundations with the AVM studied in 
Chapter 4; see, for example, Crouhy, Galia, and Mark (2000).  In particular, Koyluoglu 
and Hickman (1998) show that both model types can be classified under a single general 
framework and are capable of providing similar results provided that input parameters are 
harmonized across the models.  Gordy (2000) provides a mapping between the asset 
value model and the CreditRisk
+
 model while Gordy and Lutkebohmert (2007) present an 
example of how applications or tests from one framework can be applied to another by 
using results generated in a CreditRisk
+
 framework to propose amendments to the Basel 
II IRB framework.   
 
Wieczerkowski (2003, pp. 45-46) summarizes results of numerous comparative studies 
between the CreditRisk
+
 and the AVM, as represented by the commercialized 
CreditMetrics model, see J.P. Morgan (1997), frameworks:  
 
1. In limiting CreditMetrics to a two-state model, both it and CreditRisk+ can be 
considered factor models imposing conditional independence on defaults.  The 
two models, however, differ in the modeling of the distributions of risk factors 
and conditional default probabilities. 
 
2. The two models can be reformulated analogously to one another.  In the case of 
CreditRisk
+
, this reformulation can generate a two-state CreditMetrics framework 
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in which loss distributions are generated through Monte Carlo simulation.  In the 
case of CreditMetrics a limited two-state model probability-generating function 
can be generated analogously to CreditRisk
+
; however, no closed form solution 
has been found. 
 
3. While it is possible to match the CreditRisk+ and CreditMetrics models through 
factor transformations, this matching is not based on the standard 
parameterizations of the models. 
 
For their part, Koyluoglu and Hickman (1998) identify three points of comparison 
between the frameworks – the default rate distribution, the conditional default dtribution, 
and the loss aggregation method – with only the first found to generate significant 
divergences in results; see Koyluoglu and Hickman (1998, p. 17).   
 
In Chapter 6 we introduce a simulation-based implementation of the CreditRisk
+
 
framework.  Our comparisons of the AVM and CreditRisk
+ 
will show that using the 
calibration and bridging techniques presented in Gordy (2000), it is possible to obtain 
comparable results for an SME portfolio under the two models.  Our results emphasize 
the distinctiveness of the SME default rate volatilities and their importance in the 
calibration of portfolio credit risk models.  In particular, we will show that a unitary 
setting to normalized SME default rate volatilities in the CreditRisk
+
 framework may not 
be suitable in an SME portfolio, especially in the presence of low correlations.   
 
Our work will show that a unitary risk factor weighting, allowing for the calibration of 
the single sector risk factor volatility from internal data, as discussed in Chapter 5, 
provides loss distribution characteristics comparable to those obtained under the AVM.  In 
addition, we present a calibration refinement and show that a fixed sector normalized 
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standard deviation setting of 0.5 for our SME portfolio provides for parameter settings 
harmonized with those found in the AVM.  Given the scope of our work in the Thesis, 
especially as it applies to a real-world portfolio of SME borrowers, this result is an 
interesting contribution to the literature. 
 
Similarly to Chapter 4, correlations calibrated from internal Financing Company SME 
data are generally low in value.  We use simulation-based implementations of the 
CreditRisk
+
 model and the calibration bridge presented in Gordy (2000) to extend the ad 
hoc correlation boost presented in Chapter 4 to the modeling framework used in this 
Chapter.  This exercise, bearing similarities to that undertaken in Dietsch and Petey 
(2002), yields capital charges significantly higher than those obtained under the purely 
internal calibrations discussed above.   
 
Finally, Chapter 6 will conclude the study of SME portfolio credit risk undertaken in this 
Thesis.  Having studied the unique characteristics that underpin a high-risk SME loans 
portfolio in Chapter 2, we proceeded, in Chapter 3, with undertanding of the impact of 
the various assumptions on the behaviours of borrowers in an SME as found in the Basel 
II regulatory framework.  In Chapter 4 these assumptions were tested through the 
estimation of SME correlations as found in our portfolio and within a comparable 
framework as that used in Basel II.  Our results could not empirically support Basel II 
assertions on the relationship between SME borrower asset correlations and either 
probabilities of default or borrower size.  In addition, our estimation of borrower asset 
correlations from internal Financing Company default data resulted in low correlation 
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values as compared to those found in Basel II.  Extending our analysis on this 
phenomenon, we demonstrate, empirically, the significant underestimation of portfolio 
credit risk that can arise from the presence of these low asset correlations in an ASRF 
framework.  To our knowledge, this is the first demonstration of a relationship between 
“granularity effects” and asset correlation values in a portfolio credit risk context.   
 
In Chapter 5 we take a broader view of the underlying credit risks in an SME portfolio by 
using the CreditRisk
+
 framework to extend our analysis from a single sector framework 
to one in which multiple sectors, along with the accompanying portfolio diversification 
benefits are modelled. Our analysis quantified the overestimation resultant from the use 
of a single risk factor in a portfolio credti risk model, as opposed to an internally 
calibrated model with multiple correlated risk factors.  In addition, we quantify the 
underestimation that could result from the use of zero correlation.   
 
Chapter 6 brings us full circle by comparing the AVM and CreditRisk
+
 framework and the 
resultant portfolio risk capital charges, obtained under prudentially boosted values to 
internally calibrated correlations, to Basel II.  Specifically, Chapter 6 is divided as 
follows: Section 6.1 presents a single sector simulation-based CreditRisk
+
 model, 
including calibration implementations and calibrations; Section 6.2 presents a 
comparative analysis of AVM and CreditRisk
+
 results, and; Section 6.3 presents a 
discussion of results and conclusions.  We conclude the Thesis in Section 6.4 with a 





Section 6.1. Specification of a Simulation-Based CreditRisk+ Model 
 
While presented in an alternative structure to that found in the asset value models 
reviewed in Chapter 4, CreditRisk
+
 can be shown to share common conceptual and 
mathematical foundations with those studied in Chapter 4.  In Gordy (2000) a single 
sector implementation is used to present a comparative mapping between a simulation-
based CreditRisk
+
 model and the AVM presented in Chapter 4.  In this Section we 
elaborate on this comparison, while in Section 6.2 results based on various 
implementations of the simulation-based CreditRisk
+
 are presented.   
 
The simulation-based AVM model of Chapter 4 presented borrower defaults as 
realizations of a normally distributed latent variable below some given default barrier.  
The latent variable was assumed to depend on a single systematic factor and an 
idiosyncratic shock, both generated from standard normal distributions.  Correlations 
between obligors were determined through common dependence on the single systematic 
factor, and were calibrated from PD averages and volatilities observed in the Financing 
Company SME portfolio. 
 
In contrast, the CreditRisk
+
 model does not place assumptions on the cause of default; in 
a single sector implementation, borrower default probabilities are modelled to vary over 
time, increasing or decreasing with a gamma-distributed latent systematic factor.  
Borrower probability of default co-movements with the systematic factor thereby 
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generate correlations in defaults, Gordy (2000, p. 120).  In this Section we will use 
methods presented in Gordy (2000) to present a simulation-baesd implementation of the 
CreditRisk
+
 framework.  Using this framework we are able to form direct comparisons in 
the simulated portfolio loss distribution using two alternative calibrations to the single 
risk factor distribution and the sensitivities to that factor.   
 
In the first calibration we follow Gordy (2000) and fix the risk factor paramters and 
calibrate the sensitivies accordingly, this method will be referred to as the unitary 
normalized sector volatility setting.  In the second calibration we will hold sensitivities 
constant and calibrate the shape and scale parameters of the gamma-distributed latent 
factor from Financing Company default rate data; this setting will be referred to as the 
unitary weight setting.  These calibrations, as in Chapter 4, will depend solely on the PD 
averages and volatilities observed in the Financing Company SME portfolio.   
 
We construct the CreditRisk
+
 simulation-based implementation such that it uses the same 
simulation framework as that presented in Chapter 4.  Analogously to Equation (5.11) 
and Equation (5.12), presented in Subsection 5.1.1, adhering to a single sector setting and 
dropping the “k” subscript of the sector parameters, we define a single gamma-
distributed systematic factor (X) with shape and scale parameters:  
 




Allowing for the presence of an idiosyncratic factor with mean one and zero variance, for 
a given borrower (i) in risk grade (ζ) the probability of default, conditional on realizations 
of the systematic factor, is amplified or subdued according to a given sensitivity wi,ζ.  
More specifically, we write: 
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where   ̅̅ ̅̅     is the unconditional long term average probability of default for a given risk 
grade (ζ); see Gundlach (2004, pp. 16-17) and Gordy (2000, pp. 122-124); and:   
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To generate a distribution of defaults, Gordy (2000, p. 127) suggests the following 
specification for the latent variable yi: 
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such that the idioysyncratic risk factors      are exponentially distributed with scale 
parameter equal to one.  This specification is analogous to the AVM specification  
described in Subsection  4.1.1; see Equation (4.3).  For a borrower (i), default occurs if 
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Defaults can be simulated by drawing realizations of (   ) for each borrower and a 
realization of the systematic factor (x), and applying Equation (6.4).  This method, while 
useful for descriptive purposes is known to generate a small approximation error and can 
be replaced by independent draws of a          (     ( )) variable, using the last line 
of Equation (6.5), above, and draws of systematic factor (x); see Gordy (2000, p. 142).   
 
Losses are generated by multiplying the simulated borrower defaults by their exposures 
and their losses given default, individual losses are summed to obtain the portfolio loss 
for that draw of the systematic factor.  The process is repeated times and the loss 
distribution is generated.  Furthermore, we use the simulation-based allocation 
methodology presented Chapter 4 to present capital charges by segment.  This process 
therefore describes a simulation-based implementation of the CreditRisk
+
 framework in 
which an alternative systematic risk factor engine is used within the same portoflio loss 
distribution framework as that applied in Chapter 4.  We thereby limit differences in 
implementation to the systematic risk factor distributional assumptions and calibration 
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techniques of the asset value model (AVM) presented in Chapter 4 and the CreditRisk
+
 
model presented in Chapter 5 and extended in this Section.   
 
As previously noted, under the AVM systematic and idiosyncratic risk factors were 
modeled as standard normal random variables, asset correlations representing obligor 
dependencies were then non-parametrically calibrated using historical PD and PD 
volatility values.  In calibrating the simulation-based CreditRisk
+
 we return to a subject 
touched on in Chapter 5, that of the unitary weight setting versus the unitary normalized 
volatility setting.  In particular, CreditRisk
+
 implementations allow for the choice of 
calibration of obligor sensitivities with given assumed distributional characteristics for 
the sector factor, or, alternatively, for the calibration of the factor scale parameters given 
fixed sensitivities.  In this Subsection we will present a method incorporating both of 
these calibrations.  Results based on these calibrations will be compared against each 
other as well as against those obtained under the AVM of Chapter 4.  In addition, we will 
calibrate our model to reflect the boosted correlations obtained in Chapter 4.  This 
exercise will be similar to Dietsch and Petey (2002). 
 
In particular, we observe that for the AVM, the methods presented in Subsection 4.1.1 are 
used to calibrate asset correlations from default rate mean and volatility.  For a single 
sector implementation of the CreditRisk
+
 framework, with a borrower-specific 
idiosyncratic factor, see Credit Suisse (1997, p. 52), we can define a given segment (ζ)’s 
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such that for the normalized volatility (√   [ 
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the weights (wζ) or the normalized sector volatility (  ⁄ ); see Gordy (2000, p. 134): 
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In Section 6.2 we present cases of the simulation-based CreditRisk
+
 implementation in 
which the normalized sector volatility is held fixed and the weights are calibrated, as well 
as cases in which the weights are fixed (at a value of one) and the sector volatility is 
calibrated.  Recall, under the analytical implementations of CreditRisk
+
 the weights are 
always fixed at a value of one. 
 
Boosted Asset Correlations 
 
In order to provide comparability between boosted asset correlation results in Chapter 3 
and those obtainable under the CreditRisk
+
 framework for the same boosted asset 
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correlation values, we use the work in Gordy (2000) as a bridge, this is similar to the 
boosting and bridging in Dietsch and Petey (2002). 
 
Specifically, in a single sector setting, for a given segment, we use Equation (4.10) to 
calibrate the default rate variance given the boosted asset correlation value and the 
segment PD.  The next step then depends on our choice of calibration setting: Under the 
unitary normalized volatility setting we substitue this “boosted variance” into Equation 
(6.7) and thus obtain the segment weight; Under the unitary weight setting we take the 
square root of segment-specific boosted variances and substitute them into Equation (6.3) 
to obtain the systematic risk factor standard deviation.  The boosted weight or sector 
volatility is then substituted into the simulation-based implementation of the CreditRisk
+
 
framework described above to generate capital charges for the portfolio. 
 
Final Comparative Model Specifications 
 
In this exercise we use identical data to calibrate the CreditRisk
+
 and asset value models.  
For both models, data segmented by borrower and loan, LGD values are given as either 
73% or 41%.  In both models a conditional default framework is established such that a 
latent factor mimicking the business cycle is simulated, and borrowers default depending 
on a combination of their sensitivity to the systematic latent factor and idiosyncratic 
effects.  Our database of historical SME defaults, spanning 12 years and containing 
information on borrower creditworthiness, size and industry, allows us to determine that 
sensitivity under the varying assumptions of the models implemented. Loss distributions 
180 
 
are generated for various realizations of the latent and idiosyncratic factors for each 
obligor, a given condition for default, and fixed obligor-specific exposure and LGD 
values. 
 
In order to combine the defaults with losses, we simply use the same simulation engine 
used Chapter 4, so that defaults are generated by borrower and then assigned to the 
corresponding loans with which LGD and exposure amounts are associated.  Given the 
use of identical input data in the calibrations of the models presented in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4, we obtain results using the exact same inputs but with slight alternations to the 
conditional default and portfolio loss structure. 
 
 
Section 6.2. Comparative Capital Charges: Basel II, AVM and CreditRisk+  
 
Our results will review the comparability of various calibrations of the CreditRisk
+
 model 
to the AVM model in terms of correlations, loss distributions, and capital charges – both 
overall and at the segment-specific level.  In turn, we present results along three 
Comparisons.  Comparison I presents loss distributions under the AVM framework and 
various settings of the CreditRisk
+
 framework.  Using Figure 6.1 and Table 6.1A we are 
able to identify settings of the CreditRisk
+
 framework under which calculated loss 
distributions are clearly divergent from that obtained under the AVM.  Comparison II 
presents a comparison of segment-specific default correlations, along with other 





.  Having observed comparative loss distribution results under the various 
settings and calibrations of the CreditRisk
+
 and AVM frameworks, we apply the boosting 
method described in Section 6.1 to compare EC results under both frameworks to those 
obtained under the Basel II AIRB framework for portfolio credit risk; see Case 2 of the 
Basel II implementations of Chapter 3.  This comparison, which we will refer to as 
Comparison III, uses Figures 6.2 and 6.3, and Tables 6.4 to 6.6, to clearly delineate loss 
distributions and EC allocations under the boosted and non-boosted implementations of 
the frameworks.   
 
Fixed normalized standard deviation ratio (σ/μ) settings of the Single Sector CreditRisk+ 
model include sector weights which have been calibrated according to Equation (6.7), 
such that for each segment, the sector weight and the idiosyncratic weight sum to one.  
The unitary sector weight setting of the Single Sector CreditRisk
+
 model includes a sector 
weight that has been set to one and the single sector ratio that has been calibrated from 
the data according to Equation (6.3).  This specification, matches that used in the 
analytical implementation of the CreditRisk
+
 model and will be the primary base of 
comparison against the internally-calibrated AVM model.  In addition, we will use this 
specification as a basis for comparisons using the boosted asset correlations of Chapter 4, 
using boosted asset correlations given in Table 4.7.  This exercise shares similarities with 
Dietsch and Petey (2002).   
 
Finally, we will examine default correlation results obtained in the CreditRisk
+
 
framework and compare them to those obtained in the AVM and pre-calibrated into the 
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Basel II.  This work will be undertaken in Subsection 6.2.3.  It should be noted that here 
we are interested in the default correlations among borrowers in the same portfolio 
segment and will not discuss the cross-correlations across segments.  These values can be 
readily derived from results presented in this Subsection and the application of Equation 
(C.1) of Appendix C. 
 
Figures presented in this Chapter will have two panels: the top panel will show loss 
distributions for “non-boosted” internally calibrated models; the lower panel will show 
loss distributions for “boosted” internally calibrated models.  In Figure 6.2, a third 
(bottom) panel juxtaposes “boosted” and “non-boosted” model loss distributions, 
providing further perspective on results obtained under each calibration. 
 
Comparison I  Loss Distributions under various settings of CreditRisk
+
 
 Figure 6.1; Table 6.1A; Table 6.2  
 
 
We examine loss distributions under various settings of the CreditRisk
+
 model, under an 
RG calibration, and compare them to a similarly calibrated AVM implementation.  
Settings include the unitary weight setting, and fixed normalized standard deviation 
settings with values for the ratio (σ/μ) of one, 0.5 and 0.25.  Our choice is based on 
results our observation of normalized PD standard deviation values for our SME RG 
segments, as depicted in Table 4.4.  As can been seen in Table 4.4, SME normalized PD 
standard deviation values are considerably lower to those observed for Corporate 
borrowers.   These Corporate borrower normalized PD standard deviation values may 
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suggest a calibration of one or greater for the CreditRisk
+
 single sector risk factor 
normalized standard deviation, a fact that has resulted in such settings throughout the 
literature – even when that literature has claimed to present settings suitable for SME 
borrowers; see, for example, Gordy (2000) and Dietsch and Petey (2002).   
 
Our results show that a unitary normalized standard deviation setting for CreditRisk
+
 
presents a loss distribution significantly different in shape and characteristics from that 
obtained under the AVM.  The unitary weight setting provides a comparable loss 
distribution with thinner tails, and therefore lower capital charges.  The 0.25 and 0.5 
settings of the fixed normalized standard deviation setting provide loss distributions 
comparable in shape, both overall and at the tail, with the AVM, providing a thinner tail in 
the case of the former and a fatter tail in the case of the latter. Comparing capital charges, 
we observe 2.0% EC under an RG calibration of the unitary normalized standard 
deviation setting, as compared to 1.2% under the unitary weight implementation and 
1.4% under the AVM.  We observe 99.9% percentile EC values of 1.3% and 1.5% under 
the 0.25 and 0.5 settings, respectively.   
 
We conclude that the unitary normalized standard deviation setting for CreditRisk
+
 is not 
appropriate for our SME portfolio.  The unitary weight setting provides an approximate 
fit with thinner tails, while the 0.25 and 0.5 fixed normalized standard deviation settings 




For completeness Table 6.2 provides comparisons of capital allocations under non-
boosted implementations of the models, for various calibrations and settings.  In 
particular, we observe capital charges for Risk and Size Group segments under the Single 
Sector simulation-based implementations of CreditRisk
+
.  All models are implemented 
under an RG calibration, and CreditRisk
+
 settings include the unitary weight setting and 
fixed normalized standard deviation values of 1, 0.5 and 0.25. Overall EC figures under 
each implementation correspond to those obtained for the 99.9% percentile, as given in 
Table 6.1A.   
 
Comparison II  Default correlations under various settings of CreditRisk
+
 
 Tables 6.3A to 6.3C  
 
Table 6.3A provides default correlations under various settings of CreditRisk
+
 alongside 
those obtained under the AVM framework (top panel); see Table 4.2.  CreditRisk
+ 
default 
correlations are calculated according to Equation (C.1).  We find that the 0.5 and unitary 
fixed normalized standard deviation setting provide default correlations identical to those 
obtained in the AVM.  The unitary weight setting and the 0.25 fixed normalized standard 
deviation setting provide default correlations that vary from those observed in the AVM.  
Similarities and differences in default correlations are attributed to the “location” of the 
model specification.  For the unitary weight and 0.25 normalized standard deviation 
settings, we also observe, in Table 6.3A, increasing default correlations with increasing 
RG (and PD), both overall and when controlling for Size.  For these two settings we 




Given the calibration techniques used on the fixed normalized standard deviation 
implementations and comparing to the calibrations used for the unitary weight setting of 
the CreditRisk
+
 model, we suggest that this discrepancy may be attributable to the 
“location” of our model specification; recall Equations (6.3) and (6.7) which present two 
alternative methods of specification for the CreditRisk
+
 framework.  For the fixed 
normalized standard deviation setting, our specification of model parameters is 
concentrated on the segment-specific weights; for the unitary weight setting, our 
specification is concentrated on the sector risk factor mean and standard deviation.  This 
specification-location aspect of the fixed normalized standard deviation setting is 
somewhat neutralized in the 0.25 setting as most segment weights are set to one, as can 
be observed in Table 6.3B.  For this setting, we observe that the normalized standard 
deviation value of 0.25 provides the loss distribution properties closest to those obtained 
under the AVM, while the resultant predominance of segment weight values of 1.0 
resemble those under the unitary weight setting.  In the 0.5 setting of the fixed 
normalized standard deviation CreditRisk
+
 implementation a compromise can be found 
between the loss distribution shape and the consistent calibration of default correlations. 
 
Our results here, as in Chapter 4, show that the data does not, ultimately, reveal an 
absolute relationship between correlations in an SME credit portfolio and other credit risk 
characteristics such as PD and Size.  For the unitary weight setting, and the 0.25 
normalized standard deviation setting, the single sector risk factor parameters – uniform 
across segments – along with the segment weights, are specified and the remaining 
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component of segment default correlation, PD, is left to determine default correlations; 
see Equation (C.1) in Appendix C.  As such, under those implementations, we observe 
default correlation patterns reflective of PD patterns: increasing in RG and decreasing in 
Size.  In this respect, we propose that the AVM setting – and its equivalence in the 0.5 and 
unitary normalized standard deviation settings for CreditRisk
+
 - provides the best avenue 
for the description of the “real” characteristics of the data; put another way, these settings 
are best suited to give voice to the data and allow it to speak.  
 
Comparison III Misallocation of Capital Charges under Basel II  
 Figures 6.2 and 6.3; Tables 6.4 to 6.6  
 
In Table 6.4 we compare boosted RG and RG-SG calibrations of the AVM to boosted 
calibrations of the CreditRisk
+
 framework under unitary factor weight settings.  As in 
Tables 6.1, we observe higher capital charges under the AVM as compared to CreditRisk
+
 
implementations, with AVM-derived loss distribution exhibiting significantly higher 
kurtosis.  Figure 6.3 shows generally fatter tails when using the AVM under both RG and 
RG-SG calibrations.  Nevertheless, the loss distributions, as depicted in Figures 6.2 and 
6.3, show a considerable amount of similarity for the two models under the calibrations 
and settings described above.  
 
For completeness, Table 6.1B presents loss distribution results for the RG-SG 
calibrations of the AVM and unitary weight setting of the CreditRisk
+
 model. Results 
187 
 
show a notable decrease in EC levels under the RG-SG calibration as compared to the 
RG calibration.   
 
Comparing Economic Capital allocations under the boosted implementations of 
CreditRisk
+
 and the AVM, we again find misallocation of capital under Basel II.  This 
result holds such that smaller SME borrowers are undercharged EC under Basel II and 
larger borrowers are overcharged.  For example, we observe capital charges for the 
smallest and largest borrowers under Basel II (top panel) to be equal to 6.7% and 9.8%, 
respectively.  In contrast, capital charges for the smallest and largest borrowers obtained 
under the RG calibration of CreditRisk
+
 (third panel) are equal to 16.5% and 5.5%, 
respectively.  Comparing boosted RG-SG calibrated capital charges to those obtained 
under Basel II (Case 2), we observe in Table 6.6 capital charges for the smallest and 
riskiest borrowers equal to five times those calculated under Basel II, while those for the 
largest and least risky are one fifth those obtained under Basel II; see the second panel of 
Table 6.6 for ratios for the ≤ $100,000 Size Group – 1-3 Risk Group segment and the 
>$1,000,000 Size Group – 8-9 Risk Group segment, respectively.   
 
Our results indicate EC allocation patterns across Risk and Size Groups in our boosted 
internally calibrated models contradict those found under Basel II.  These results are 
similar to those of Chapter 4, which are replicated here in boosted AVM EC charge 
allocations.  In particular, we once again observe strictly decreasing EC charges with 
increasing borrower Size segments and decreasing, both at an overall level and when 
controlling for Risk Group, under RG calibration.  Decreasing capital charges are also 
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observed with improving credit quality.  Similarly to the AVM case, we observe a general 
amplification of these EC allocation patterns under RG-SG calibrations, with a lower 
overall portfolio EC charges.   
 
 
Section 6.3. Discussion of Comparative Results 
 
As shown in Gordy (2000), the underlying driver of loss distributions as derived under 
CreditRisk
+
 is the specification of the systematic risk factor normalized standard 
deviation.  When detailed SME portfolio data is not available, this specification can be a 
source of concern to practitioners as an obvious setting may not be necessarily 
discernible.  This critical ambiguity underlines the importance of our work in Chapter 4, 
in which much time and effort was spent to ensure that our segmentation of the data 
delivered robust segment-specific estimates of default rate volatilities and averages.  
Using this data, we are able to proceed with the estimation of both the AVM and 
CreditRisk
+
 from a set of purely internal data.   
 
Our results under a unitary weight setting for CreditRisk
+
 and internally calibrated 
normalized standard deviation show that under these specifications portfolio loss 
distributions and capital charges under both models are quite similar.  This setting may 
not, however, provide default correlation parameterizations comparable to the AVM due 
to the exclusive reliance on the overall sector normalized volatility, in this setting, as 




Conversely, when calibrating segment-specific weights for a fixed normalized sector 
volatility, our results show that CreditRisk
+
 may not provide adequately similar SME loss 
distribution results under popular assumptions for risk factor normalized volatility values 
of one or greater, as found in Corporate credit portfolio calibrations; see Gordy (2000).  
Specifically, the unitary normalized standard deviation setting of the CreditRisk
+
 model is 
shown to display excessively fat tails as compared to the AVM, while obtaining identical 
default correlations.   
 
Our results suggest a CreditRisk
+
 single sector risk factor normalized standard deviation 
setting of 0.5 for SME portfolios as an acceptable calibration when internal data are not 
available; see Tables 6.2 and 6.5, and Figures 6.1 and 6.2.  This setting, however, has 
come under some fire in the literature.  Wieczerkowski (2003, p. 47) observes that 
normalized default rate standard deviations of the order of one (or less) correspond to 
“unrealistically” small asset correlations in CreditMetrics, Wieczerkowski (2003, p. 47).   
 
These seemingly contradictory results, that of an inability to generate consistent loss 
distributions under the two models when the normalized volatility in CreditRisk
+
 has 
been set to one (or more), and the low resultant asset correlations when the two models 
are consistently parameterized, may be traced back to a common source.  In particular, 
we suggest that these results may originate from the generally low default rate volatilities 
observed in SME portfolios, despite their generally higher mean default rates; see Table 
4.4.  Work in Frye (2008) underlines the significant misestimates of correlations, in a 
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credit portfolio setting, that may arise from the use of market equity data to estimate asset 
correlations.   
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, Frye (2008, p. 78) highlights some cases in which default and 
a shortfall of asset values below liability values may not correspond.  One of these cases 
is default due to a liquidity crunch for the borrower resulting in an inability to repay short 
term debts despite elevated asset values.  Another view of the break in the connection 
between default and shortfall is presented, that in which a shortfall in asset values does 
not lead to default due, for example, to an extension of further credit by the lending 
institution.  Other assumptions tested include the assumption of known liability values 
(versus randomly varying liabilities) and the use of unconditional asset correlations 
(versus conditional asset correlations); see Frye (2008). 
 
Notwithstanding these results on low correlations observed in our data, our 
implementation of both the CreditRisk
+
 and AVM frameworks has included a prudential 
adjustment bringing correlation levels in line with those observed under the Basel II IRB 
regulatory framework for portfolio credit risk.  That our estimated correlations might 
benefit from such a boost is not uncommon or unexpected; see, for example Dietsch and 
Petey (2002) and the discussion in Chapter 4.  Applying a similar adjustment to their 
internally estimated asset correlations, Dietsch and Petey (2002) use a normalized 
standard deviation setting greater than one and a modified to obtain “boosted” capital 
results comparable to those obtained under the Basel II IRB framework.  Boosted 
internally calibrated capital results are lower in both models as compared to Basel II, 
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these results are similar to those obtained in this Thesis when RG-SG calibrations are 
used; see Table 4 in Dietsch and Petey (2002, p. 317) and Table 6.5.  As expected, the 
elevated normalized volatility setting in Dietsch and Petey (2002) results in higher capital 
requirements under the CreditRisk
+
 framework as compared to the AVM.  Our results 
suggest that a unitary weight setting of CreditRisk
+
 could reverse this ranking.  
 
Under a simplified setting, Koyluoglu and Hickman (1998) show that the CreditRisk
+
 and 
AVM frameworks similar loss distributions for a wide range of parameter values – 
wherein the parameters studied included the average default rate, or PD, and the 
normalized PD standard deviations; see Koyluoglu and Hickman (1998, p. 15).  
Divergence in model results was observed for very high values of the normalized PD 
standard deviations, especially in the presence of very high or very low PDs.  
Additionally, and unsurprisingly, model results were found to differ significantly in the 
presence of inconsistent parameterizations of the models; see, Koyluoglu and Hickman 
(1998, p. 15).   
 
Finally, returning to our comparison of boosted EC results we observe under the 
CreditRisk
+
 framework, as under the AVM, a significant break in capital charge allocation 
as compared to the Basel II IRB framework.  Under CreditRisk
+
, as under the AVM 
framework, we observe strictly decreasing capital charges with increasing Size.  Under 
Basel II we note an overestimation of capital charges for the largest borrower segments 




Our exercise in boosting the parameters of the CreditRisk
+
 model in Chapter 6 reveals 
significantly lower capital charges than those obtained under Basel II.  Further fine-
tuning of this boosting methodology could lead to higher capital charges overall, with 
retain the pattern observed above.  Our work in this Chapter, as well as in Chapter 4 
reveals that further evidence against Basel II assumptions of correlation relationships 
with Size and PD.  This is especially revealed in our discussion of the various calibrations 
and settings for CreditRisk
+
.  As such, we will have presented the CreditRisk
+
 under three 
distinct exercises, that of the quantification of single sector and independent multiple 
sector approximation errors in Chapter 5; that of estimating a parameter-consistent 
calibration of CreditRisk
+
 to the AVM; and that of estimating Economic Capital charges 
under boosted asset correlations. 
 
 
Section 6.4. Conclusions  
 
Small and Medium Enterprise loans portfolios present a unique set of challenges to 
portfolio credit risk modellers and managers.  These challenges are rooted, in no small 
part, in the traditional calibrations of portfolio credit risk models on Corporate credit 
data, a necessity itself wrought from the general lack of default data available within 
individual institutions.   
 
As a response to this reliance on external data, the literature has responded by trying to 
present methods to calibrate portfolio credit risk models to SME data sets, generally 
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constructed over aggregated national data banks.  These have presented their own 
shortcomings, not least of which is the presence of default time series limited in span, and 
high degrees of diversification within the data sets, leading to a potential dilution of 
results. 
 
Notwithstanding these data constraints, estimates of SME portfolio credit risk from 
internal data have faced several challenges.  These include the challenge to provide 
consistent calibrations and parameterizations across varying models of SME portfolio 
credit risk; the challenge to compare to results obtained under external data sets, and; 
perhaps as a combination of the previous two points, the challenge to compare to 
prudential settings for portfolio credit risk, as presented under Basel II. 
 
In presenting prudential guidelines for the treatment of portfolio credit risk, along with 
specific formulations for the estimation of regulatory capital to meet these risks, Basel II 
presents specific characterizations of the credit risk among SME borrowers that open 
themselves up to testing.  Specifically, the underlying tool for the estimation of portfolio 
credit risks lies in an asymptotic single risk factor model calibrated to a 99.9% 
confidence level, and within which specific dictates on the relationship between a 
borrower’s sensitivity to the systematic risk factor, i.e., their asset correlation, and their 
size, as well as their probability of default.   
 
For SME borrowers we observe these dictates to include decreasing asset correlations 
with increasing probabilities of default, and decreasing asset correlations with decreasing 
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borrower size.  Furthermore, for the smallest borrowers, with low enough exposures to a 
given financial institution’s portfolio, with loans classified into the Retail-Other asset 
class, we observe an acknowledgement of a relaxation of these conditions such that asset 
correlations are no longer related to borrower size, and the relationship between 
probabilities of default and asset correlations is relaxed.  Meanwhile, the underlying 
theoretical and empirical bases for these settings have been shaky at best, in large part 
due to the data and modelling restriction constrictions discussed above.  
 
Our work in this Thesis has sought to tackle this broad span of challenges related to the 
estimation of SME portfolio credit risk and SME credit risk characteristics.  The crux of 
our work has centered on a unique portfolio of Canadian SME borrowers and loans 
spanning a significant time span and with enough depth to allow for meaningful 
segmentations of the data.  This segmentation allows us to derive robust results on the 
behaviour of different segments of an SME portfolio, and therefore tackle the question of 
SME parameter specifications, such as those presented in the Basel II IRB framework.  In 
addition, this data depth and segmentation has allowed us to pursue a consistent 
calibration of the asset value model (AVM) and the CreditRisk
+
 framework for the 
estimation of portfolio credit risk.   
 
Undertaking an estimation of asset correlations within a setting comparable to the Basel 
II IRB framework, our results revealed that SME borrowers’ asset correlations could not 
be found to have a strong relationship with either PD or Size.  In addition, internally 
estimated SME asset correlations were found to be considerably lower than those 
195 
 
observed in the Basel II IRB framework.  This result suggests some similarity with the 
Retail-Other asset class settings for SME borrowers’ asset correlations in the IRB 
framework, with a strict rejection of the presence of a positive relationship between asset 
correlations and probabilities of default.  An underlying driver in this result, and overall 
in this overall portfolio credit risk model, was found to be the ratio of the probability of 
default standard deviation to the average (or unconditional) probability of default, i.e., the 
normalized PD standard deviation. 
 
The unveiling of the normalized PD standard deviation as being a significant driver of 
portfolio credit risk has been reviewed in the literature, mostly in theoretical settings.  In 
particular, this driver has been shown to be a critical factor in the calibration of the 
CreditRisk
+
 model.  Given the lack of SME default data available, the calibrations of this 
factor has relied on Corporate data generally provided by external rating agencies such as 
Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s.  In addition, traditional calibrations of the AVM in this 
same insufficient default data environment has relied on external market-based equity 
data, alongside data from external rating agencies to estimate such parameters as the asset 
correlations.   
 
As such, these external calibrations have presented challenges to the consistent 
calibrations of the models. When consistent calibrations have been pursued, results have 
been cast into doubt due to their inconsistent comparison with market-based parameters.  
Specifically, asset correlations derived from default rate data were found to be very weak 




In an updated review of the literature on the calibration of asset correlations our Thesis 
presented arguments from the literature on inaccuracies incurred in the use of market-
based data to estimate correlations between borrowers in a credit environment.  
Meanwhile, further evidence from the literature was presented in support correlation 
levels generally lower to those found using market-based data in an AVM framework.   
 
The finding of low correlations has numerous consequences.  For one, the use of default 
data and the low correlations generated by it, allows for a corresponding calibration of 
the CreditRisk
+
 framework such that the model present similar loss distributions and 
Economic Capital results.  These consistent calibrations are found to be not only 
legitimate but realistic; suggesting an SME calibration for the CreditRisk
+
 framework 
single sector normalized risk factor standard deviation in the range of 0.25 to 0.5.  This 
finding is significant in an environment in which suggested calibrations for the 
CreditRisk
+
 model have been limited to settings derived from Corporate data.  Our ability 
to suggest this calibration is based on the depth of our data and our ability to consistently 
calibrate the CreditRisk
+
 model to the AVM framework using a unitary weight setting of 




Our findings of low correlations were also showed to imply a significant result for 
asymptotic implementations of the single factor AVM, such as that calibrated into the 
Basle II IRB framework.  In particular, our results showed a significant increase in 
granularity effects given the presence of low correlations in an SME portfolio.  This 
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effect can be perhaps explained by the predominant role played by idiosyncratic risks in 
the presence of low correlations.  When these idiosyncratic contributions to portfolio risk 
are assumed away, such as under an asymptotic framework, a significant underestimation 
of portfolio credit risk may arise.  This result was shown to hold even in a very large 
SME portfolio with several dozen thousand obligors. 
 
To our knowledge, this is the first time the level of asset correlations has been linked to 
the granularity effect in a portfolio.  The granularity has been a focus research since the 
release of the Basel II guidelines given the asymptotic nature of the framework in which 
portfolio credit risk is assessed – with links between the granularity effect and PD levels 
made in the literature.  Another aspect of the Basel II framework has attracted significant 
attention in the literature, that is the single sector aspect which has been shown to provide 
an overestimation of the portfolio credit risk in contrast to a multiple sector or risk factor 
setting in which diversity benefits are incorporated into the portfolio credit risk 
calculation.  Our work within the CreditRisk
+
 framework provided a measure of the 
overestimation that may be incurred when the single risk factor assumption is applied to 
an SME portfolio.  These results were generally in line with those observed in the 
literature. 
 
Finally, a major consequence of the low level of correlations addressed in this Thesis is 
the ultimately low capital figures generated, especially when compared to the Basel II 
framework.  To address this issue, and building on the significant default data 
segmentation available to us through our unique portfolio of SME borrowers and our 
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consistent parameterization of the CreditRisk
+
 and AVM frameworks, we are able to 
propose a prudential adjustment to our model parameters. In particular, we are able to 
boost asset correlations in the AVM to values observed in Basel II, and obtain a consistent 
parameterization of CreditRisk
+
 through calibrations to the normalized PD standard 
deviations. 
 
This exercise brings to light significant misallocation of capital in the Basel II 
framework, due primarily to asset correlation relationships discussed above, such that 
small SME borrowers obtain discounts to capital charges while larger SME borrowers are 
shown to have surcharge in capital under Basel II.  In addition, through this exercise we 
are able to confirm results on low asset correlations by comparing them to results for 
boosted asset correlations.  These boosted results show a dissipation of granularity effects 
observed under internally calibrated asset correlations, given all else constant we are 
thereby able to reaffirm low correlations as the source of the granularity effect.  Taking 
Size into account in the calibration of PDs and correlations results in an overemphasis in 
patterns of capital allocation observed under the traditional rating grade calibration of 
these parameters, while simultaneously lowering overall capital charges.  
 
Our contributions can be summarized as follows: 
 
1. A Comprehensive Analysis of an SME loans portfolio within a financial institution 
 We provide a very finely detailed description of an SME portfolio, including various 
breakdowns of risk characteristics, in terms of borrowers and borrower exposures.  
This level of analysis is difficult to find in the literature as it pertains to one 
institution, whereas in cases in which SME data has been collected and analyzed it 




2. A Detailed Schematic for SME Portfolio Credit Risk Input Data and Structure 
 We are able to segment this portfolio into homogenous groups of borrowers defined 
along credit risk dimensions such as size, industry, and risk grade.  For each 
borrower segment we generate probabilities of default.  Probabilities of default by 
risk grade, in particular, form the basis of credit risk management frameworks as 
stipulated under the Basel II prudential guidelines for portfolio credit risk.  A 
financial institution’s ability to treat its portfolio credit risk under the most advanced 
systems within Basel II is thus dependent on its ability to properly estimate the PDs 
associated with its internal risk grades.  Conversely, this data requirement is 
countered by the need to minimize data requirements and costs at financial 
institutions.  By contrasting the implementation of Basel II frameworks for portfolio 
credit risk management and internally-calibrated models for portfolio credit risk, we 
are able to highlight the minimal data requirements stipulated under Basel II.  In 
particular, the significant depth of our unique database allows for a fine segmentation 
of homogenous segments of our SME portfolio such that a dual-dimension system is 
defined.  As such, we are able to estimate credit risk measures, such as PDs and, 
later, correlations, for homogenous segments of borrowers defined by risk grade and 
size.  These credit risk measures form the underlying basis on which our work in this 
Thesis is conducted, both in testing the assumptions and relationships inherent in the 
Basel II treatment of SME portfolio credit risk, and in establishing internally-
calibrated models of our own.  The elevated data requirements accompanying the 
estimation of these models, and our ability to meet them in a robust manner, 
highlights the unique and important data source on which our results are based.   
 
3. A View of Conceptual & Pragmatic Implications of Basel II treatments for SMEs 
 We present a comprehensive analysis of the Basel II treatments for SME portfolio 
credit risk, underlining the assumptions used in the calculation of capital charges 
under the framework and the impacts these assumptions have on patterns of capital 
charges across SME borrower segments.  In particular, we study the Standardized 
Approach and the Internal Ratings Based (IRB) Approach to portfolio credit risk, 
and engage in a Partial Implementation exercise to test the impact of the assumptions 
within each implementation on capital charges.  Our focus is on SME borrower Size 
segments and our results reveal that the presence of two SME treatment possibilities 
in Basel II, i.e., the Corporate asset class treatment and the Retail-Other asset class 
treatment, open the door to dual regimes for SMEs such that the smallest can be 
treated under a certain set of assumptions and capital rules while the largest are 
treated under another.  Specifically, we find that the Corporate asset class treatment, 
with its elevated asset correlation values and their programmed positive relationship 
with Size and negative relationship with PD, provides for elevated capital charges for 
the largest SME borrowers.  The Retail-Other asset class treatment, which maintains 
the negative relationship with PD but does away with the size-based adjustment for 
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SME borrowers, maintains lower asset correlation settings for these borrowers and 
generates capital charge that are decreasing with increasing Size.  When applied 
together across a portfolio of SME borrowers of various Sizes, the result of this dual 
treatment is a U-shaped capital allocation with increasing borrower size.  Even when 
treating borrowers under one asset class, Corporate, we observe this U-shaped 
pattern in capital allocations, with our partial implementation exercise revealing the 
source to be the size adjustment applied to asset correlations. 
 
4. Empirical findings concerning SME Asset Correlations 
 Working within a single sector asset value model (AVM) framework similar to that of 
the Basel II IRB framework, and using robustly specified segments of our SME 
portfolio, defined according to Risk and Size Groups (RG and SG, respectively), 
especially including dual-dimension segmentations, we estimate asset correlations 
for an SME portfolio.  Our results show that SME portfolios typically exhibit low 
asset correlation values, and we find no empirical evidence of either a positive 
relationship with size or a negative relationship with PD.  This result runs counter to 
Basel II specifications of a negative relationship between asset correlations and PD, 
and counters the Corporate asset class assumption of a positive relationship between 
asset correlation and size.  In the finding of low asset correlation values and no 
relationship between asset correlations and size our results appear to provide some 
support to specifications under the Retail-Other treatment, however this support 
remains limited by that treatment’s programming of a negative relationship of asset 
correlations with PD, even if that relationship is weaker than under the Corporate 
asset class.  In addition, our results on the lack of relationships between asset 
correlations and size and PD, contrast with the literature wherein such relationships 
have been deduced from generally weak empirical evidence.  Our work in defining 
robust risk-size segments of SME borrowers allows us to present stronger evidence 
the presence of such relationships, or lack thereof. 
 
5. Increased Granularity Effects in SME credit portfolios with Low Asset Correlations 
 The presence of low asset correlations increases the approximation error generated 
by the use of an asymptotic framework in which idiosyncratic risks in a credit 
portfolio are assumed to be diversified away.  The assumption of a fully diversified 
portfolio, along with the assumption of a single sector or risk factor, forms the 
underlying basis of the Basel II portfolio credit risk framework.  Our findings appear 
within the context of a very large portfolio and show an approximation error, or 
granularity effect, of approximately 6%.  A figure higher than would be expected for 
such a large portfolio.  This result is the first, to our knowledge, to show empirical 





6. Empirical Evidence on the Economic Capital Impact of the Single Sector Assumption  
 Using the CreditRisk
+
 framework we are able to estimate the level of approximation 
error generated by another underlying assumption in the Basel II framework, the use 
of a single sector framework for the estimation of portfolio credit risk.  Our results 
show that for our portfolio of SME borrowers the use of a single risk factor can 
increase EC figures by approximately 40%.  The assumption of independence across 
multiple sectors in our portfolio was shown to underestimate Economic Capital 
charges by approximately 60%. 
 
7. A Consistent Calibration of Single Sector CreditRisk+ and Asset Value Models for 
SME Portfolio Credit Risk 
 We calibrate single sector AVM and CreditRisk
+
 models and show that the two 
models provide generally similar results if they are calibrated consistently.  Two 
calibration methodologies are presented for CreditRisk
+
, along with a simulation-
based implementation to enhance comparability.  Our results show that a calibration 
of the risk factor weights according to segment-specific ratios of the PD standard 
deviation to its unconditional mean, in the presence of a fixed sector normalized 
volatility figure of 0.5, generates segment-specific default correlations consistent 
with those observed in the AVM. In such a setting, the accompanying CreditRisk
+
 
loss distribution displays fatter tails that of the AVM implementation, and therefore 
produces higher EC values.  Alternatively, we show that a fixed unitary weight 
setting for the CreditRisk+ model, or a fixed normalized.   
 
8. An SME portfolio-specific calibration refinement for CreditRisk+ models 
 These fixed sector normalized volatility values of 0.5 and 0.25 are not commonly 
found in the literature, which has tended to focus on calibrations from Corporate 
borrowers.  These calibrations, along with the unitary weight calibration, therefore 
present SME-specific calibrations of the Single Sector CreditRisk
+
 model.  
 
9. A thorough Assessment of Basel II approaches to SME credit risk modelling 
The estimation of low correlation values in the empirical literature is not uncommon, 
and recent research has highlighted several potential sources for the discrepancy 
between correlations estimated from default or loss data, and correlations estimated 
from market-based sources.  We present a widely-applied ad hoc boost to our 
estimated correlations, calibrated from average correlations observed in the 
application of the Basel II AIRB framework to our portfolio.  This prudential 
adjustment allows us to generate EC figures that are prudentially comparable to the 
capital charges generated under the AIRB, but also take into account the SME 
portfolio credit risk characteristics revealed by our study.  Our results reveal that 
Basel II lead to misallocation of capital charges, such that in some cases, smaller and 
riskier SME borrowers are charged less than larger and safer SME borrowers.  These 
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Basel II capital charges can represent cases of under- or over-charging of capital to 
borrowers as compared to the capital charges they would incur under internally-
calibrated models of portfolio credit risk. 
 
10. Suggestions for an SME portfolio credit risk management framework 
 Taken as a whole our results suggest a choice, not only of internally calibrated 
portfolio credit risk models for financial institutions and regulators, but also a choice 
with respect to the calibration and application of regulatory standards and guidelines.  
In particular, we observe that despite the misallocation capital across SME borrower 
segments in Basel II, this condition may be alleviated through the removal of size-
based adjustments within SME segments.  Such a case exists in the Retail-Other 
treatment of SME borrowers, but is limited in its applicability to all SME segments 
due to exposure limits and other restrictions on its use.  The dropping or easing of 
these limits may provide avenue through which SME capital allocation within the 
framework may be corrected.  Our work also advises against too quick an attribution 
of correlation patterns across SME borrower segments.  In performing the empirical 
work we have in this Thesis, and in applying two models to the estimation of SME 
portfolio credit risk, we have sought to allow the data to speak and have endeavoured 
to find the calibrations and model specifications that best allow for this.  To that end, 
we found that the simulation-based AVM framework provides the freest setting in 
which to pursue such a study, with limited preconditions or assumptions placed on 
the overall framework.  In addition, this framework presents advantages in its ease of 
comparability with prudential guidelines.  Our adoption of a simulation-based 
implementation methodology in the CreditRisk
+
 framework, and our successful 
calibration of the model to our SME portfolio in a manner consistent with that of the 
AVM provides another avenue for SME portfolio credit risk measurement and 
management, and presents practitioners with a variety of settings to which the model 
structure can be set without some of the drawbacks usually associated with original 
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Appendix A – Chapter 4: The Asset Value Model (AVM) Mathematical Framework 
 
The introduction and implementation of the AVM in our Thesis is generally limited to a 
direct application of the mathematical structures contained within the model for the 
estimation of asset correlations and in the generation of a loss distribution for our 
portfolio of SME borrowers; see, for example, Subsection 4.1.1 and Appendix B.  In 
these pages we hope to illuminate the broader conceptual framework that allows for the 
use of a parsimonious set of empirical data for the estimation of asset correlations and 
portfolio credit losses using the AVM framework. 
 
Ultimately, our application of the AVM is centered on the use of a factor model to 
describe the relationship between any two borrowers in the Financing Company 
portfolio.  To that end, we introduce two borrowers in our portfolio, firms (i) and (j).  For 
these two borrowers we make four principle assumptions. 
 
Assumption 1:  A borrower’s capital structure is such that his assets are funded by 
a mixture of equity and debt (with a one year maturity).  Should 
the value of a borrower’s assets fall below the value of his debt at 
its due date, the borrower is in default. 
 
Assumption 2: The value of a borrower’s assets can be described by a geometric 
Brownian motion. 
 
Assumption 3: The asset value dynamics of any two borrowers are correlated 
through time. 
 
Assumption 4: The correlation structure between borrowers in our portfolio can 




Assumption 4 is important in several ways.  Firstly, taken with Assumptions 2 and 3, it 
allows us to reduce the relationship between two borrowers to one between two latent 
stochastic processes, easily described within a Gaussian environment.  Secondly, it 
allows for the parsimonious modeling of relationships across a portfolio of multiple 
borrowers. 
 
Below we will describe in greater detail the mathematical mechanisms which will allow 
us to move from a conceptual “balance sheet” framework, to a mathematical “latent 
variable” one.  In doing so, we will eliminate the need for substantial external data in the 
AVM framework, and limit ourselves to the use of internally observed default rate time 
series for homogenous segments of borrowers in our credit portfolio.  Here homogeneity 
will signify classes of borrowers with generally similar risk profiles, and identical 
probabilities of default as well as systematic risk factor weightings.  In presenting the 
AVM mathematical framework below we will rely on conventions presented in Grasselli 
and Hurd (2010) and Vasicek (2002). 
 
Specifically, we can write the value of a firm’s assets as (Ai) and describe its evolution as: 
 
   
    
  [          
 ]                                              (   ) 
 
For borrowers (i) and (j), (  ) and (  ) are correlated Brownian motions with a 
constant correlation parameter of (    ); see, for example, Grasselli and Hurd (2010, p. 
93).  Choosing a fixed time duration (  ) – say equal to one year – we can interpret 
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Equation (A.1) as relating firm (i)’s asset return, over the chosen time period, to the 
standardized normal random variable (  ): 
 
   (   
   





     √                                    (   ) 
 
For our two borrowers we are thus in a bivariate normal setting with a correlation of 
(    ) and standard normal marginal distributions.  Under this framework, we are thus 
able to link, not only, the probability of default for borrower (i) to the statistical 
properties of  (  ), but also obtain a value for the joint probability of default of 
borrowers (i) and (j) to both those borrowers’ standard normal latent variables and the 
correlation parameter (    ). 
 
Introducing our single factor framework, we can write, for firm (i): 
 
       √(    
 )                                                                (   ) 
 
where (Z) is the systematic factor, (  ) is the idiosyncratic factor and each is an 
independent standard normal variate.  The [asset] correlation between our two borrowers 
can thus be written as the product of the weights of each borrower’s latent variable on the 
systematic factor: 
 




In many applications, especially as they relate to publicly traded borrowers, the 
estimation of the correlation parameter is undertaken through the study of equity returns 
data – where equity returns act as proxies for asset returns; see, for example Grasselli and 
Hurd (2010, p. 94).  In Subsection 4.1.1 we present methodology introduced in Gordy 
(2000) for the estimation of asset correlations from historical default data within the 
AVM framework.   
 
The work in Subsection 4.1.1 elaborates on Equation (A.3) to a setting in which 
borrowers in a portfolio are placed in homogenous segments for which default rates are 
observed over time.  Using the mathematical framework presented here, in Subsection 
4.1.1 and in Appendix B, conditional independence is established between borrowers in 
the portfolio.  For every segment of borrowers in the portfolio, we are thus able to define 
a non-linear relationship between the segment unconditional probability of default, 
conditional probability of default variance, and systematic factor weighting.  Using a 
non-parametric methods we use our empirical default rates to estimate the weightings 




Appendix B – Chapter 4: The Vasicek Asymptotic Single Factor Model 
 
Vasicek (2002) defines a portfolio of (n) identical borrowers for whom default at the end 
of a given period (say 1 year) is determined by the comparative level of their assets to 
their liabilities.  Those borrowers whose liabilities exceed their assets at the end of the 
given period are determined to be in default.  For any borrower (i), the probability of 
default within this one year period is defined as (p).  For any two borrowers in this 
portfolio, the asset value correlation is defined as (ρ). 
 
For any borrower (i) the gross loss given default as a proportion of exposure, is defined 
as (  ), such that:  
 
   {
                   
          
}                                               (   ) 
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For each borrower, the dynamics of the asset value are determined by a latent variable Xi, 
such that the set of latent variables {X1, X2, … , Xn} is jointly standard normal, and Xi is 
defined as a function of a systematic factor Y and a borrower-specific idiosyncratic factor 




More specifically, we define (Xi) as: 
 
   √   √                                                                (   ) 
 
Characterising the systematic factor as being representative of the state of the economy, 
the borrower’s dependence on the business cycle can be measured by the weighting √  
on Y.   Given the unconditional probability of default (p), a borrower’s status at the end of 
a given time horizon of one year is set to default if: 
 
√   √        
  ( )                                                    (   )                                               
 
where    ( ) denotes the inverse standard normal cumulative distribution function.  
Conditional on a fixed realization of (Y) of the state of the economy the conditional 
probability of default and loss for a borrower (i) is given by:  
 
 ( )    [   
   ( )  √  
√   
| ]   [
   ( )  √  
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]                      (   ) 
 
where the unconditional probability of default (p) is the average of the conditional 
probabilities over all realizations of (Y).  Given (Y), the random variables (Xi) and the 




Recall, all obligors in the portfolio are identical.  This uniformity of borrower 
characteristics applies not only to probabilities of default and correlations, but also to 
dollar exposures.  Recall, also, (L) in Equation (B.2) giving the portfolio gross 
proportional loss. Given as a proportion of the total number of borrowers in the portfolio, 
Equation (B.2) can be considered to give the portfolio default rate at the end of our one 
year period Elizalde (2005, p. 9).  Given the independence of defaults conditional on the 
realization of (Y) Vasicek (2002) uses the law of large numbers to show that (L) 
converges to the individual borrower uniform conditional probability of default p(Y).  
Therefore, the portfolio loss distribution can be defined according to the cumulative 
distribution function:  
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with the inverse distribution, or the (α)-percentile value of (L) given by:  
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The mean and variance of the distribution are respectively given by: 
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To recap, Vasicek (2002) assumes a portfolio of borrowers with uniform exposures, 
probabilities of default and asset correlations.  For this portfolio, unconditional 
probabilities of default are given and, without loss of generality, it can also be assumed 
that recovery (or net loss given default) rates are uniform across borrowers and 
deterministic Elizalde (2005).  Finally, it is assumed that the number of borrowers in the 
portfolio is sufficiently large,        
 
Given these assumptions, and building on Vasicek (1987) and Vasicek (1991), Vasicek 
(2002) provides an asymptotic single factor model for the estimation of portfolio credit 
losses.  This approximating asymptotic portfolio loss distribution is shown to hold even if 
borrower exposures are not uniform but with a large number of borrowers not one or a 




Appendix C – Chapter 5: CreditRisk+ Default Correlations and Capital Allocation 
 
As a final step, and having generated a portfolio loss distribution, CreditRisk
+
 provides 
the framework within which pairwise correlations can be calculated and Economic 
Capital allocated; see Credit Suisse (1997, pp. 52-57) and Gundlach (2004, p. 13).  
 
In order to calculate pairwise correlation between two obligors, “h” and “i", in the same 
sector “k”, the following relation is used: 
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Further details can be found at Credit Suisse (1997, pp. 56-57) and Gundlach (2004, p. 
13).  In order to determine capital allocation, we first define the portfolio loss distribution 
variance as derived in Credit Suisse (1997, pp. 54-55): 
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Next, we determine each obligor i’s capital charge by first calculating the obligor’s “Risk 
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such that,  
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To transform RCi into the “Risk Capital Contribution” (RCKi), we first define a 
multiplier to our given loss distribution tail percentile, such that: 
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where Q denotes the quantile at which the VaR is calculated.  Then, RCKi is defined as: 
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For further details refer to Credit Suisse (1997, pp. 52-53).   
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For the Multiple Correlated Sectors implementation, Burgisser, Kurth, Wagner, and Wolf 
(1999, p. 6) show that, for a unitary weight setting, Equaiton (C.2) can be replaced by 
Equation (5.24) such that the risk contribution for an obligor to the portfolio standard 
deviation can be written as follows: 
 
   
   
     
  (  )










     
)          (   ) 
 















Figure 1.1 present an organizational flowchart of the structure of this Thesis highlighting the main issues 
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Figure 2.1A gives the distribution of borrowers across Risk Ratings and Size Buckets for the Financing 
Company portfolio as of March 2009.  On the z-axis is the proportion of borrowers in the overall portfolio 
in a given segment, while the x-axis provides the Size Buckets, ranging from ≤$100,000 to >$5,000,000.  





































































Figure 2.1B shows the distribution of $OS across Risk Ratings and Size Buckets for the Financing 
Company portfolio as of March 2009.  On the z-axis is the proportion of overall portfolio $OS in each 
segment, while the x-axis provides the Size Buckets, ranging from ≤$100,000 to >$5,000,000.  On the y-











































Figure 2.2A shows the distribution of borrowers across Industries and Size Buckets for the Financing 
Company portfolio as of March 2009.  On the y-axis is the number of borrowers in each segment, while the 
z-axis provides the Size Buckets, ranging from ≤$100,000 to >$5,000,000.  On the x-axis are the Industries 
starting, from left to right, with Business Services (BUS); Construction (CON); Manufacturing (MAN); 
Non-Business Services (NBUS); Resources (RES); Retail (RET); Supplier or Premises (SOP); Tourism 


































































Figure 2.2B gives the distribution of borrower $OS across Industries and Risk Ratings for the Financing 
Company portfolio as of March 2009.  On the y-axis is the proportion of overall portfolio $OS in each 
segment, while the z-axis provides the Size Buckets, ranging from ≤$100,000 to >$5,000,000.  On the x-
axis are the Industries.  Note that for illustrative purpose for this figure, the alphabetical ordering of the 
industries presented throughout has been altered.  The industries, in alphabetical order, are as follows: 
Business Services (BUS); Construction (CON); Manufacturing (MAN); Non-Business Services (NBUS); 
Resources (RES); Retail (RET); Supplier or Premises (SOP); Tourism (TOU); Transportation and Storage 
























































Figure 2.3A shows the distribution of borrowers across Industries and Risk Ratings for the Financing 
Company portfolio as of March 2009.  On the y-axis is the proportion of the overall portfolio borrowers in 
each segment, while the z-axis provides the Risk Ratings, ranging from 1 (least risky) to 9 (most risky).  On 
the x-axis are the Industries.  Note that for illustrative purpose for this figure, the alphabetical ordering of 
the industries presented throughout has been altered.  The industries, in alphabetical order, are as follows: 
Business Services (BUS); Construction (CON); Manufacturing (MAN); Non-Business Services (NBUS); 
Other (OTH); Resources (RES); Retail (RET); Supplier or Premises (SOP); Tourism (TOU); 




































































Figure 2.3B gives the distribution of borrower $OS across Industries and Risk Ratings for the Financing 
Company portfolio as of March 2009.  On the y-axis is the proportion of overall portfolio $OS in each 
segment, while the z-axis provides the Risk Ratings, ranging from 1 (least risky) to 9 (most risky).  On the 
x-axis are the Industries.  Note that for illustrative purpose for this figure, the alphabetical ordering of the 
industries presented throughout has been altered.  The industries, in alphabetical order, are as follows: 
Business Services (BUS); Construction (CON); Manufacturing (MAN); Non-Business Services (NBUS); 
Other (OTH); Resources (RES); Retail (RET); Supplier or Premises (SOP); Tourism (TOU); 





























































Borrower Distribution across Geographic Region and Industry 
 
 
Figure 2.4A shows the distribution of borrowers across Geographic Region and Industry for the Financing 
Company portfolio as of March 2009.  On the y-axis is the proportion of overall portfolio borrowers in each 
segment, while the z-axis provides the Geographic Regions.  Note that for illustrative purposes for this 
figure, the alphabetical ordering of the provinces/territories presented throughout has been altered.  The 
provinces/territories, in alphabetical order, are as follows: Alberta (AL); British Columbia (B.C.); Manitoba 
(MN); New Brunswick (N.B.); Newfoundland and Labrador (N. & L.); Northwest Territories and Nunavut 
(N.W.T.); Nova Scotia (N.S.); Ontario (ON); Prince Edward Island (P.E.I.); Quebec (QC); Saskatchewan 
(SK); the Yukon (YK).  On the x-axis are the Industries.  Note that for illustrative purpose for this figure, 
the alphabetical ordering of the industries presented throughout has been altered.  The industries, in 
alphabetical order, are as follows: Business Services (BUS); Construction (CON); Manufacturing (MAN); 
Non-Business Services (NBUS); Other (OTH); Resources (RES); Retail (RET); Supplier of Premises 


























































Figure 2.4B gives the distribution of borrower $OS across Geographic Region and Industry for the 
Financing Company portfolio as of March 2009.  On the y-axis is the proportion of overall portfolio $OS in 
each segment, while the z-axis provides the provinces/territories.  Note that for illustrative purposes for this 
figure, the alphabetical ordering of the provinces/territories presented throughout has been altered.  The 
provinces/territories, in alphabetical order, are as follows: Alberta (AL); British Columbia (B.C.); Manitoba 
(MN); New Brunswick (N.B.); Newfoundland & Labrador (N. & L.); Northwest Territories and Nunavut 
(N.W.T.); Nova Scotia (N.S.); Ontario (ON); Prince Edward Island (P.E.I.); Quebec (QC); Saskatchewan 
(SK); the Yukon (YK).  On the x-axis are the Industries.  Note that for illustrative purpose for this figure, 
the alphabetical ordering of the industries presented throughout has been altered.  The industries, in 
alphabetical order, are as follows: Business Services (BUS); Construction (CON); Manufacturing (MAN); 
Non-Business Services (NBUS); Other (OTH); Resources (RES); Retail (RET); Supplier or Premises 





















































Figure 2.5A shows the distribution of borrowers across Geographic Region and Size Bucket for the 
Financing Company portfolio as of March 2009.  On the y-axis is the proportion of overall portfolio 
borrowers in each segment, while the x-axis provides the Geographic Regions.  Note that for illustrative 
purposes for this figure, the alphabetical ordering of the provinces/territories presented throughout has been 
altered.  The provinces/territories, in alphabetical order, are as follows: Alberta (AL); British Columbia 
(B.C.); Manitoba (MN); New Brunswick (N.B.); Newfoundland & Labrador (N. & L.); Northwest 
Territories and Nunavut (N.W.T.); Nova Scotia (N.S.); Ontario (ON); Prince Edward Island (P.E.I.); 
Quebec (QC); Saskatchewan (SK); the Yukon (YK).  On the z-axis are the Size Buckets, ranging from 





























































Figure 2.5B gives the distribution of borrower $OS across Geographic Region and Size Bucket for the 
Financing Company portfolio as of March 2009.  On the y-axis is the proportion of overall portfolio $OS in 
each segment, while the x-axis provides the provinces/territories.  Note that for illustrative purposes for this 
figure, the alphabetical ordering of the provinces/territories presented throughout has been altered.  The 
provinces/territories, in alphabetical order, are as follows: Alberta (AL); British Columbia (B.C.); Manitoba 
(MN); New Brunswick (N.B.); Newfoundland & Labrador (N. & L.); Northwest Territories and Nunavut 
(N.W.T.); Nova Scotia (N.S.); Ontario (ON); Prince Edward Island (P.E.I.); Quebec (QC); Saskatchewan 
(SK); the Yukon (YK).  ).  On the z-axis are the Size Buckets, ranging from ≤$100,000 to >$5,000,000.   





























































Figure 2.6 displays the concentration of borrowers (top) and $OS (bottom) in a given industry at yearly 
intervals starting in December 1997 and ending in December 2010.  The industries, in alphabetical order, 
are as follows: Business Services (BUS); Construction (CON); Manufacturing (MAN); Non-Business 
Services (NBUS); Other (OTH); Resources (RES); Retail (RET); Supplier or Premises (SOP); Tourism 
(TOU); Transportation and Storage (TRS); Wholesale (WHS).  Figure 2.6 indicates MAN to be the 
predominant industry in the portfolio.  Significant increases in borrower concentration, from the start of the 
evaluation period to the end of it, can be observed for the BUS and NBUS industries, while significant 
decreases in portfolio concentration are observed for the SOP and TOU industries.  Decreases in $OS 
concentration, from the start of the evaluation period to the end of it, can be observed for the TOU and SOP 
industries – although for the latter a resurgence is noted in 2009 and 2010.  A moderate increase in $OS 
































































































Figure 2.7 displays the concentration of borrowers (top) and $OS (bottom) in a given Risk Rating at yearly 
intervals starting in December 1997 and ending in December 2010, with Risk Ratings ranging from 1 (least 
risky) to 9 (most risky).  Figure 2.7 indicates a significant but gradual increase in the borrower 
concentration in the 9 RR, from 1% in 1997 to 12% in 2010, reaching a peak of 14% in 2008.  In addition, 
from 1997 to 2010 we observe a migration in the portfolio towards higher concentrations of borrowers in 
the 1 to 4 RRs, accompanied by a significant decrease in the concentration of borrowers in the 6 and 7 RRs 
(along with a moderate decrease in the 5 RR).  Comparing 2009 and 2010 to 1997 and 1998, we observe a 
more uniform distribution of $OS, with the 9 RR accounting for the smallest percentage of $OS in both 





























































































Figure 2.8 displays the concentration of borrowers (top) and $OS (bottom) in a given Size Bucket at yearly 
intervals starting in December 1997 and ending in December 2010.  Size Buckets range from ≤$100,000 to 
>$5,000,000 and are based on the total commitment to a borrower (including commitment to other 
“related” borrowers under the same ownership) at last authorization.  Results from Table 2.9 indicate a 
fairly stable distribution of borrowers across the evaluation period, with a slight increase in the 
concentration of borrowers in Size Buckets of $3,000,000 or more going from 1997 to 2010.  In terms of 
$OS concentration, we observe a significant increase (decrease) in the concentration of $OS in Size 




































































































Figure 2.9 provides the annual default rate by Industry for the period starting January 1997 and ending 
December 2010.  The industries, in alphabetical order, are as follows: Business Services (BUS); 
Construction (CON); Manufacturing (MAN); Non-Business Services (NBUS); Other (OTH); Resources 
(RES); Retail (RET); Supplier or Premises (SOP); Tourism (TOU); Transportation and Storage (TRS); 
Wholesale (WHS).  To calculate annual default rates, the number of defaulted borrowers over a given 
calendar year is divided by the number of borrowers at the beginning of that calendar year, so that for the 
2008 calendar year, defaults from January 2008 to December 2008 are summed and divided by the number 




































Figure 2.10 shows the annual default rate by Risk Rating for the period starting January 1997 and ending 
December 2010.  Risk Ratings range from 1 (least risky) to 9 (most risky).  To calculate annual default 
rates the number of defaulted borrowers over a given calendar year is divided by the number of borrowers 
at the beginning of that calendar year, so that for the 2008 calendar year, defaults from January 2008 to 
December 2008 are summed and divided by the number of healthy borrowers as of December 31, 2007.  













































































Figure 2.11 provides the annual default rate by Size Bucket for the period starting January 1997 and ending 
December 2010.  Size Buckets, denoted in the graph in (‘000), range from ≤$100,000 to >$5,000,000 and 
are based on the total commitment to a borrower (including commitment to other “related” borrowers under 
the same ownership) at last authorization.  To calculate annual default rates the number of defaulted 
borrowers over a given calendar year is divided by the number of borrowers at the beginning of that 
calendar year, so that for the 2008 calendar year, defaults from January 2008 to December 2008 are 
































IRB Asset Correlations for Corporate and Retail-Other Asset Classes 
 
 
Figure 3.1 plots the Basel II IRB approach asset correlations under the Corporate and Retail-Other asset 
classes across various values of the Probability of Default and excluding any Size adjustments.  See 



























Financing Company PD by Risk Rating and Size Bucket 
 
 
Figure 3.2 – Probability of Default (“PD”) figures are calculated by Risk Rating (“RR”) – Size Bucket 
(“Size”) segments.  PDs are calculated using realized annual default rate data from 1997 to 2010.  Results 


































































































Figure 3.3 depicts the Probability of Default for each Industry-Risk Rating segment, with Risk Ratings 
ranging from 1 (least risky) to 9 (most risky).  Probabilities of Default and their standard of deviations are 
calculated over a period spanning 14 years starting in January 1997 and ending in December 2010.  
Defaults were aggregated over a given calendar year and then divided over the count of healthy customers 
at the start of the year.  A weighted average of default rates over the time period then gives the PDs 
presented above.  In addition, defaults were segregated by Risk Rating and Industry as defined in Chapter 






















































Figure 3.4 depicts the Probability of Default for each Industry-Size Bucket segment.  Probabilities of 
Default and their standard of deviations are calculated over a period spanning 14 years starting in January 
1997 and ending in December 2010.  Defaults were aggregated over a given calendar year and then divided 
over the count of healthy customers at the start of the year.  A weighted average of default rates over the 
time period then gives the PDs presented above.  In addition, defaults were segregated by Risk Rating and 











































Figure 4.1 plots the Basel II IRB asset correlations under the Corporate and Retail-Other asset classes 
(excluding Size adjustments) as applied to exposures in the Financing Portfolio in various Risk Groups.  
These asset correlations are compared to internally calibrated asset correlations as derived according to the 


































































Loss Distributions with Boosted and Non-Boosted Asset Correlations 
 
 
Figure 4.2 depicts simulation-based loss distributions generated using boosted and non-boosted asset 
correlations.  The top panel depicts loss distributions using RG-based asset correlation calibrations; the 













































































































































































































































































Figure 5.1 – Economic Capital (%) charges are calculated under RG-SG calibrations and various 
implementations of the CreditRisk
+
 framework, including (a) Single Sector implementation; (b) Multiple 
Sector implementation, and; (c).  Industry segregations are used to define sectors – both in the standard 






























































































































Figure 5.2 – Economic Capital (%) charges are calculated under RG-SG calibrations and various 
implementations of the CreditRisk
+
 framework, including (a) Single Sector implementation; (b) Multiple 
Sector implementation, and; (c) Multiple Correlated Sectors implementation.  Industry segregations are 























































































































































































Figure 5.3 depicts the portfolio loss distributions obtained under various implementations of the analytical 
CreditRisk
+
 framework.  We use both RG- and RG-SG-calibrations of the model according to Single 
Sector, Multiple Sectors, and Multiple Correlated Sectors implementations.  Sectors here are defined by 



































































































































































































































































Loss as a (%) of $OS
Single Sector (RG)
Multiple Sector (RG)
Multiple Correlated Sectors (RG)
Single Sector (RGxSG)
Multiple Sector (RGxSG)











Figure 6.1 presents the loss distributions generated under the single factor simulation-based AVM and 
CreditRisk
+
 models.  The top panel presents results under various implementations using internally-












































































































































































































































Comparing AVM and CreditRisk
+




Figure 6.2 presents loss distributions for various calibrations and implementations of the simulation-based 
AVM and CreditRisk
+
 frameworks.  The top panel presents implementations using the RG and RG-SG 
calibrations of both models, the middle panel presents boosted calibrations of both models, and the third 
panel presents boosted and non-boosted calibrations together.  Distributional statistics can be found in 
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Figure 6.3 presents the tails of the loss distributions shown in Figure 6.1, and includes distributions 
generated under the single factor simulation-based AVM and CreditRisk
+
 models.  The top panel presents 
results under various implementations using internally-calibrated data, while the bottom panel shows loss 
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AVM (RGxSG) Boost










Cumulative Borrower and $OS Distributions in the Financing Company Portfolio 
 
Full Portfolio as of March 2009 
$OS Threshold 
Percentile of Borrowers 
≤ Threshold 
Percentile of Borrower 
$OS ≤ Threshold 
 $10,000 4.7% 0.1% 
 $25,000 13.6% 0.4% 
 $50,000 27.4% 1.7% 
 $100,000 43.0% 4.5% 
 $150,000 55.5% 8.3% 
 $250,000 67.3% 13.9% 
 $500,000 80.3% 25.1% 
 $1,000,000 89.4% 40.7% 
 $3,000,000 97. 9% 74.7% 
 $5,000,000 99.3% 88.0% 
 $50,000,000 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 2.1 provides a description of the Financing Company portfolio as of March 2009.  The table provides 
descriptions of the portfolio at various thresholds on the $OS values for a single borrower.  As an example, 
consider the fourth row of the table wherein we examine the $25,000 $OS threshold.  From Table 2.1 we 
observe that approximately 14% of borrowers in the Financing Company portfolio have $OS of $25,000 or 







Borrowers Segregated into Risk Ratings (RR) and Size Buckets 
 
 
For Each RR: Distribution of Borrowers across Size Buckets (%) 
 
Size Bucket (‘000) 
Risk Rating ≤ $100 $100 - $250 $250 - $1000 $1000 - $3000 $3000 - $5000 > $5000 Overall 
1 13.9  19.0  28.8  23.4  7.2  7.7  100.0  
2 11.3  20.2  34.6  22.5  5.6  5.7  100.0  
3 18.8  26.3  28.7  16.4  4.8  4.9  100.0  
4 19.2  23.8  31.3  17.0  4.6  4.1  100.0  
5 17.0  24.3  35.6  15.6  3.9  3.5  100.0  
6 13.1  20.4  38.6  20.0  4.6  3.4  100.0  
7 20.7  23.3  35.8  14.6  3.7  1.9  100.0  
8 32.4  27.6  28.9    8.1  1.6  1.3  100.0  
9 58.1  25.0  12.2    3.7  0.7  0.3  100.0  
Overall 24.7  23.9  30.1  14.4  3.7  3.2  100.0  
 
For Each Size Bucket: Distribution of Borrowers across RR (%) 
1     3.2      4.5      5.5       9.3    11.3    14.0      5.7  
2     4.0      7.3      9.9    13.4    13.1    15.6      8.6  
3     8.6   12.4    10.8    12.8    14.9    17.5     11.3  
4     8.1   10.4    10.8    12.2    13.1    13.5     10.4  
5     8.1   11.9    13.8    12.7    12.5    13.1     11.7  
6     5.1     8.2    12.3    13.4    12.1    10.2      9.7  
7   11.4   13.2    16.1     13.7    13.7     8.2    13.6  
8   21.3   18.7    15.5      9.1     7.0     6.9    16.2  
9   30.2   13.4      5.2      3.3     2.4      1.1    12.8  
Overall 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  
 
Distribution of Borrowers across RR & Size Buckets (%) 
1   0.8    1.1    1.7    1.3  0.4  0.4      5.7  
2   1.0    1.7    3.0    1.9  0.5  0.5      8.6  
3   2.1    3.0    3.2    1.9  0.5  0.6    11.3  
4   2.0    2.5    3.3    1.8  0.5  0.4    10.4  
5   2.0    2.8    4.2    1.8  0.5  0.4    11.7  
6   1.3    2.0    3.7    1.9  0.4  0.3      9.7  
7   2.8    3.2    4.9    2.0  0.5  0.3    13.6  
8   5.3    4.5    4.7    1.3  0.3  0.2    16.2  
9   7.4    3.2    1.6    0.5  0.1  0.0    12.8  
Overall 24.7  23.9  30.1  14.4  3.7  3.2  100.0  
 
Table 2.2A describes the distribution of Financing Company borrowers, as of March 2009 across Risk 
Ratings and Size Buckets.  The portfolio consists of borrowers and $OS in Risk Ratings ranging from 1 
(least risky) to 9 (riskiest).  Size Buckets range from ≤$100,000 to >$5,000,000 and are based on the total 
commitment to a borrower at last authorization.  Table 2.2A is segregated into three sections: the top 
section describes the distribution of borrowers across Size Buckets for each Risk Rating; the second section 
describes the distribution of borrowers across Risk Ratings for each Size Bucket, and; the third section 





Borrower $OS Segregated into Risk Ratings (RR) and Size Buckets 
 
 
For Each RR: Distribution of Borrower $OS across Size Buckets (%) 
 
Size Bucket (‘000) 
Risk Rating ≤ $100 $100 - $250 $250 - $1000 $1000 - $3000 $3000 - $5000 > $5000 Overall 
1 0.8      2.9  12.0  29.1  17.2  38.1  100.0  
2 0.6      3.3  15.9  32.4  16.5  31.2  100.0  
3 1.5      5.7  16.6  31.7  16.0  28.4  100.0  
4 1.5     5.2  17.9  28.8  17.2  29.4  100.0  
5 1.4     5.8  22.4  30.6  15.7  24.2  100.0  
6 0.8     4.6  22.8  34.8  16.7  20.3  100.0  
7 1.8     6.0  27.0  33.8  15.9  15.5  100.0  
8 4.2   11.3  30.7  27.7  11.3  14.9  100.0  
9 18.5   21.7  24.2  23.3    8.7    3.6  100.0  
Overall 2.1    6.0  20.7  31.0  15.7  24.5  100.0  
 
For Each Size Bucket: Distribution of Borrower $OS across RR (%) 
1    3.7       4.5      5.5     8.9    10.4     14.7      9.5  
2    4.0       7.0      9.8    13.2    13.4     16.2     12.7  
3   10.0     12.9    10.8    13.8    13.9     15.7     13.5  
4    9.0     10.8    10.9    11.7    13.9     15.2     12.6  
5    8.9     12.8    14.5    13.2    13.4     13.3     13.4  
6    4.8       9.4    13.7    14.0    13.3     10.4     12.5  
7   11.1     12.7    16.7    14.0    13.1      8.2     12.8  
8   19.6     18.2    14.4      8.7     7.0      5.9      9.7  
9   29.0     11.7      3.8      2.4      1.8      0.5      3.3  
Overall 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  
 
Distribution of Borrower $OS across RR & Size Buckets (%) 
1 0.1  0.3     1.1    2.8    1.6   3.6      9.5  
2 0.1  0.4     2.0    4.1    2.1   4.0    12.7  
3 0.2  0.8     2.2    4.3    2.2   3.8    13.5  
4 0.2  0.7     2.3    3.6    2.2   3.7    12.6  
5 0.2  0.8     3.0    4.1    2.1   3.3    13.4  
6 0.1  0.6     2.8    4.3    2.1   2.5    12.5  
7 0.2  0.8     3.5    4.3    2.0   2.0    12.8  
8 0.4  1.1    3.0    2.7    1.1   1.4      9.7  
9 0.6  0.7    0.8    0.8    0.3    0.1      3.3  
Overall 2.1  6.0  20.7  31.0  15.7  24.5  100.0  
 
Table 2.2B describes the distribution of Financing Company $OS, as of March 2009 across Risk Ratings 
and Size Buckets.  The portfolio consists of borrowers and $OS in Size Buckets ranging from ≤$100,000 to 
>$5,000,000 and based on the total commitment to a borrower at last authorization.  Risk Ratings range 
from 1 (least risky) to 9 (riskiest).  Table 2.2B is segregated into three sections: the top section describes 
the distribution of borrower $OS across Size Buckets for each Risk Rating; the second section describes the 
distribution of borrower $OS across Risk Ratings for each Size Bucket, and; the third section describes the 






Distribution of Borrowers across Industries and Size Bucket 
 
 
For Each Industry: Distribution of Borrowers across Size Buckets (%) 
Industry 
Size Bucket (‘000) 
Overall 
≤ $100 $100 - $250 $250 - $1000 $1000 - $3000 $3000 - $5000 > $5000 
BUS 34.8  29.8  24.7  8.5  1.4  0.8  100.0  
CON 25.8  24.3  32.3  13.4  2.0  2.1  100.0  
MAN 19.0  19.8  31.4  19.6  5.7  4.4  100.0  
NBUS 30.7  25.5  30.1  10.6  1.5  1.6  100.0  
OTH 33.8  26.2  25.5  11.0  1.7  1.7  100.0  
RES 24.7  24.0  30.8  13.8  3.9  2.8  100.0  
RET 26.7  25.9  26.9  13.1  4.1  3.2  100.0  
SOP   4.0  14.3  44.5  23.8  6.7  6.6  100.0  
TOU 21.0  26.1  33.7  12.3  3.8  3.1  100.0  
TRS 22.3  20.0  34.3  14.0  4.5  4.9  100.0  
WHS 27.0  25.8  24.9  15.2  3.3  3.7  100.0  
Overall 24.7  23.9  30.1  14.4  3.7  3.2  100.0  
 
For Each Size Bucket: Distribution of Borrowers across Industries (%) 
BUS   12.5     11.0      7.3     5.2     3.4       2.2       8.9  
CON     8.3       8.0      8.5     7.4     4.4        5.2       7.9  
MAN   18.5     19.9    25.0    32.6   37.1      33.7     24.0  
NBUS   15.5     13.2    12.4     9.1     5.1       6.2     12.4  
OTH     4.7       3.7      2.9     2.6     1.6       1.9      3.4  
RES     2.8       2.9      2.9      2.7     3.0       2.5      2.8  
RET    14.3      14.3    11.8    12.0   14.6     13.5     13.2  
SOP     0.5       2.0      5.0     5.6     6.2      7.1      3.4  
TOU     9.1    11.6    11.9     9.0    11.1    10.5    10.6  
TRS    3.6      3.4     4.6     3.9     5.0      6.2      4.0  
WHS   10.2    10.0      7.7     9.8     8.4    11.0      9.3  
Overall 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  
 
Distribution of Borrowers across Industries & Size Buckets (%) 
BUS 3.1  2.6  2.2  0.8  0.1  0.1  8.9  
CON 2.0  1.9  2.6  1.1  0.2  0.2  7.9  
MAN 4.6  4.8  7.5  4.7  1.4  1.1  24.0  
NBUS 3.8  3.2  3.7  1.3  0.2  0.2  12.4  
OTH 1.2  0.9  0.9  0.4  0.1  0.1  3.4  
RES 0.7  0.7  0.9  0.4  0.1  0.1  2.8  
RET 3.5  3.4  3.6  1.7  0.5  0.4  13.2  
SOP 0.1  0.5  1.5  0.8  0.2  0.2  3.4  
TOU 2.2  2.8  3.6  1.3  0.4  0.3  10.6  
TRS 0.9  0.8  1.4  0.6  0.2  0.2  4.0  
WHS 2.5  2.4  2.3  1.4  0.3  0.3  9.3  
Overall 24.7  23.9  30.1  14.4  3.7  3.2  100.0  
 
Table 2.3A describes borrowers in the Financing Company portfolio, as of March 2009 and following the 
same specifications as those given for Table 2.2, are segregated into Industries and Size Buckets.  The 
industries, in alphabetical order, are as follows: Business Services (BUS); Construction (CON); 
Manufacturing (MAN); Non-Business Services (NBUS); Resources (RES); Retail (RET); Supplier or 






Distribution of Borrower $OS across Industries and Size Bucket 
 
 
For Each Industry: Distribution of Borrower $OS across Size Buckets (%) 
Industry 
Size Bucket (‘000) 
Overall 
≤ $100 $100 - $250 $250 - $1000 $1000 - $3000 $3000 - $5000 > $5000 
BUS 4.9  13.2  27.9  32.9  11.5  9.6  100.0  
CON 2.7  7.7  25.0  33.0  9.8  21.9  100.0  
MAN 1.2  3.8  16.8  31.1  18.5  28.6  100.0  
NBUS 3.8  10.2  33.2  31.6  9.6  11.6  100.0  
OTH 3.8  9.6  25.4  37.8  10.6  12.8  100.0  
RES 1.9  6.6  23.3  30.5  16.6  21.1  100.0  
RET 2.4  6.7  19.4  30.3  17.6  23.6  100.0  
SOP 0.2  1.8  17.5  29.5  17.1  33.9  100.0  
TOU 1.7  6.3  22.7  28.8  16.5  24.0  100.0  
TRS 1.5  3.8  19.2  25.9  16.5  33.1  100.0  
WHS 2.5  6.5  16.9  33.8  13.6  26.8  100.0  
Overall 2.1  6.0  20.7  31.0  15.7  24.5  100.0  
 
For Each Size Bucket: Distribution of Borrower $OS across Industries (%)  
BUS 12.2  11.2  6.9  5.4  3.7  2.0  5.1  
CON 8.4  8.3  7.9  6.9  4.1  5.8  6.5  
MAN 18.4  19.4  25.2  31.2  36.8  36.4  31.1  
NBUS 14.6  13.4  12.7  8.1  4.8  3.8  7.9  
OTH 4.3  3.7  2.9  2.9  1.6  1.2  2.4  
RES 2.4  2.9  3.0  2.6  2.8  2.3  2.7  
RET 15.1  14.5  12.2  12.7  14.6  12.6  13.0  
SOP 0.6  1.6  4.6  5.2  5.9  7.5  5.4  
TOU 9.4  12.0  12.5  10.6  12.1  11.2  11.4  
TRS 3.8  3.3  4.8  4.4  5.5  7.1  5.2  
WHS 10.9  9.8  7.4  10.0  8.0  10.0  9.1  
Overall 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  
 
Distribution of Borrower $OS across Industries & Size Buckets (%)  
BUS 0.3  0.7  1.4  1.7  0.6  0.5  5.1  
CON 0.2  0.5  1.6  2.2  0.6  1.4  6.5  
MAN 0.4  1.2  5.2  9.7  5.8  8.9  31.1  
NBUS 0.3  0.8  2.6  2.5  0.8  0.9  7.9  
OTH 0.1  0.2  0.6  0.9  0.3  0.3  2.4  
RES 0.0  0.2  0.6  0.8  0.4  0.6  2.7  
RET 0.3  0.9  2.5  3.9  2.3  3.1  13.0  
SOP 0.0  0.1  1.0  1.6  0.9  1.8  5.4  
TOU 0.2  0.7  2.6  3.3  1.9  2.7  11.4  
TRS 0.1  0.2  1.0  1.4  0.9  1.7  5.2  
WHS 0.2  0.6  1.5  3.1  1.2  2.5  9.1  
Overall 2.1  6.0  20.7  31.0  15.7  24.5  100.0  
 
Table 2.3B describes the $OS in the Financing Company portfolio, as of March 2009 and following the 
same specifications as those given for Table 2.2, are segregated into Industries and Size Buckets – as 







Borrower Distribution by Risk Rating and Industry 
 
 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
BUS 6.1  9.0  11.5  11.3  11.3  8.1  10.6  16.1  16.0  100.0  
CON 7.2  11.3  12.5  10.3  11.3  8.8  11.3  13.0  14.1  100.0  
MAN 7.2  10.6  13.2  11.1  11.3  10.3  13.4  13.7  9.2  100.0  
NBUS 3.6  7.3  9.8  10.0  12.1  9.7  13.7  18.4  15.4  100.0  
OTH 5.2  6.8  9.7  10.3  12.0  7.9  13.1  17.9  17.1  100.0  
RES 3.5  7.5  11.1  7.1  12.4  9.3  12.8  20.6  15.8  100.0  
RET 7.2  8.2  11.3  10.7  12.1  9.0  14.4  14.8  12.3  100.0  
SOP 1.9  4.7  7.3  7.6  9.4  13.3  20.5  24.1  11.4  100.0  
TOU 3.6  5.6  8.2  9.3  11.6  9.5  16.7  22.2  13.2  100.0  
TRS 3.2  6.2  10.3  9.7  14.0  12.7  14.5  16.0  13.3  100.0  
WHS 6.8  9.8  13.1  11.7  12.1  9.4  11.4  13.0  12.5  100.0  
Overall 5.7  8.6  11.3  10.4  11.7  9.7  13.6  16.2  12.8  100.0  
 
For Each Risk Rating: Distribution of Borrowers across Industries (%) 
BUS 9.5  9.3  9.0  9.6  8.6  7.4  6.9  8.8  11.1  8.9  
CON 10.0  10.5  8.8  7.9  7.7  7.2  6.6  6.4  8.7  7.9  
MAN 30.2  29.6  28.0  25.5  23.2  25.6  23.6  20.2  17.2  24.0  
NBUS 7.8  10.6  10.8  12.0  12.8  12.4  12.5  14.1  15.0  12.4  
OTH 3.1  2.7  2.9  3.4  3.5  2.8  3.3  3.8  4.6  3.4  
RES 1.7  2.5  2.8  1.9  3.0  2.7  2.7  3.6  3.5  2.8  
RET 16.5  12.6  13.2  13.5  13.6  12.3  14.0  12.1  12.7  13.2  
SOP 1.1  1.8  2.2  2.5  2.7  4.7  5.1  5.0  3.0  3.4  
TOU 6.7  7.0  7.8  9.5  10.5  10.5  13.1  14.5  11.0  10.6  
TRS 2.3  2.9  3.7  3.8  4.8  5.3  4.3  4.0  4.2  4.0  
WHS 11.1  10.6  10.8  10.5  9.6  9.0  7.8  7.5  9.1  9.3  
Overall 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  
 
Distribution of Borrowers across Industries & Risk Ratings (%) 
BUS 0.5  0.8  1.0  1.0  1.0  0.7  0.9  1.4  1.4  8.9  
CON 0.6  0.9  1.0  0.8  0.9  0.7  0.9  1.0  1.1  7.9  
MAN 1.7  2.5  3.2  2.7  2.7  2.5  3.2  3.3  2.2  24.0  
NBUS 0.4  0.9  1.2  1.2  1.5  1.2  1.7  2.3  1.9  12.4  
OTH 0.2  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.4  0.3  0.4  0.6  0.6  3.4  
RES 0.1  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.4  0.3  0.4  0.6  0.4  2.8  
RET 0.9  1.1  1.5  1.4  1.6  1.2  1.9  2.0  1.6  13.2  
SOP 0.1  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.7  0.8  0.4  3.4  
TOU 0.4  0.6  0.9  1.0  1.2  1.0  1.8  2.4  1.4  10.6  
TRS 0.1  0.2  0.4  0.4  0.6  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.5  4.0  
WHS 0.6  0.9  1.2  1.1  1.1  0.9  1.1  1.2  1.2  9.3  
Overall 5.7  8.6  11.3  10.4  11.7  9.7  13.6  16.2  12.8  100.0  
 
Table 2.4A presents the Financing Company portfolio borrowers, as of March 2009 and following the same 
specifications as those given for Table 2.2, are segregated into Industries (as described in Table 2.3A) and 


















1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  
 BUS 11.2  11.0  15.6  15.8  11.5  11.3  9.9  9.3  4.5  100  
 CON 9.9  21.4  16.3  8.8  13.0  10.9  9.4  7.6  2.8  100  
 MAN 12.1  14.1  14.0  13.4  12.1  12.1  11.2  8.6  2.3  100  
 NBUS 5.8  10.0  13.9  13.0  13.9  13.1  14.2  11.4  4.7  100  
 OTH 8.9  9.7  11.9  10.9  16.7  13.5  13.1  10.2  5.1  100  
 RES 5.7  11.7  16.0  5.7  16.4  9.9  13.3  17.0  4.3  100  
 RET 10.7  12.4  12.5  12.9  15.4  13.0  12.6  7.4  3.1  100  
 SOP 2.7  3.7  12.7  12.4  14.1  17.8  17.2  13.8  5.5  100  
 TOU 5.3  10.8  8.2  10.7  15.9  11.5  18.5  15.4  3.6  100  
 TRS 8.3  10.5  13.5  15.2  12.7  13.0  15.7  7.9  3.2  100  
 WHS 11.7  15.5  17.0  13.7  11.3  12.5  10.1  6.0  2.3  100  
 Overal 9.5  12.7  13.5  12.6  13.4  12.5  12.8  9.7  3.3  100  
 For Each Risk Rating: Distribution of Borrower $OS across Industries (%) 
 BUS 6.0  4.4  5.9  6.4  4.4  4.6  4.0  4.9  7.0  5.1  
 CON 6.8  11.0  7.8  4.6  6.3  5.7  4.8  5.1  5.7  6.5  
 MAN 39.9  34.6  32.2  33.0  28.0  30.3  27.1  27.7  22.5  31.1  
 NBUS 4.9  6.2  8.1  8.2  8.2  8.3  8.8  9.3  11.5  7.9  
 OTH 2.2  1.8  2.1  2.0  2.9  2.6  2.4  2.5  3.7  2.4  
 RES 1.6  2.4  3.1  1.2  3.2  2.1  2.7  4.6  3.5  2.7  
 RET 14.7  12.8  12.0  13.3  15.0  13.5  12.8  9.9  12.3  13.0  
 SOP 1.6  1.6  5.1  5.4  5.7  7.8  7.3  7.7  9.2  5.4  
 TOU 6.4  9.7  6.9  9.7  13.6  10.5  16.5  18.2  12.8  11.4  
 TRS 4.6  4.3  5.2  6.3  5.0  5.5  6.4  4.3  5.2  5.2  
 WHS 11.3  11.1  11.5  9.9  7.7  9.2  7.2  5.7  6.5  9.1  
 Overal 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  
 Distribution of Borrower $OS across Industries & Risk Rating (%) 
 BUS 0.6  0.6  0.8  0.8  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.5  0.2  5.1  
 CON 0.6  1.4  1.1  0.6  0.8  0.7  0.6  0.5  0.2  6.5  
 MAN 3.8  4.4  4.4  4.2  3.8  3.8  3.5  2.7  0.7  31.1  
 NBUS 0.5  0.8  1.1  1.0  1.1  1.0  1.1  0.9  0.4  7.9  
 OTH 0.2  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.1  2.4  
 RES 0.2  0.3  0.4  0.2  0.4  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.1  2.7  
 RET 1.4  1.6  1.6  1.7  2.0  1.7  1.6  1.0  0.4  13.0  
 SOP 0.1  0.2  0.7  0.7  0.8  1.0  0.9  0.8  0.3  5.4  
 TOU 0.6  1.2  0.9  1.2  1.8  1.3  2.1  1.8  0.4  11.4  
 TRS 0.4  0.5  0.7  0.8  0.7  0.7  0.8  0.4  0.2  5.2  
 WHS 1.1  1.4  1.6  1.3  1.0  1.1  0.9  0.6  0.2  9.1  
 Overal 9.5  12.7  13.5  12.6  13.4  12.5  12.8  9.7  3.3  100.0  
 
Table 2.4B presents the Financing Company portfolio $OS, as of March 2009 and following the same 
specifications as those given for Table 2.2, are segregated into Industries (as described in Table 2.3A) and 







Borrower Distribution by Industry and Geographical Region 
 
 




BUS CON MAN NBUS OTH RES RET SOP TOU TRS WHS 
Alberta 10.6 9.6 21.1 13.8 3.2 5.7 11.7 2.9 9.5 4.0 8.0 100.0 
British Columbia 8.6 7.0 23.2 12.8 3.4 2.8 11.7 2.8 14.0 5.1 8.5 100.0 
Manitoba 10.0 7.7 21.7 13.7 4.4 1.5 12.5 2.4 9.4 6.5 10.1 100.0 
New Brunswick 6.0 9.6 18.0 16.8 2.4 4.1 17.1 3.3 14.0 3.4 5.3 100.0 
N. & L. 4.1 8.8 9.7 13.1 3.0 16.7 16.8 7.0 12.2 4.0 4.5 100.0 
N.W. Territories 10.6 7.6 0.0 3.0 1.5 0.0 33.3 16.7 13.6 12.1 1.5 100.0 
Nova Scotia 8.9 8.2 14.5 15.2 4.1 3.6 15.9 3.0 15.5 3.7 7.4 100.0 
Ontario 10.0 6.3 24.8 11.8 4.3 0.9 12.3 3.1 11.9 4.3 10.2 100.0 
P.E.I. 5.9 11.0 8.5 15.3 3.4 3.4 15.3 2.5 28.0 3.4 3.4 100.0 
Quebec 9.1 8.6 29.4 11.4 2.9 1.0 13.1 3.3 7.3 3.1 10.9 100.0 
Saskatchewan 5.4 10.6 21.8 13.8 2.0 5.9 13.6 2.9 10.4 6.5 7.2 100.0 
Yukon 4.0 8.1 2.0 17.2 5.1 3.0 18.2 6.1 25.3 10.1 1.0 100.0 
Overall 8.9 7.9 24.0 12.4 3.4 2.8 13.2 3.4 10.6 4.0 9.3 100.0 
 
For Each Industry: Distribution of Borrowers across Region (%) 
Alberta 8.9 8.9 6.5 8.2 6.9 14.9 6.6 6.3 6.6 7.4 6.3 7.4 
British Columbia 10.5 9.6 10.5 11.1 10.8 10.7 9.6 9.1 14.3 13.6 10.0 10.8 
Manitoba 3.2 2.7 2.5 3.1 3.6 1.5 2.7 2.0 2.5 4.5 3.1 2.8 
New Brunswick 2.9 5.3 3.3 5.9 3.0 6.3 5.6 4.2 5.7 3.6 2.5 4.3 
N. & L. 2.8 6.7 2.4 6.3 5.3 35.1 7.6 12.3 6.9 6.0 2.9 6.0 
N.W. Territories 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.7 1.3 0.3 0.8 0.0 0.3 
Nova Scotia 3.4 3.5 2.0 4.1 4.0 4.3 4.1 3.0 4.9 3.1 2.7 3.4 
Ontario 31.1 21.8 28.3 26.0 34.8 8.9 25.6 25.1 30.7 29.1 30.1 27.4 
P.E.I. 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.3 1.2 0.4 0.2 0.5 
Quebec 35.1 37.1 42.1 31.5 29.0 12.5 34.1 33.7 23.6 26.7 40.4 34.4 
Saskatchewan 1.4 3.1 2.1 2.6 1.4 4.9 2.4 2.0 2.3 3.8 1.8 2.4 
Yukon 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.0 0.0 0.4 
Overall 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Distribution of Borrowers across Region and Industry (%) 
Alberta 0.8 0.7 1.6 1.0 0.2 0.4 0.9 0.2 0.7 0.3 0.6 7.4 
British Columbia 0.9 0.8 2.5 1.4 0.4 0.3 1.3 0.3 1.5 0.5 0.9 10.8 
Manitoba 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.3 2.8 
New Brunswick 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.2 4.3 
N. & L. 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.2 1.0 1.0 0.4 0.7 0.2 0.3 6.0 
N.W. Territories 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 
Nova Scotia 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.2 3.4 
Ontario 2.8 1.7 6.8 3.2 1.2 0.3 3.4 0.9 3.3 1.2 2.8 27.4 
P.E.I. 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 
Quebec 3.1 2.9 10.1 3.9 1.0 0.4 4.5 1.1 2.5 1.1 3.7 34.4 
Saskatchewan 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 2.4 
Yukon 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 
Overall 8.9 7.9 24.0 12.4 3.4 2.8 13.2 3.4 10.6 4.0 9.3 100.0 
 
Table 2.5A describes the Financing Company portfolio borrowers, as of March 2009 and following the 
same specifications as those given for Table 2.2, are segregated into Industries (as described in Table 2.3A) 






$OS Distribution by Industry and Geographical Region 
 




BUS CON MAN NBUS OTH RES RET SOP TOU TRS WHS 
Alberta 8.8 12.3 23.6 9.7 1.6 8.1 9.4 6.0 8.3 4.2 8.1 100.0 
British Columbia 4.8 6.3 25.2 8.7 1.3 3.3 12.1 2.5 20.4 6.8 8.7 100.0 
Manitoba 4.7 4.7 38.1 6.2 1.7 1.5 8.7 3.3 9.3 10.1 11.8 100.0 
New Brunswick 4.3 6.0 23.7 11.7 1.2 3.1 18.8 5.3 16.3 3.7 5.8 100.0 
N. & L. 3.6 8.6 14.8 9.7 3.1 11.6 16.6 11.8 10.6 6.2 3.5 100.0 
N.W. Territories 5.3 6.2 0.0 1.3 1.1 0.0 41.1 16.0 15.3 9.7 4.0 100.0 
Nova Scotia 7.5 6.8 17.4 9.2 5.0 2.6 18.3 4.0 16.3 5.8 7.2 100.0 
Ontario 5.4 5.3 32.2 7.7 3.1 1.1 12.1 5.6 13.8 4.3 9.4 100.0 
P.E.I. 0.5 11.5 16.5 10.6 4.8 2.4 17.6 1.1 32.9 0.6 1.5 100.0 
Quebec 4.1 6.1 38.5 7.0 2.1 1.1 13.7 5.8 6.5 4.7 10.4 100.0 
Saskatchewan 6.1 5.6 26.2 6.6 1.9 7.6 7.3 2.6 10.5 13.7 11.9 100.0 
Yukon 1.3 5.5 0.9 8.8 2.2 0.3 28.6 2.1 25.1 25.0 0.1 100.0 
Overall 5.1 6.5 31.1 7.9 2.4 2.7 13.0 5.4 11.4 5.2 9.1 100.0 
 
For Each Industry: Distribution of Borrower $OS across Region (%) 
Alberta 15.5 16.9 6.8 11.0 6.1 27.4 6.5 9.9 6.5 7.1 8.0 9.0 
British Columbia 9.5 9.8 8.2 11.1 5.6 12.8 9.4 4.6 18.1 13.2 9.7 10.2 
Manitoba 2.0 1.6 2.7 1.7 1.6 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.8 4.3 2.9 2.2 
New Brunswick 3.2 3.6 2.9 5.7 2.0 4.6 5.6 3.7 5.5 2.7 2.5 3.9 
N. & L. 2.8 5.3 1.9 4.9 5.2 17.5 5.1 8.6 3.7 4.7 1.5 4.0 
N.W. Territories 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 
Nova Scotia 4.1 2.9 1.6 3.3 5.9 2.8 3.9 2.1 4.0 3.1 2.2 2.8 
Ontario 31.8 24.3 31.0 29.0 39.9 13.0 27.9 31.0 36.1 24.8 31.0 30.0 
P.E.I. 0.0 0.8 0.2 0.6 0.9 0.4 0.6 0.1 1.2 0.1 0.1 0.4 
Quebec 28.0 32.4 42.7 30.3 30.5 14.1 36.4 36.6 19.5 31.2 39.3 34.5 
Saskatchewan 2.6 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 6.2 1.2 1.0 2.0 5.7 2.8 2.2 
Yukon 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.6 0.5 0.1 1.2 0.2 1.2 2.5 0.0 0.5 
Overall 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Distribution of Borrowers across Region & Industry (%) 
Alberta 0.8 1.1 2.1 0.9 0.1 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.7 9.0 
British Columbia 0.5 0.6 2.6 0.9 0.1 0.3 1.2 0.3 2.1 0.7 0.9 10.2 
Manitoba 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 2.2 
New Brunswick 0.2 0.2 0.9 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.2 3.9 
N. & L. 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.1 4.0 
N.W. Territories 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 
Nova Scotia 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.2 2.8 
Ontario 1.6 1.6 9.7 2.3 0.9 0.3 3.6 1.7 4.1 1.3 2.8 30.0 
P.E.I. 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 
Quebec 1.4 2.1 13.3 2.4 0.7 0.4 4.7 2.0 2.2 1.6 3.6 34.5 
Saskatchewan 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 2.2 
Yukon 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.5 
Overall 5.1 6.5 31.1 7.9 2.4 2.7 13.0 5.4 11.4 5.2 9.1 100.0 
 
Table 2.5B presents the Financing Company portfolio $OS, as of March 2009 and following the same 







Borrower Distribution by Size Bucket and Region 
 
 
For Each Region: Distribution of Borrowers across Size Buckets (%) 
Region 
Size Bucket (‘000) 
Overall 
≤ $100 $100 - $250 $250 - $1000 $1000 - $3000 $3000 - $5000 > $5000 
Alberta 21.9  27.7  26.0  15.4  4.1  4.8  100.0  
British Columbia 28.0  25.0  27.5  13.4  3.5  2.6  100.0  
Manitoba 33.2  24.9  26.8  10.7  1.5  2.8  100.0  
New Brunswick 31.0  19.7  29.8  13.8  3.5  2.2  100.0  
N. & L. 24.9  22.9  34.8  12.1  3.3  2.0  100.0  
N.W. Territories 4.5  10.6  43.9  34.8  3.0  3.0  100.0  
Nova Scotia 26.1  25.8  30.1  14.7  1.8  1.5  100.0  
Ontario 23.2  25.5  30.2  14.4  3.5  3.2  100.0  
P.E.I. 33.9  11.0  36.4  14.4  3.4  0.8  100.0  
Quebec 24.1  22.1  30.8  15.3  4.3  3.5  100.0  
Saskatchewan 21.8  27.0  31.9  12.8  4.0  2.5  100.0  
Yukon 14.1  18.2  41.4  19.2  1.0  6.1  100.0  
Overall 24.7  23.9  30.1  14.4  3.7  3.2  100.0  
 
For Each Size Bucket: Distribution of Borrowers across Region (%) 
Alberta 6.6  8.6  6.4  7.9  8.3  11.2  7.4  
British Columbia 12.3  11.3  9.9  10.0  10.3  9.0  10.8  
Manitoba 3.8  2.9  2.5  2.1  1.2  2.5  2.8  
New Brunswick 5.5  3.6  4.3  4.2  4.1  3.0  4.3  
N. & L. 6.0  5.7  6.9  5.0  5.4  3.9  6.0  
N.W. Territories 0.0  0.1  0.4  0.6  0.2  0.2  0.3  
Nova Scotia 3.6  3.6  3.4  3.4  1.6  1.6  3.4  
Ontario 25.7  29.2  27.5  27.3  25.8  27.9  27.4  
P.E.I. 0.6  0.2  0.6  0.5  0.4  0.1  0.5  
Quebec 33.6  31.8  35.2  36.4  39.9  37.9  34.4  
Saskatchewan 2.1  2.7  2.5  2.1  2.6  1.9  2.4  
Yukon 0.2  0.3  0.5  0.5  0.1  0.7  0.4  
Overall 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  
 
Distribution of Borrowers across Region & Size Buckets (%) 
Alberta 1.6  2.1  1.9  1.1  0.3  0.4  7.4  
British Columbia 5.0  2.7  5.0  1.4  0.4  0.3  10.8  
Manitoba 0.9  0.7  0.7  0.3  0.0  0.1  2.8  
New Brunswick 1.3  0.9  1.3  0.6  0.1  0.1  4.3  
N. & L. 2.0  1.4  2.1  0.7  0.2  0.1  6.0  
N.W. Territories 0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.3  
Nova Scotia 0.9  0.9  1.0  0.5  0.1  0.1  3.4  
Ontario 6.3  7.0  8.3  3.9  0.9  0.9  27.4  
P.E.I. 0.2  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.5  
Quebec 8.3  7.6  10.6  5.3  2.0  1.2  34.4  
Saskatchewan 0.5  0.6  0.7  0.3  0.1  0.1  2.4  
Yukon 0.1  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.4  
Overall 24.7  23.9  30.1  14.4  3.7  3.2  100.0  
 
Table 2.6A presents the Financing Company portfolio borrowers, as of March 2009, are segregated into 






$OS Distribution by Size Bucket and Region 
 
 
For Each Region: Distribution of Borrower $OS across Size Buckets (%) 
Region 
Size Bucket (‘000) 
Overall 
≤ $100 $100 - $250 $250 - $1000 $1000 - $3000 $3000 - $5000 > $5000 
Alberta 1.4  5.8  16.2  30.3  15.1  31.2  100.0  
British Columbia 2.6  6.8  20.4  33.0  16.6  20.5  100.0  
Manitoba 3.6  7.7  24.8  26.0  11.9  26.0  100.0  
New Brunswick 2.7  5.5  23.6  35.3  20.0  12.8  100.0  
N. & L. 2.8  8.1  31.4  29.0  16.0  12.7  100.0  
N.W. Territories 0.4  3.4  33.0  51.3  7.7  4.1  100.0  
Nova Scotia 2.7  8.4  26.5  42.9  12.5  6.9  100.0  
Ontario 1.8  6.0  20.0  30.9  15.1  26.2  100.0  
P.E.I. 3.3  3.9  27.7  41.9  12.4  10.9  100.0  
Quebec 2.0  5.4  19.9  29.8  16.4  26.4  100.0  
Saskatchewan 2.2  7.6  24.9  25.8  14.7  24.7  100.0  
Yukon 1.3  3.7  22.0  33.2  3.0  36.7  100.0  
Overall 2.1  6.0  20.7  31.0  15.7  24.5  100.0  
 
For Each Size Bucket: Distribution of Borrower $OS across Region (%) 
Alberta 6.1  8.6  7.0  8.8  8.7  11.5  9.0  
British Columbia 12.7  11.5  10.0  10.8  10.8  8.5  10.2  
Manitoba 3.9  2.8  2.7  1.9  1.7  2.4  2.2  
New Brunswick 5.0  3.5  4.4  4.4  4.9  2.0  3.9  
N. & L. 5.3  5.4  6.0  3.7  4.1  2.1  4.0  
N.W. Territories 0.1  0.1  0.4  0.4  0.1  0.0  0.3  
Nova Scotia 3.7  3.9  3.6  3.9  2.2  0.8  2.8  
Ontario 26.2  29.9  28.9  29.9  28.8  32.2  30.0  
P.E.I. 0.7  0.3  0.6  0.6  0.3  0.2  0.4  
Quebec 33.6  30.8  33.2  33.2  36.2  37.3  34.5  
Saskatchewan 2.3  2.8  2.6  1.8  2.0  2.2  2.2  
Yukon 0.3  0.3  0.6  0.6  0.1  0.8  0.5  
Overall 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  
 
Distribution of Borrower $OS across Region & Size Buckets (%) 
Alberta 0.1  0.5  1.5  2.7  1.4  2.8  9.0  
British Columbia 0.3  0.7  2.1  3.4  1.7  2.1  10.2  
Manitoba 0.1  0.2  0.6  0.6  0.3  0.6  2.2  
New Brunswick 0.1  0.2  0.9  1.4  0.8  0.5  3.9  
N. & L. 0.1  0.3  1.3  1.2  0.6  0.5  4.0  
N.W. Territories 0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.3  
Nova Scotia 0.1  0.2  0.7  1.2  0.4  0.2  2.8  
Ontario 0.5  1.8  6.0  9.3  4.5  7.9  30.0  
P.E.I. 0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.4  
Quebec 0.7  1.9  6.9  10.3  5.7  9.1  34.5  
Saskatchewan 0.0  0.2  0.5  0.6  0.3  0.5  2.2  
Yukon 0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.2  0.5  
Overall 2.1  6.0  20.7  31.0  15.7  24.5  100.0  
 
Table 2.6B describes the Financing Company portfolio $OS, as of March 2009 and following the same 
specifications as those given for Table 2.2, are segregated into Size Buckets (as described in Table 2.2A) 







Time Series of Distribution of Borrowers across Industries 
 
 





BUS CON MAN NBUS OTH RES RET SOP TOU TRS WHS 
1997 4% 6% 21% 9% 3% 3% 15% 10% 18% 4% 8% 100% 
1998 5% 6% 22% 9% 2% 3% 13% 10% 17% 4% 9% 100% 
1999 5% 6% 23% 9% 2% 3% 13% 11% 16% 4% 9% 100% 
2000 6% 6% 24% 8% 2% 3% 12% 11% 16% 4% 9% 100% 
2001 6% 6% 25% 9% 2% 3% 12% 10% 15% 4% 9% 100% 
2002 7% 6% 26% 9% 2% 3% 12% 9% 14% 4% 9% 100% 
2003 7% 6% 26% 9% 2% 3% 12% 8% 14% 4% 10% 100% 
2004 7% 6% 27% 9% 2% 3% 11% 7% 14% 4% 10% 100% 
2005 7% 6% 27% 11% 4% 3% 12% 6% 12% 4% 8% 100% 
2006 7% 7% 27% 12% 4% 3% 12% 5% 11% 4% 9% 100% 
2007 8% 7% 26% 12% 4% 3% 13% 4% 11% 4% 9% 100% 
2008 8% 7% 25% 12% 4% 3% 13% 3% 11% 4% 9% 100% 
2009 9% 8% 24% 12% 3% 3% 13% 3% 11% 4% 9% 100% 
2010 9% 8% 23% 13% 3% 3% 13% 4% 11% 4% 9% 100% 
 
Distribution of $OS across Industries 
1997 3% 4% 28% 6% 2% 2% 11% 13% 18% 4% 8% 100% 
1998 3% 4% 30% 6% 2% 2% 10% 13% 17% 4% 9% 100% 
1999 3% 4% 30% 6% 2% 2% 10% 13% 17% 4% 9% 100% 
2000 3% 4% 32% 6% 2% 2% 9% 12% 16% 4% 9% 100% 
2001 4% 4% 34% 6% 2% 2% 9% 11% 15% 4% 9% 100% 
2002 4% 4% 35% 6% 2% 3% 9% 9% 15% 4% 9% 100% 
2003 4% 4% 36% 6% 2% 3% 10% 8% 14% 4% 10% 100% 
2004 3% 4% 36% 8% 2% 3% 11% 7% 13% 4% 8% 100% 
2005 4% 5% 35% 8% 2% 3% 12% 6% 12% 5% 9% 100% 
2006 4% 6% 35% 8% 2% 2% 12% 5% 11% 5% 9% 100% 
2007 5% 6% 33% 8% 2% 3% 13% 5% 11% 5% 9% 100% 
2008 5% 6% 32% 8% 2% 3% 13% 5% 11% 5% 9% 100% 
2009 5% 7% 29% 8% 2% 3% 12% 8% 11% 5% 9% 100% 
2010 5% 7% 26% 8% 3% 3% 13% 9% 12% 5% 9% 100% 
 
Table 2.7 displays the concentration of borrowers (top) and $OS (bottom) in a given industry at yearly 
intervals starting in December 1997 and ending in December 2010.  The industries, in alphabetical order, 
are as follows: Business Services (BUS); Construction (CON); Manufacturing (MAN); Non-Business 
Services (NBUS); Resources (RES); Retail (RET); Supplier or Premises (SOP); Tourism (TOU); 
Transportation and Storage (TRS); Wholesale (WHS); and Other (OTH).  Results from Table 2.7 indicate 





Time Series of Distribution of Borrowers across Risk Ratings 
 
 





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1997 3% 5% 6% 9% 16% 18% 28% 15% 1% 100% 
1998 3% 4% 7% 9% 17% 19% 28% 13% 1% 100% 
1999 1% 3% 5% 7% 16% 15% 30% 21% 1% 100% 
2000 1% 4% 6% 6% 14% 11% 27% 28% 3% 100% 
2001 2% 6% 6% 7% 14% 10% 23% 26% 6% 100% 
2002 2% 7% 7% 8% 14% 9% 22% 25% 6% 100% 
2003 2% 7% 7% 8% 14% 10% 21% 25% 6% 100% 
2004 2% 7% 8% 9% 13% 10% 19% 24% 7% 100% 
2005 2% 7% 8% 9% 13% 10% 19% 26% 7% 100% 
2006 2% 7% 8% 10% 13% 10% 19% 24% 8% 100% 
2007 4% 7% 9% 10% 12% 10% 16% 20% 13% 100% 
2008 5% 8% 10% 10% 11% 10% 14% 18% 14% 100% 
2009 6% 8% 11% 10% 12% 10% 14% 16% 13% 100% 
2010 6% 9% 12% 11% 12% 9% 13% 16% 12% 100% 
 
Distribution of $OS across Risk Ratings  
1997 4% 6% 9% 10% 19% 19% 22% 10% 0% 100% 
1998 2% 5% 7% 8% 19% 16% 26% 16% 1% 100% 
1999 3% 6% 8% 8% 19% 12% 22% 20% 1% 100% 
2000 4% 10% 8% 10% 18% 11% 19% 18% 2% 100% 
2001 5% 10% 10% 11% 17% 10% 19% 17% 2% 100% 
2002 4% 9% 9% 11% 18% 11% 19% 16% 2% 100% 
2003 4% 10% 10% 13% 16% 11% 17% 15% 2% 100% 
2004 4% 9% 10% 13% 17% 11% 17% 17% 2% 100% 
2005 4% 9% 11% 14% 17% 12% 17% 15% 2% 100% 
2006 7% 10% 13% 13% 15% 12% 14% 12% 4% 100% 
2007 9% 11% 14% 13% 13% 13% 12% 11% 4% 100% 
2008 9% 12% 14% 12% 14% 12% 13% 10% 3% 100% 
2009 9% 12% 13% 13% 14% 12% 13% 10% 3% 100% 
2010 8% 12% 14% 13% 14% 12% 13% 11% 3% 100% 
 
Table 2.8 displays the concentration of borrowers (top) and $OS (bottom) in a given Risk Rating at yearly 
intervals starting in December 1997 and ending in December 2010, with Risk Ratings ranging from 1 (least 






Time Series of Distribution of Borrowers across Size Buckets 
 
 
Distribution of Borrowers across Size Buckets 
 
Size Bucket (‘000) 
Calendar Year ≤ $100 $100 - $250 $250 - $1000 $1000 - $3000 $3000 - $5000 > $5000 Overall 
1997 25%  28%  35%  9%  2%  1%  100% 
1998 24%  27%  35%  11%  2%  1%  100% 
1999 23%  26%  36%  12%  2%  1%  100% 
2000 21%  25%  38%  13%  2%  1%  100% 
2001 20%  24%  38%  13%  3%  2%  100% 
2002 19%  24%  38%  14%  3%  2%  100% 
2003 19%  23%  38%  15%  3%  2%  100% 
2004 20%  23%  37%  15%  3%  2%  100% 
2005 22%  22%  35%  15%  3%  2%  100% 
2006 24%  22%  34%  15%  4%  3%  100% 
2007 25%  22%  32%  14%  4%  3%  100% 
2008 26%  23%  31%  14%  3%  3%  100% 
2009 25%  24%  30%  14%  4%  3%  100% 
2010 24%  24%  30%  15%  4%  4%  100% 
 
Distribution of $OS across Size Buckets 
1997 4%  12%  42%  27%  7%  8%  100% 
1998 3%  11%  40%  29%  8%  8%  100% 
1999 3%  10%  39%  30%  10%  9%  100% 
2000 2%  9%  36%  32%  11%  10%  100% 
2001 2%  8%  35%  32%  12%  11%  100% 
2002 2%  7%  33%  33%  13%  12%  100% 
2003 2%  7%  31%  33%  14%  13%  100% 
2004 3%  6%  29%  33%  14%  15%  100% 
2005 3%  6%  26%  33%  15%  17%  100% 
2006 3%  6%  25%  32%  15%  19%  100% 
2007 3%  6%  23%  32%  16%  21%  100% 
2008 2%  6%  21%  31%  16%  24%  100% 
2009 2%  5%  19%  30%  16%  29%  100% 
2010 1%  5%  18%  29%  16%  31%  100% 
 
Table 2.9 displays the concentration of borrowers (top) and $OS (bottom) in a given Size Bucket at yearly 
intervals starting in December 1997 and ending in December 2010.  Size Buckets range from ≤$100,000 to 










Calendar Year Overall 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1997 4.9% 0.7% 0.9% 0.9% 1.3% 1.7% 4.3% 6.2% 11.7% 26.3% 
1998 5.5% 0.9% 1.6% 2.5% 2.4% 2.5% 4.9% 7.1% 10.9% 37.0% 
1999 4.8% 0.4% 1.5% 0.8% 2.2% 2.1% 3.3% 5.5% 8.6% 19.5% 
2000 4.5% 0.0% 0.9% 1.3% 2.1% 1.8% 2.2% 4.1% 6.8% 30.0% 
2001 5.0% 0.3% 0.6% 1.6% 2.1% 2.6% 2.8% 4.1% 8.5% 15.8% 
2002 4.1% 0.8% 1.3% 1.0% 1.4% 1.3% 2.7% 3.5% 7.1% 14.0% 
2003 4.4% 1.3% 1.1% 1.6% 1.9% 2.3% 2.7% 4.9% 6.7% 12.7% 
2004 4.0% 0.7% 0.5% 1.4% 1.5% 1.8% 2.3% 3.6% 7.3% 11.0% 
2005 4.2% 0.7% 0.6% 1.5% 1.5% 2.5% 2.2% 4.4% 6.8% 11.5% 
2006 4.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.2% 1.5% 1.9% 3.2% 3.3% 5.4% 14.0% 
2007 4.6% 0.8% 0.9% 2.0% 2.4% 2.3% 3.3% 4.4% 6.6% 11.7% 
2008 5.9% 0.9% 1.7% 2.9% 3.4% 4.4% 4.4% 5.8% 8.4% 14.2% 
2009 4.4% 0.5% 1.8% 1.6% 2.8% 4.0% 3.5% 4.5% 6.4% 10.8% 
2010 3.7% 0.6% 0.9% 1.9% 2.6% 2.8% 2.9% 3.0% 5.6% 9.3% 
Average 4.6% 0.7% 1.1% 1.7% 2.2% 2.5% 3.3% 4.6% 7.3% 12.7% 
Std Dev 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.8 1.1   1.5   3.6 
 
Table 2.10 shows the annual default rate by Risk Rating for the period starting January 1997 and ending 
December 2010.  Risk Ratings range from 1 (least risky) to 9 (most risky).  To calculate annual default 
rates, the number of defaulted borrowers over a given calendar year are divided by the number of 
borrowers at the beginning of that calendar year - so that for the 2008 calendar year, defaults from January 
2008 to December 2008 are summed and divided by the number of healthy borrowers as of December 31, 





Table 2.11  
 
































5.3% 6.4% 4.7% 4.6% 6.8% 4.5% 3.4% 4.8% 4.9% 6.2% 
1999 4.8% 7.8% 4.9% 6.1% 4.5% 5.0% 7.7% 3.5% 2.8% 3.7% 3.2% 5.7% 
2000 4.5% 7.4% 4.7% 5.4% 3.1% 5.4% 4.5% 3.7% 2.4% 4.9% 4.5% 3.7% 
2001 5.0% 7.7% 5.2% 6.5% 3.7% 7.1% 3.1% 4.6% 3.1% 3.9% 4.1% 4.8% 
2002 4.1% 6.6% 3.8% 5.3% 4.1% 3.7% 4.1% 2.9% 2.0% 3.3% 6.0% 3.7% 
2003 4.4% 6.0% 4.5% 6.0% 3.6% 3.8% 3.0% 3.6% 1.8% 3.9% 5.0% 4.4% 
2004 4.0% 5.2% 3.6% 5.1% 3.5% 4.9% 3.8% 3.5% 2.4% 3.5% 4.7% 2.9% 
2005 3.9% 5.3% 2.4% 4.9% 3.2% 4.4% 3.5% 3.3% 1.7% 4.0% 4.1% 4.4% 
2006 3.9% 3.9% 3.2% 5.0% 3.1% 4.6% 6.0% 3.3% 1.2% 4.3% 3.1% 4.1% 
2007 4.0% 3.5% 2.7% 4.8% 3.4% 3.9% 3.4% 3.8% 1.5% 4.7% 3.6% 5.1% 
2008 5.1% 4.3% 3.6% 6.1% 4.6% 5.8% 4.5% 5.0% 0.5% 5.1% 6.1% 6.2% 
2009 5.7% 5.6% 5.0% 6.5% 4.5% 5.9% 4.1% 5.5% 1.9% 5.6% 7.5% 6.7% 
2010 4.2% 4.3% 4.6% 4.8% 3.9% 5.5% 4.2% 4.0% 1.1% 4.1% 3.8% 4.4% 
Average 4.6% 5.6% 4.0% 5.6% 3.8% 5.0% 4.5% 4.1% 2.3% 4.4% 4.7% 4.8% 
Std Dev 0.1  0.3  0.2  0.1   0.1  0.2  0.3  0.2 0.4  0.2 0.3   0.2 
 
Table 2.11 provides the annual default rate by Industry for the period starting January 1997 and ending 
December 2010.  The industries, in alphabetical order, are as follows: Business Services (BUS); 
Construction (CON); Manufacturing (MAN); Non-Business Services (NBUS); Resources (RES); Retail 
(RET); Supplier or Premises (SOP); Tourism (TOU); Transportation and Storage (TRS); Wholesale 
(WHS); Other (OTH).  To calculate annual default rates the number of defaulted borrowers over a given 
calendar year are divided by the number of borrowers at the beginning of that calendar year, so that for the 
2008 calendar year, defaults from January 2008 to December 2008 are summed and divided by the number 












Size Buckets ('000) 
Overall ≤ $100 $100 - $250 $250 - $1000 $1000 - $3000 $3000 - $5000 > $5000 
1997 4.9% 7.8% 5.1% 4.0% 1.7% 2.1% 0.0% 
1998 5.5% 9.1% 4.9% 4.5% 2.9% 2.1% 0.5% 
1999 4.8% 10.0% 3.8% 3.6% 1.7% 0.6% 0.9% 
2000 4.5% 9.3% 4.1% 3.3% 1.9% 1.6% 0.4% 
2001 5.0% 9.7% 4.3% 4.0% 3.1% 2.4% 0.4% 
2002 4.1% 9.0% 3.5% 3.0% 2.5% 0.9% 0.9% 
2003 4.4% 8.5% 4.1% 3.1% 4.0% 2.1% 2.1% 
2004 4.0% 7.5% 4.1% 2.9% 2.6% 2.2% 0.9% 
2005 3.9% 7.6% 3.8% 2.7% 2.4% 1.7% 1.9% 
2006 3.9% 7.0% 3.8% 2.9% 2.5% 2.1% 0.8% 
2007 4.0% 7.0% 4.1% 2.8% 2.3% 1.9% 1.1% 
2008 5.1% 8.8% 5.7% 3.1% 3.1% 2.2% 1.5% 
2009 5.7% 9.0% 6.8% 4.1% 2.9% 3.0% 1.3% 
2010 4.2% 7.7% 5.0% 2.5% 2.4% 1.8% 1.8% 
Average 4.6% 8.3% 4.6% 3.3% 2.6% 2.0% 1.2% 
Std Dev  0.1   0.1       0.2        0.2         0.2         0.3    0.4 
 
Table 2.12 provides the annual default rate by Size Bucket for the period starting January 1997 and ending 
December 2010.  Size Buckets range from ≤$100,000 to >$5,000,000 and are based on the total 
commitment to a borrower (including commitment to other “related” borrowers under the same ownership) 
at last authorization.  To calculate annual default rates the number of defaulted borrowers over a given 
calendar year are divided by the number of borrowers at the beginning of that calendar year, so that for the 
2008 calendar year, defaults from January 2008 to December 2008 are summed and divided by the number 






Annual Default Rate Correlation between Risk Ratings 
 
RR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Overall 0.12 0.57 0.66 0.67 0.52 0.80 0.83 0.67 0.51 
1 1.00 0.33 0.23 0.01 0.05 0.16 0.25 0.05 -0.16 
2 
 
1.00 0.46 0.65 0.51 0.66 0.54 0.24 0.27 
3 
  
1.00 0.81 0.72 0.56 0.41 0.07 0.06 
4 
   
1.00 0.90 0.52 0.37 0.00 0.03 
5 
    
1.00 0.45 0.27 -0.04 -0.18 
6 
     
1.00 0.81 0.72 0.48 
7 
      
1.00 0.82 0.67 
8 
       
1.00 0.72 
9 
        
1.00 
 
Table 2.13 provides the correlation between the annual default rates of borrowers in Risk Ratings 1 (least 
risky) to 9 (most risky).  In addition, we provide the correlation between a given Risk Rating’s default rate 
and that of the overall portfolio (“All”) as given in the second row.  Correlations are measured over an 
evaluation period of 1997-2010.  See Table 2.10 and Figure 2.10 for more information on the time series of 






Annual Default Rate Correlation between Industries 
 
Industry BUS CON MAN NBUS OTH RES RET SOP TOU TRS WHS 
Overall 0.55 0.72 0.92 0.67 0.50 0.32 0.86 0.37 0.63 0.50 0.76 
BUS 1.00 0.59 0.64 0.16 0.06 0.51 0.23 0.91 0.10 -0.05 0.08 
CON 
 
1.00 0.74 0.51 0.51 0.28 0.45 0.45 0.17 0.25 0.36 
MAN 
  
1.00 0.57 0.44 0.29 0.68  0.49 0.37 0.40 0.61 
NBUS 
   
1.00 0.26 0.31 0.43 -0.06 0.16 0.56 0.76 
OTH 
    
1.00 -0.08 0.60 0.04 0.27 0.17 0.33 
RES 
     
1.00 0.05 0.39 0.15 -0.32 0.27 
RET 
      
1.00 0.16 0.80 0.44 0.66 
SOP 
       
1.00 0.01 -0.22 -0.10 
TOU 
        
1.00 0.33 0.57 
TRS 
         
1.00 0.39 
 
Table 2.14 provides the correlation between the annual default rates across Industries.  In addition, we 
provide the correlation between a given Industry’s default rate and that of the overall portfolio as given in 
the second row.  The industries, in alphabetical order, are as follows: Business Services (BUS); 
Construction (CON); Manufacturing (MAN); Non-Business Services (NBUS); Resources (RES); Retail 
(RET); Supplier or Premises (SOP); Tourism (TOU); Transportation and Storage (TRS); Wholesale 
(WHS); Other (OTH). Correlations are measured over an evaluation period of 1997-2010.  See Table 2.11 







Annual Default Rate Correlation between Size Buckets 
 
Size Buckets (‘000) ≤ $100 $100 - $250 $250 - $1000 $1000 - $3000 $3000 - $5000 > $5000 
Overall 0.63 0.75 0.86 0.20 0.39 -0.26 
≤ $100 1.00 0.10 0.59 0.10 -0.27 -0.23 
$100 - $250 
 
1.00 0.42 0.21 0.69 0.06 
$250 - $1000 
  
1.00 0.03 0.26 -0.59 
$1000 - $3000 
   
1.00 0.50 0.51 
$3000 - $5000 
    
1.00 0.03 
> $5000 
     
1.00 
 
Table 2.15 provides the correlation between the annual default rates across Size Buckets.  In addition, we 
provide the correlation between a given Industry’s default rate and that of the overall portfolio as given in 
the second row.  Size Buckets range from ≤$100,000 to >$5,000,000 and are based on the total 
commitment to a borrower (including commitment to other “related” borrowers under the same ownership) 
at last authorization.  Correlations are measured over an evaluation period of 1997-2010.  See Table 2.12 













Credit Assessment  AAA to AA- A+ to A- BBB+ to BB- Below BB- Unrated 
Risk Weight 75% 20% 50% 100% 150% 100% 
 






Borrower Size Buckets and Annual Sales 
 
Size Bucket (‘000) Loans (%) $OS (%) PD MtM Sales $ (m) 
≤ $100 20% 2% 8.3% 42 
$3.6 
$100 - $250 23% 6% 4.7% 56 
$250 - $1000 31% 21% 3.2% 74 $4.3 - $5.4 
$1000 - $3000 5% 31% 2.6% 97 
$12.7 
$3000 - $5000 17% 16% 1.9% 116 
> $5000 4% 24% 1.3% 132 $46.1 
Overall 100% 100% 4.6% 61 $5.2 
 
Table 3.2 presents summary information on the March 2009 the Financing Company portfolio by Size 
Bucket.  In particular, we note in the sixth column average annual sales (in $ millions) by Size Bucket, as 
well as the Months-to-Maturity in the fifth column for each Size Bucket, and in the fourth column, the 
weighted average annual default rate – identified as the stationary Probability of Default – for each Size 
Bucket (as calculated in Chapter 2).  In addition, columns two and three show the percentage of the overall 
March 2009 portfolio accounted for by each Size Bucket, both in terms of number of loans (column two) 






Probabilities of Default by Risk Rating and Size Bucket 
 
 
Probability of Default  
Risk Rating 
Size Bucket (‘000) 
Overall 
≤ $100 $100 - $250 $250 - $1000 $1000 - $3000 $3000 - $5000 > $5000 
1 2.1% 1.1% 0.4% 0.4% 0.2% 0.2% 0.7% 
2 2.6% 1.2% 0.9% 0.6% 1.1% 0.2% 1.1% 
3 3.2% 2.2% 1.3% 1.0% 0.7% 0.6% 1.7% 
4 4.2% 2.7% 1.6% 1.3% 1.4% 0.9% 2.1% 
5 4.5% 2.9% 1.8% 1.9% 1.3% 0.8% 2.4% 
6 5.6% 3.6% 2.8% 2.0% 2.1% 0.9% 3.2% 
7 8.2% 4.0% 3.5% 3.3% 2.5% 1.7% 4.6% 
8 10.0% 6.3% 6.1% 6.5% 6.8% 6.5% 7.3% 
9 13.2% 12.5% 10.6% 14.3% 8.1% 7.5% 12.7% 
Overall 8.3% 4.6% 3.3% 2.6% 2.0% 1.2% 4.6% 
 
Table 3.3 presents the Probabilities of Default as calculated over a period spanning 14 years starting in 
January 1997 and ending in December 2010.  Defaults were aggregated over a given calendar year and then 
divided over the count of healthy customers at the start of the year.  A weighted average of default rates 
over the time period then gives the PDs presented above.  In addition, defaults were segregated by Risk 






Probabilities of Default by Risk Rating and Industry 
 
 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
BUS 1.0% 2.3% 2.0% 2.6% 3.3% 4.4% 6.6% 8.7% 11.3% 5.6% 
CON 0.8% 1.8% 2.0% 2.3% 2.6% 3.2% 4.0% 5.9% 10.6% 4.0% 
MAN 0.6% 1.1% 1.9% 2.7% 3.0% 4.3% 6.6% 11.5% 15.4% 5.6% 
NBUS 0.7% 0.8% 1.2% 1.4% 2.0% 2.2% 3.4% 5.6% 11.1% 3.8% 
OTH 1.3% 0.7% 1.2% 2.3% 2.1% 3.3% 4.7% 7.0% 13.8% 5.0% 
RES 0.5% 0.2% 1.0% 2.7% 2.5% 4.0% 4.8% 6.5% 11.6% 4.5% 
RET 0.6% 1.0% 1.8% 1.9% 2.0% 2.4% 4.2% 6.5% 12.5% 4.1% 
SOP 0.5% 0.3% 0.3% 0.1% 0.8% 1.3% 2.3% 3.0% 8.5% 2.3% 
TOU 0.8% 0.7% 1.6% 1.3% 1.5% 2.4% 3.9% 6.2% 13.4% 4.4% 
TRS 0.9% 0.8% 1.9% 2.2% 2.4% 4.2% 4.7% 7.8% 10.6% 4.7% 
WHS 0.9% 0.8% 1.7% 2.5% 3.0% 3.8% 5.0% 8.8% 14.0% 4.8% 
Overall 0.7% 1.1% 1.7% 2.1% 2.4% 3.2% 4.6% 7.3% 12.7% 4.6% 
 
Table 3.4 depicts the Probability of Default for each Industry-Risk Rating segment, with Risk Ratings 
ranging from 1.0 (least risky) to 5.0 (most risky).  Probabilities of Default and their standard of deviations 
are calculated over a period spanning 14 years starting in January 1997 and ending in December 2010.  
Defaults were aggregated over a given calendar year and then divided over the count of healthy customers 
at the start of the year.  A weighted average of default rates over the time period then gives the PDs 
presented above.  In addition, defaults were segregated by Risk Rating and Industry as defined in Chapter 







Probabilities of Default by Industry and Size Bucket 
 
 
Probability of Default  
Industry 
















BUS 8.2% 4.9% 3.3% 2.8% 2.5% 3.7% 5.6% 
CON 6.7% 3.9% 3.2% 2.0% 1.9% 0.4% 4.0% 
MAN 10.3% 6.2% 4.5% 3.5% 3.1% 2.2% 5.6% 
NBUS 6.9% 3.4% 2.1% 1.9% 2.1% 0.3% 3.8% 
OTH 8.7% 4.7% 3.1% 1.7% 2.0% 1.2% 5.0% 
RES 6.4% 4.8% 4.4% 2.0% 1.7% 1.2% 4.5% 
RET 8.1% 3.8% 2.5% 1.5% 0.6% 0.4% 4.1% 
SOP 2.5% 2.8% 2.4% 1.8% 0.3% 0.5% 2.3% 
TOU 7.8% 4.4% 3.3% 3.5% 0.9% 1.5% 4.4% 
TRS 8.3% 5.7% 3.5% 2.9% 3.2% 1.2% 4.7% 
WHS 9.8% 5.2% 2.6% 1.6% 0.8% 0.6% 4.8% 
Overall 8.3% 4.6% 3.3% 2.6% 2.0% 1.2% 4.6% 
 
Table 3.5 depicts the Probability of Default for each Industry-Size Bucket segment.  Probabilities of 
Default and their standard of deviations are calculated over a period spanning 14 years starting in January 
1997 and ending in December 2010.  Defaults were aggregated over a given calendar year and then divided 
over the count of healthy customers at the start of the year.  A weighted average of default rates over the 
time period then gives the PDs presented above.  In addition, defaults were segregated by Risk Rating and 





Average Asset Correlations under Basel II RR-calibrated Partial Implementations 
 
  Average Asset Correlation (%)   
 






1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
≤ $100 11.8 10.3 8.1 7.1 6.5 5.2 4.0 3.2 3.0 4.9 
$100 - $250 11.8 10.3 8.1 7.1 6.5 5.2 4.0 3.2 3.0 5.7 
$250 - $1000 11.8 10.3 8.1 7.1 6.5 5.2 4.0 3.2 3.0 6.2 
$1000 - $3000 16.8 15.5 13.5 12.6 12.1 10.8 9.6 8.8 8.5 12.3 
$3000 - $5000 16.8 15.5 13.5 12.6 12.1 10.8 9.6 8.8 8.5 12.5 
> $5000 19.2 17.9 15.9 15.0 14.4 13.2 12.0 11.1 10.9 15.4 
Overall 14.2 12.5 9.9 8.9 8.1 7.1 5.4 4.0 3.3 7.5 
  Case 3: Naïve AIRB   
≤ $100 20.4 19.1 17.1 16.1 15.6 14.4 13.2 12.3 12.0 13.9 
$100 - $250 20.4 19.1 17.1 16.1 15.6 14.4 13.2 12.3 12.0 14.8 
$250 - $1000 20.4 19.1 17.1 16.1 15.6 14.4 13.2 12.3 12.0 15.2 
$1000 - $3000 20.4 19.1 17.1 16.1 15.6 14.4 13.2 12.3 12.0 15.8 
$3000 - $5000 20.4 19.1 17.1 16.1 15.6 14.4 13.2 12.3 12.0 16.0 
> $5000 20.4 19.1 17.1 16.1 15.6 14.4 13.2 12.3 12.0 16.6 
Overall 20.4 19.1 17.1 16.1 15.6 14.4 13.2 12.3 12.0 15.0 
  Case 4: S-AIRB   
≤ $100 16.4 15.1 13.1 12.1 11.6 10.4 9.2 8.3 8.0 9.9 
$100 - $250 16.4 15.1 13.1 12.1 11.6 10.4 9.2 8.3 8.0 10.8 
$250 - $1000 16.4 15.1 13.1 12.1 11.6 10.4 9.2 8.3 8.0 11.2 
$1000 - $3000 16.8 15.5 13.5 12.6 12.1 10.8 9.6 8.8 8.5 12.3 
$3000 - $5000 16.8 15.5 13.5 12.6 12.1 10.8 9.6 8.8 8.5 12.5 
> $5000 19.2 17.9 15.9 15.0 14.4 13.2 12.0 11.1 10.9 15.4 
Overall 16.8 15.4 13.4 12.4 11.8 10.6 9.4 8.4 8.1 11.3 
  Case 5: R-AIRB   
≤ $100 11.8 10.3 8.1 7.1 6.5 5.2 4.0 3.2 3.0 4.9 
$100 - $250 11.8 10.3 8.1 7.1 6.5 5.2 4.0 3.2 3.0 5.7 
$250 - $1000 11.8 10.3 8.1 7.1 6.5 5.2 4.0 3.2 3.0 6.2 
$1000 - $3000 20.4 19.1 17.1 16.1 15.6 14.4 13.2 12.3 12.0 15.8 
$3000 - $5000 20.4 19.1 17.1 16.1 15.6 14.4 13.2 12.3 12.0 16.0 
> $5000 20.4 19.1 17.1 16.1 15.6 14.4 13.2 12.3 12.0 16.6 
Overall 15.5 13.7 10.9 9.9 9.0 8.1 6.2 4.4 3.5 8.3 
 
Table 3.6 provides a description of average asset correlations over loans by Risk Rating and Size Bucket.  








Average Asset Correlations Comparison using PDs calibrated by RR-SB 
 
 
Average Asset Correlation (%) 
 





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
≤ $100 11.8 10.3 8.1 7.1 6.5 5.2 4.0 3.2 3.0 4.9 
$100 - $250 11.8 10.3 8.1 7.1 6.5 5.2 4.0 3.2 3.0 5.7 
$250 - $1000 11.8 10.3 8.1 7.1 6.5 5.2 4.0 3.2 3.0 6.2 
$1000 - $3000 16.8 15.5 13.5 12.6 12.1 10.8 9.6 8.8 8.5 12.3 
$3000 - $5000 16.8 15.5 13.5 12.6 12.1 10.8 9.6 8.8 8.5 12.5 
> $5000 19.2 17.9 15.9 15.0 14.4 13.2 12.0 11.1 10.9 15.4 
Overall 14.2 12.5 9.9 8.9 8.1 7.1 5.4 4.0 3.3 7.5 
  Case 3: Naïve AIRB (RR)   
≤ $100 20.4 19.1 17.1 16.1 15.6 14.4 13.2 12.3 12.0 13.9 
$100 - $250 20.4 19.1 17.1 16.1 15.6 14.4 13.2 12.3 12.0 14.8 
$250 - $1000 20.4 19.1 17.1 16.1 15.6 14.4 13.2 12.3 12.0 15.2 
$1000 - $3000 20.4 19.1 17.1 16.1 15.6 14.4 13.2 12.3 12.0 15.8 
$3000 - $5000 20.4 19.1 17.1 16.1 15.6 14.4 13.2 12.3 12.0 16.0 
> $5000 20.4 19.1 17.1 16.1 15.6 14.4 13.2 12.3 12.0 16.6 
Overall 20.4 19.1 17.1 16.1 15.6 14.4 13.2 12.3 12.0 15.0 
  Case 7a: (RR-SB)   
≤ $100 16.2 15.3 14.5 13.5 13.3 12.7 12.2 12.1 12.0 12.8 
$100 - $250 18.8 18.5 16.0 15.1 14.8 13.9 13.6 12.5 12.0 14.4 
$250 - $1000 22.0 19.8 18.2 17.5 16.8 15.0 14.1 12.6 12.1 16.1 
$1000 - $3000 22.1 20.8 19.2 18.1 16.7 16.4 14.4 12.5 12.0 17.3 
$3000 - $5000 23.1 18.8 20.4 17.9 18.4 16.2 15.5 12.4 12.2 17.9 
> $5000 23.1 22.6 21.1 19.8 20.2 19.7 17.1 12.5 12.3 20.2 
Overall 21.0 19.5 17.6 16.6 16.1 15.1 13.8 12.4 12.0 15.5 
  Case 7d: (RR-SB)   
≤ $100 7.2 6.2 5.3 4.3 4.1 3.6 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.7 
$100 - $250 10.1 9.7 7.0 6.0 5.6 4.8 4.4 3.4 3.0 5.3 
$250 - $1000 13.7 11.1 9.3 8.6 7.9 5.9 4.9 3.4 3.0 7.1 
$1000 - $3000 22.1 20.8 19.2 18.1 16.7 16.4 14.4 12.5 12.0 17.3 
$3000 - $5000 23.1 18.8 20.4 17.9 18.4 16.2 15.5 12.4 12.2 17.9 
> $5000 23.1 22.6 21.1 19.8 20.2 19.7 17.1 12.5 12.3 20.2 
Overall 16.1 14.2 11.3 10.4 9.5 8.9 6.9 4.5 3.5 8.7 
 
Table 3.7 describes average asset correlations calculated over loans in Risk Rating and Size Bucket 
segments.  The top two panels replicate results presented in Table 3.6 for average asset correlations under 
the Case 2 and Case 3 partial implementations.  The bottom two panels present results under two 






Basel IRB Implementations on the Financing Company Portfolio 
 
Method 
Size Bucket ('000) 
Portfolio ≤$100 
$100 $250 $1,000 $3,000 
>$5000  -   -   -  -  
$250 $1,000 $3,000 $5,000 
SA 7.4% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 
Case 1a: FIRB 8.8% 7.3% 5.7% 4.3% 10.1% 10.0% 11.3% 
Case 1b: FIRB (M) 7.4% 7.3% 5.7% 4.3% 8.2% 8.0% 9.0% 
Case 2: AIRB 8.1% 7.1% 5.4% 4.0% 9.2% 9.1% 10.3% 
Case 3: Naïve AIRB 8.5% 16.6% 12.2% 9.0% 8.1% 7.9% 7.4% 
Case 4: S-AIRB 6.9% 12.7% 9.3% 6.8% 6.4% 6.3% 6.9% 
Case 5: R-AIRB 6.9% 7.1% 5.4% 4.0% 8.1% 7.9% 7.4% 
Case 6a: M-AIRB (M) 12.2% 20.8% 16.4% 12.6% 11.7% 11.5% 11.1% 
Case 6b: M-AIRB (Full) 20.2% 21.7% 19.3% 19.0% 20.1% 21.0% 20.9% 
Case 7a: PD by RR-SB 7.2% 18.8% 12.4% 8.2% 7.0% 6.5% 4.7% 
Case 7d: R-PD by RR-SB 5.6% 7.8% 5.4% 3.8% 7.0% 6.5% 4.7% 
 
Table 3.8 gives the resultant risk capital given various implementations and variations of the Basel II IRB 
framework.  Capital charges are in excess of Expected Loss (EL).  EL figures are based on the use of given 
PD and LGD risk components, respective to the implementation.  That is to say, in Cases 1a and 1b (the 
Foundation IRB cases), pre-set fixed LGDs of 45% for secured loans, and 75% for unsecured loans, in 
conjunction with the internally estimated “average” PDs (by risk rating) give the EL (%) for each loan.  
This percentage EL is then multiplied by the $OS (which we use as a proxy for the EAD) and summed for 
all loans to obtain the values given above.  For all other cases, the Financing Company downturn LGDs of 
73% and 41% were used.  For Case 1a, instead of using the standard 2.5 year M as specified in Basel II we 
follow OSFI convention and use minimum of the actual loan maturity and 5 years. The SA approach 
classifies borrowers as either Retail or Corporate, with Retail borrowers taking a capital charge of 6%, 







Capital Charges under Case 2 by Risk Rating and Size Bucket 
 





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
≤ $100 4.0 4.7 5.5 5.7 5.9 5.6 6.2 7.2 9.7 7.1 
$100 - $250 3.4 4.1 4.8 5.0 4.9 4.9 4.9 5.8 8.6 5.4 
$250 - $1000 2.8 3.2 3.7 3.9 3.9 4.0 4.1 4.6 6.4 4.0 
$1000 - $3000 6.9 7.6 8.6 9.0 9.3 9.6 10.3 11.7 14.1 9.2 
$3000 - $5000 6.8 7.7 8.6 8.8 9.0 9.6 10.7 12.2 14.2 9.1 
> $5000 7.7 9.3 10.2 10.5 10.7 11.4 12.2 14.1 20.4 10.3 
Overall 6.6 7.3 8.0 8.2 8.1 8.5 8.6 9.1 10.4 8.1 
 
Table 3.9 presents capital charges, as a dollar-weighted percentage of $OS, across portfolio Risk Rating 






Probability of Default by Risk and Size Group 
 
Probability of Default (%) 
Size Group ('000) 
Risk Group 
Overall 
1-3 4-5 6 7 8-9 
≤$100 2.81 4.34 5.59 8.15 11.39 8.32 
$100 - $250 1.71 2.85 3.63 4.01 7.71 4.58 
$250 - $1000 1.00 1.72 2.78 3.50 6.68 3.25 
GT $1000 0.68 1.49 1.92 3.02 7.43 2.37 




≤$100 0.0056 0.0079 0.0087 0.0306 0.0369 0.0080 
$100 - $250 0.0012 0.0084 0.0123 0.0147 0.0418 0.0071 
$250 - $1000 0.0010 0.0039 0.0024 0.0105 0.0403 0.0032 
GT $1000 0.0005 0.0021 0.0017 0.0023 0.0186 0.0021 
Overall 0.0011 0.0045 0.0063 0.0125 0.0237 0.0031 
 
Normalized Standard Deviation 
 
≤$100 0.27 0.20 0.17 0.21 0.17 0.11 
$100 - $250 0.20 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.27 0.18 
$250 - $1000 0.31 0.36 0.18 0.29 0.30 0.17 
GT $1000 0.35 0.31 0.22 0.16 0.18 0.20 
Overall 0.26 0.29 0.24 0.24 0.18 0.12 
 
Table 4.1 presents the Probabilities of Default as calculated over a period spanning 14 years starting in 
January 1997 and ending in December 2010.  Defaults were aggregated over a given calendar year and then 
divided over the count of healthy customers at the start of the year.  A healthy-weighted average of default 
rates over the time period then gives the PDs presented above.  Results are presented according to Risk and 
Size Groups; see Section 4.2 for definitions and descriptions.  PD Variance is calculated according to 
Equation (4.11).  Normalized standard deviations in the third panel are calculated as the ratio of the square 







Auxiliary Table A – Probabilities of Default by Risk and Size Group 
 





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
≤$100 2.10 2.58 3.18 4.16 4.47 5.59 8.15 10.03 13.19 8.32 
$100 - $250 1.13 1.24 2.19 2.72 2.93 3.63 4.01 6.25 12.50 4.58 
$250 - $1000 0.36 0.87 1.33 1.56 1.82 2.78 3.50 6.05 10.64 3.25 
$1000 - $3000 0.35 0.63 1.02 1.34 1.88 2.02 3.26 6.50 14.25 2.63 
$3000 - $5000 0.16 1.12 0.71 1.42 1.27 2.10 2.49 6.79 8.15 2.00 
> $5000 0.16 0.24 0.55 0.86 0.77 0.88 1.71 6.46 7.50 1.24 
Overall 0.72 1.06 1.72 2.13 2.41 3.24 4.63 7.30 12.68 4.56 
  Variance (%)   
≤$100 0.0149 0.0177  0.0101  0.0032  0.0110  0.0087  0.0306  0.0457  1.4767  0.0080  
$100 - $250 0.0071 0.0021  0.0060  0.0024  0.0128  0.0123  0.0147  0.0370  0.3753  0.0071  
$250 - $1000 0.0021 0.0015 0.0034  0.0020  0.0055  0.0024  0.0105  0.0375  1.0265  0.0032  
$1000 - $3000 0.0009 0.0025 0.0031  0.0033  0.0013  0.0007  0.0033  0.0189  1.3482  0.0028  
$3000 - $5000 0.0007 0.0061  0.0048  0.0167  0.0118  0.0135  0.0119  0.0615  13.1410  0.0033  
> $5000 0.0014 0.0019  0.0040  0.0113  0.0006  0.0115  0.0300  0.2388  9.4413  0.0004  
Overall 0.0005 0.0008  0.0026  0.0023  0.0062  0.0063  0.0125  0.0293  0.6669  0.0031  
  Normalized Standard Deviation   
≤$100 0.58 0.52 0.32 0.14 0.23 0.17 0.21 0.21 0.92 0.11 
$100 - $250 0.75 0.37 0.35 0.18 0.39 0.31 0.30 0.31 0.49 0.18 
$250 - $1000 1.26 0.44 0.44 0.29 0.41 0.18 0.29 0.32 0.95 0.17 
$1000 - $3000 0.85 0.79 0.54 0.43 0.19 0.13 0.18 0.21 0.81 0.20 
$3000 - $5000 1.67 0.70 0.97 0.91 0.86 0.55 0.44 0.37 4.45 0.29 
> $5000 2.36 1.82 1.14 1.24 0.33 1.21 1.01 0.76 4.10 0.16 
Overall 0.31 0.26 0.30 0.23 0.33 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.64 0.12 
 
Table 4.1A is analogous to Table 4.1 and presents Probabilities of Default along with PD Variance and 
normalized standard deviation.  Results are presented according to Risk and Size Groups; see Section 4.2 
for definitions and descriptions.  PD Variance is calculated according to Equation (4.11).  Normalized 
standard deviations in the third panel are calculated as the ratio of the square root of the variance (second 







Auxiliary Table B – Probabilities of Default by Size and Risk Group 
 
Probability of Default (%) 
Size Group ('000) 
Risk Group 
Overall 
 1-3  4-5  6-7  8-9 
≤$100 2.81 4.34 7.44 11.39 8.32 
$100 - $250 1.71 2.85 3.88 7.71 4.58 
$250 - $1000 0.85 1.63 3.01 6.86 2.94 
Overall 1.30 2.29 4.14 8.75 4.56 
  Variance (%)   
≤$100 0.0056 0.0079 0.0230 0.0369 0.0080 
$100 - $250 0.0012 0.0084 0.0138 0.0418 0.0071 
$250 - $1000 0.0007 0.0028 0.0278 0.0278 0.0019 
Overall 0.0011 0.0045 0.0088 0.0237 0.0031 
  Normalized Standard Deviation   
≤$100 0.27 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.11 
$100 - $250 0.20 0.32 0.30 0.27 0.18 
$250 - $1000 0.32 0.33 0.55 0.24 0.15 
Overall 0.26 0.29 0.23 0.18 0.12 
 
Table 4.1B is analogous to Table 4.1 and presents Probabilities of Default along with PD Variance and 
normalized standard deviation.  Results are presented according to Risk and Size Groups; see Section 4.2 
for definitions and descriptions.  PD Variance is calculated according to Equation (4.11).  Normalized 
standard deviations in the third panel are calculated as the ratio of the square root of the variance (second 







Auxiliary Table C – Probabilities of Default by Size and Risk Group 
 





 1-3  4-5  6-7  8-9 
≤ $100 2.81 4.34 7.44 11.39 8.32 
$100 - $250 1.71 2.85 3.88 7.71 4.58 
$250 - $1000 1.00 1.72 3.23 6.68 3.25 
> $1000 0.68 1.49 2.53 7.43 2.37 
Overall 1.30 2.29 4.14 8.75 4.56 
  Variance (%)   
≤ $100 0.0056 0.0079 0.0230 0.0369 0.0080 
$100 - $250 0.0012 0.0084 0.0138 0.0418 0.0071 
$250 - $1000 0.0010 0.0039 0.0054 0.0403 0.0032 
> $1000 0.0005 0.0021 0.0013 0.0186 0.0021 
Overall 0.0011 0.0045 0.0088 0.0237 0.0031 
  Normalized Standard Deviation   
≤ $100 0.27 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.11 
$100 - $250 0.20 0.32 0.30 0.27 0.18 
$250 - $1000 0.31 0.36 0.23 0.30 0.17 
> $1000 0.35 0.31 0.14 0.18 0.20 
Overall 0.26 0.29 0.23 0.18 0.12 
 
Table 4.1C is analogous to Table 4.1 and presents Probabilities of Default along with PD Variance and 
normalized standard deviation.  Results are presented according to Risk and Size Groups; see Section 4.2 
for definitions and descriptions.  PD Variance is calculated according to Equation (4.11).  Normalized 
standard deviations in the third panel are calculated as the ratio of the square root of the variance (second 





Internally Calibrated Asset and Default Correlations by Size and Risk Group 
 
 





 1-3  4-5 6 7  8-9 
≤ $100 1.32 0.92 0.68 1.33 0.99 0.34 
$100 - $250 0.67 1.92 1.88 1.92 1.96 0.77 
$250 - $1000 1.31 2.06 0.58 1.70 2.34 0.60 
> $1000 1.46 1.45 0.77 0.49 0.93 0.68 
Overall 0.98 1.49 1.17 1.30 0.93 0.34 
 
Default Correlation (%)  
≤ $100 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.41 0.37 0.10 
$100 - $250 0.07 0.31 0.35 0.38 0.59 0.16 
$250 - $1000 0.10 0.23 0.09 0.31 0.65 0.10 
> $1000 0.08 0.14 0.09 0.08 0.27 0.09 
Overall 0.09 0.20 0.20 0.28 0.30 0.07 
 
Table 4.2 presents asset and default correlations calculated by Risk and Size Group segments.  Asset and 
default correlations correspond to PD and PD variance values given in Table 4.1.  For calculation 







Auxiliary Table A – Internally Calibrated Correlations by Size and Risk Group 
 





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
≤$100 5.27 4.53 1.92 0.40 1.22 0.68 1.33 1.46 27.49 0.34 
$100 - $250 6.83 1.94 2.11 0.60 2.74 1.88 1.92 2.38 8.39 0.77 
$250 - $1000 11.72 2.50 2.72 1.29 2.59 0.58 1.70 2.53 25.32 0.60 
$1000 - $3000 6.42 6.49 3.79 2.60 0.59 0.28 0.61 1.16 23.38 0.73 
$3000 - $5000 14.39 6.00 9.30 10.08 8.84 4.80 3.28 3.44 99.99 1.37 
> $5000 21.25 17.28 11.10 14.10 1.37 13.73 12.69 12.99 99.99 0.40 
Overall 1.24 0.93 1.41 0.88 1.85 1.17 1.30 1.50 14.12 0.34 
  Default Correlation (%)   
≤$100 0.73 0.71 0.33 0.08 0.26 0.17 0.41 0.51 12.89 0.10 
$100 - $250 0.64 0.17 0.28 0.09 0.45 0.35 0.38 0.63 3.43 0.16 
$250 - $1000 0.58 0.17 0.26 0.13 0.31 0.09 0.31 0.66 10.79 0.10 
$1000 - $3000 0.26 0.40 0.31 0.25 0.07 0.03 0.10 0.31 11.03 0.11 
$3000 - $5000 0.46 0.55 0.68 1.19 0.94 0.66 0.49 0.97 98.86 0.17 
> $5000 0.88 0.80 0.72 1.33 0.08 1.31 1.78 3.95 98.85 0.03 
Overall 0.07 0.07 0.16 0.11 0.26 0.20 0.28 0.43 6.02 0.34 
 
Table 4.2A is analogous to Table 4.2 and presents asset and default correlations calculated by Risk and Size 
Group segments.  Asset and default correlations correspond to PD and PD variance values given in Table 







Auxiliary Table B – Internally Calibrated Correlations by Size and Risk Group 
 
Asset Correlation (%) 
Size Group ('000) 
Risk Group 
Overall 
 1-3  4-5  6-7  8-9 
≤$100 1.32 0.92 1.15 0.99 0.34 
$100 - $250 0.67 1.92 1.89 1.96 0.77 
$250 - $1000 1.31 2.06 1.02 2.34 0.60 
>$1000 1.46 1.45 0.36 0.93 0.68 
Overall 0.98 1.49 1.11 0.93 0.34 
Default Correlation (%) 
≤$100 0.21 0.19 0.33 0.37 0.10 
$100 - $250 0.07 0.31 0.37 0.59 0.16 
$250 - $1000 0.10 0.23 0.17 0.65 0.10 
>$1000 0.08 0.14 0.05 0.27 0.09 
Overall 0.09 0.20 0.22 0.30 0.07 
 
Table 4.2B is analogous to Table 4.2 and presents asset and default correlations calculated by Risk and Size 
Group segments.  Asset and default correlations correspond to PD and PD variance values given in Table 








Auxiliary Table C – Internally Calibrated Correlations by Size and Risk Group 
 
Asset Correlation (%) 
Size Group ('000) 
Risk Group 
Overall 
 1-3  4-5  6-7  8-9 
≤$100 1.32 0.92 1.15 0.99 0.34 
$100 - $250 0.67 1.92 1.89 1.96 0.77 
$250 - $1000 1.32 1.64 5.44 1.56 0.43 
Overall 0.98 1.49 1.11 0.93 0.34 
Default Correlation (%) 
≤$100 0.21 0.19 0.33 0.37 0.10 
$100 - $250 0.07 0.31 0.37 0.59 0.16 
$250 - $1000 0.09 0.18 0.95 0.43 0.07 
Overall 0.09 0.20 0.22 0.30 0.07 
 
Table 4.2C is analogous to Table 4.2 and presents asset and default correlations calculated by Risk and Size 
Group segments.  Asset and default correlations correspond to PD and PD variance values given in Table 







Asset Correlations Derived from Various Data Sources 
 
Source Study Default data source Results (%) 
Gordy (2000, Table 2) S&P 1.5 - 12.5 
Cespedes (2002) Moody's 10 
Hamerle, Liebig, and Roesch (2003a) Unknown Max 2.3 
Hamerle, Liebig, and Roesch (2003b) S&P 1982-1999 0.4-6.04 
Frey and McNeil (2003, Table 1) S&P 1981-2000 6.5-6.9-9.1 
Dietsch and Petey (2004) Coface 1994-2001 0.12-10.72 
Jobst and De Servigny (2005) S&P 1981-2003 4.7-14.6 
Duellman and Scheule (2003) DB 1987-2000 0.5-6.4 
Jakubik (2006) BF 1988-2003 5.7 
Source Study Asset data source Results (%) 
Duellmann, Scheicher, and Schmieder (2008) MKMV Credit Monitor 10.2 
Zeng and Zhang (2001) MKMV source 9.46 - 19.98 
Akhavein, Kocagil, and Neugebauer (2005) Equity 20.92 - 24.09 
Lopez (2002) MKMV Portfolio Manager 11.25 
de Servigny and Renault (2002) Equity 6 
 
Table 4.3 replicates asset correlation results presented in Chernih, Henrard, and Vanduffel (2010, p. 53) 
Tables 1 and 2.  Results show a large discrepancy between asset correlation results generated from market 
equity data and those generated from default data sources; see Section 4.2 for further details. S&P: 







Financing Company SME PDs and Ratings as Compared to S&P PDs and Ratings 
 
One Year Default Rates, Average, Standard Deviation, Normalized SD 
S&P Mean Std Dev Norm SD FC RG Mean Std Dev Norm SD 
AAA 0.00% 0.00% 
     AA+ 0.00% 0.00% 
     AA 0.01% 0.08% 8.0 
    AA- 0.03% 0.10% 3.3 
    A+ 0.05% 0.15% 3.0 
    A 0.07% 0.14% 2.0 
    A- 0.07% 0.02% 0.3 
    BBB+ 0.16% 0.32% 2.0 
    BBB 0.26% 0.35% 1.3 
    BBB- 0.31% 0.47% 1.5 
    BB+ 0.67% 0.96% 1.4 
    BB 0.88% 0.83% 0.9 
    BB- 1.47% 1.79% 1.2  1-3 1.30% 0.34% 0.3 
B+ 2.47% 2.12% 0.9  4-5 2.29% 0.67% 0.3 
    
6 3.24% 0.79% 0.2 
    
7 4.63% 1.12% 0.2 
B 7.17% 4.62% 0.6         
         8-9 8.75% 1.54% 0.2 
B- 9.99% 7.95% 0.8         
        CCC/C 23.56% 12.69% 0.5         
 
Table 4.4 provides descriptive statistics for the Financing Company SME loans and Standard & Poor’s 
(S&P) rated corporate debt.  Statistics are given by rating for the Mean, Standard Deviation (Std Dev) and 
Normalized Standard Deviation (Norm SD).  S&P statistics were measured over the 1921 – 2010 
observation period while Financing Company (FC) statistics were measured over the 1997 – 2010 period.  
Results show significantly higher normalized standard deviations for the FC Risk Groups (RGs).  Source: 
Default, Transition, and Recovery: 2010 Annual Global Corporate Default Study and Rating Transitions. 





Average Asset Correlations under Partial Implementations 
 
Method 
Size Group ('000) 
Overall ≤$100 
$100 $250 
>$1000  -   -  
$250 $1,000 
      
Case 1a: FIRB 7.4% 4.9% 5.7% 6.1% 12.7% 
Case 1b: FIRB (M) 7.4% 4.9% 5.7% 6.1% 12.7% 
Case 2: AIRB 7.4% 4.9% 5.7% 6.1% 12.7% 
Case 3: Naïve AIRB 15.0% 14.0% 14.8% 15.1% 15.8% 
Case 4: S-AIRB 11.2% 10.0% 10.8% 11.1% 12.7% 
Case 5: R-AIRB 8.2% 4.9% 5.7% 6.1% 15.8% 
Case 6a: M-AIRB (M) 15.0% 14.0% 14.8% 15.1% 15.8% 
Case 6b: M-AIRB (Full) 15.0% 14.0% 14.8% 15.1% 15.8% 
Case 7a: PD by RR-SB 15.4% 12.8% 14.3% 16.0% 17.7% 
Case 7d: R-PD by RR-SB 11.6% 8.8% 10.3% 12.0% 17.7% 
 
Table 4.5 restates Table 3.6 in Chapter 3 and uses Size Groups defined in Chapter 4 to present average 
asset correlations obtained under a Partial Implementation exercise using PD calibrated along Risk Groups 







Restated Partial Implementation Capital Charge Results 
 
Method 
Size Group ('000) 
Overall ≤$100 
$100 $250 
>$1000  -   -  
$250 $1,000 
SA 7.4% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 8.0% 
Case 1a: FIRB 9.0% 7.0% 5.6% 4.4% 10.6% 
Case 1b: FIRB (M) 7.5% 7.0% 5.6% 4.4% 8.6% 
Case 2: AIRB 8.2% 6.7% 5.3% 4.1% 9.8% 
Case 3: Naïve AIRB 8.6% 15.9% 12.1% 9.1% 8.0% 
Case 4: S-AIRB 7.0% 12.1% 9.2% 6.9% 6.7% 
Case 5: R-AIRB 7.0% 6.7% 5.3% 4.1% 8.0% 
Case 6a: M-AIRB (M) 12.3% 20.2% 16.3% 12.7% 11.6% 
Case 6b: M-AIRB (Full) 20.4% 21.1% 19.2% 19.2% 20.8% 
Case 7a: PD by RG-SG 7.5% 18.7% 12.2% 8.2% 6.6% 
Case 7d: R-PD by RG-SG 6.1% 14.2% 9.2% 6.3% 6.6% 
 
Table 4.6 is analogous to Table 3.8 and restates capital charges obtained in Chapter 3 under the Partial 
Implementation exercise.  In Table 4.6 we use PDs calibrated along Risk Groups, as well as Risk and Size 






Boosted Asset Correlations by Risk and Size Group 
 
 





 1-3  4-5 6 7  8-9 
≤ $100 14.7 12.4 10.6 14.8 12.9 7.4 
$100 - $250 10.5 17.3 17.2 17.3 17.4 11.3 
$250 - $1000 14.7 17.8 9.8 16.5 18.6 9.9 
> $1000 15.4 15.4 11.3 8.9 12.5 10.6 
Overall 12.8 15.6 13.9 14.6 12.5 7.4 
 
Default Correlation (%)  
≤ $100 2.90 3.01 2.91 5.15 5.18 2.45 
$100 - $250 1.42 3.58 4.04 4.30 6.06 2.80 
$250 - $1000 1.55 2.79 1.76 3.77 6.11 1.97 
> $1000 1.30 2.11 1.66 1.67 4.05 1.75 
Overall 1.52 2.76 2.94 3.80 4.41 1.74 
 
Table 4.7 is analogous to Table 3.6 and presents boosted asset correlation values.  A bounded log odds 
adjustment method is applied to the original internally-calibrated correlations such that the overall (Overall) 
portfolio asset correlation is boosted from 0.21% to 7.4%, while maintaining existing patterns and 
relationships by Risk and Size Group.  The 7.4% value corresponds to the average correlation across all 





Internally Calibrated Simulation Based Capital Charges vs. Basel II 
 





1-3 4-5 6 7 8-9 
≤ $100 5.1% 5.8% 5.6% 6.2% 7.9% 6.7% 
$100 - $250 4.4% 4.9% 4.9% 4.9% 6.6% 5.3% 
$250 - $1000 3.5% 3.9% 4.0% 4.1% 5.1% 4.1% 
> $1000 8.6% 9.7% 10.1% 10.8% 13.2% 9.8% 
Overall 7.6% 8.2% 8.5% 8.6% 9.5% 8.2% 
  Capital Charges under Case 7b Boosted by RG and SG   
≤ $100 12.9% 14.7% 14.1% 23.2% 24.8% 20.2% 
$100 - $250 6.0% 13.1% 14.5% 14.5% 21.5% 14.2% 
$250 - $1000 4.5% 7.9% 6.3% 10.7% 16.4% 8.8% 
> $1000 3.6% 5.9% 5.3% 5.8% 12.7% 5.5% 
Overall 3.9% 6.8% 6.0% 8.0% 16.0% 7.0% 
  Capital Charges under Case 10 Boosted by RG and SG   
≤ $100 6.9% 12.0% 12.7% 16.9% 21.1% 16.1% 
$100 - $250 5.9% 10.4% 11.1% 13.4% 17.6% 11.9% 
$250 - $1000 4.6% 8.2% 9.1% 11.2% 13.6% 8.9% 
> $1000 4.6% 7.8% 8.8% 11.0% 13.4% 7.5% 
Overall 4.7% 8.1% 9.0% 11.3% 14.6% 8.2% 
 
Table 4.8 presents Basel II capital charges (Case 2) and those obtained under Cases 7b and Case 10.  Case 
7b here represents a simulation-based implementation of the asset value model (AVM) using Probabilities 
of Default (PDs) and asset correlations calibrated to RG-SG.  Case 10 here represents a simulation-based 
implementation of the AVM using PDs and asset correlations calibrated to RG.  Results are presented for 








Basel II and Simulation-Based Capital Charges Comparative Ratios 
 





1-3 4-5 6 7 8-9 
≤ $100 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.8 3.1 3.0 
$100 - $250 1.4 2.7 2.9 3.0 3.3 2.7 
$250 - $1000 1.3 2.0 1.6 2.6 3.2 2.2 
> $1000 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.5 1.0 0.6 
Overall 0.5 0.8 0.7 0.9 1.7 0.9 
  Ratio of Boosted Case 10 to Case 2 Capital Charges    
≤ $100 1.4 2.1 2.3 2.7 2.7 2.4 
$100 - $250 1.3 2.1 2.3 2.7 2.7 2.2 
$250 - $1000 1.3 2.1 2.2 2.8 2.7 2.2 
> $1000 0.5 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.8 
Overall 0.6 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.0 
  Ratio of Boosted Case 10 to Case 7b Capital Charges    
≤ $100 1.9 1.2 1.1 1.4 1.2 1.3 
$100 - $250 1.0 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.2 
$250 - $1000 1.0 1.0 0.7 1.0 1.2 1.0 
> $1000 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.9 0.7 
Overall 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 1.1 0.9 
 
Table 4.9 presents ratios of capital charges under various three portfolio credit risk models: the Basel II 
model (Case 2), and; the AVMs under Cases 7b and Case 10.  Case 7b here represents a simulation-based 
implementation of the asset value model (AVM) using Probabilities of Default (PDs) and asset correlations 
calibrated to RG-SG.  Case 10 here represents a simulation-based implementation of the AVM using PDs 
and asset correlations calibrated to RG.  Results are presented for Risk and Size Group segments in the 












Simulation-based Implementation EC (%) 
Overall Risk Group 
1-3 4-5 6 7 8-9 
≤ $100 0.91 1.92 2.08 2.92 3.78 2.76 
$100 - $250 0.77 1.58 1.74 2.29 3.13 1.95 
$250 - $1000 0.62 1.28 1.43 1.92 2.42 1.44 
> $1000 0.69 1.34 1.53 2.15 2.63 1.32 
Overall 0.69 1.35 1.52 2.11 2.73 1.41 
 
Asymptotic Implementation EC (%)  
≤ $100 0.91 1.93 2.02 2.96 3.83 2.79 
$100 - $250 0.79 1.65 1.78 2.34 3.20 2.00 
$250 - $1000 0.62 1.31 1.46 1.94 2.47 1.47 
> $1000 0.60 1.23 1.38 1.90 2.43 1.18 
Overall 0.62 1.28 1.42 1.96 2.66 1.33 
  
% Change in EC from Asymptotic to Simulation-based 
Implementation 
 
≤ $100 -0.2% -0.7% 2.7% -1.5% -1.3% -1.1% 
$100 - $250 -3.1% -4.6% -2.6% -2.1% -2.1% -2.7% 
$250 - $1000 -0.1% -2.3% -1.6% -1.0% -2.1% -1.6% 
> $1000 14.9% 8.8% 11.0% 13.2% 8.5% 11.1% 
Overall 11.5% 5.3% 7.2% 7.9% 2.7% 6.4% 
 
Table 4.10 presents capital charges generated under a simulation-based implementation of the single factor 
model presented in Subsection 4.1.2 and using internally-calibrated asset correlations and PDs by RR.  The 
top panel presents the simulation-based capital charges by Risk Rating and Size Bucket.  The second panel 
presents capital charges under an equivalent calibration but using the asymptotic implementation of the 
single factor model.  The bottom panel presents the percentage change in going from the asymptotic 
implementation to the simulation-based implementation.  The figure in the bottom-right corner of the table 












Simulation-based Implementation EC (%) 
Overall Risk Group 
1-3 4-5 6 7 8-9 
≤ $100 2.1 2.3 2.2 4.4 4.7 3.7 
$100 - $250 0.8 2.3 2.7 2.6 4.5 2.6 
$250 - $1000 0.6 1.2 0.9 1.8 3.6 1.5 
> $1000 0.5 1.0 0.8 0.9 2.5 0.9 
Overall 0.6 1.1 0.9 1.3 3.3 1.2 
Size Asymptotic Implementation EC (%) 
 
≤ $100 2.0 2.3 2.2 4.5 4.7 3.7 
$100 - $250 0.8 2.3 2.6 2.7 4.6 2.7 
$250 - $1000 0.6 1.3 0.8 1.9 3.6 1.6 
> $1000 0.5 0.9 0.7 0.8 2.2 0.8 
Overall 0.5 1.1 0.8 1.2 3.1 1.1 
  % Change in EC from Asymptotic to Simulation-based Implementation   
≤ $100 2.1% -0.9% -0.5% -1.5% -0.2% -0.3% 
$100 - $250 -3.2% -1.7% 1.3% -2.8% -3.2% -2.4% 
$250 - $1000 -3.5% -4.5% 2.1% -2.9% -1.3% -2.2% 
> $1000 12.9% 10.3% 15.8% 17.7% 14.7% 13.5% 
Overall 8.5% 4.8% 10.3% 5.4% 3.9% 5.7% 
 
Table 4.11 presents capital charges generated under a simulation-based implementation of the single factor 
model presented in Subsection 4.1.2 and using internally-calibrated asset correlations and PDs by RR x 
Size.  The top panel presents the simulation-based capital charges by Risk Rating and Size Bucket.  The 
second panel presents capital charges under an equivalent calibration but using the asymptotic 
implementation of the single factor model.  The bottom panel presents the percentage change in going from 
the asymptotic implementation to the simulation-based implementation.  The figure in the bottom-right 









EC Charge Comparison using Boosted Correlations Calibrated by RG 
 
Size Group  
(‘000) 
Simulation-based Implementation EC (%) 
Overall Risk Group 
1-3 4-5 6 7 8-9 
≤ $100 6.9 12.0 12.7 16.9 21.1 16.1 
$100 - $250 5.9 10.4 11.1 13.4 17.6 11.9 
$250 - $1000 4.6 8.2 9.1 11.2 13.6 8.9 
> $1000 4.6 7.8 8.8 11.0 13.4 7.5 
Overall 4.7 8.1 9.0 11.3 14.6 8.2 
 
Asymptotic Implementation EC (%) 
 
≤ $100 6.7 11.9 12.4 16.6 20.5 15.7 
$100 - $250 5.8 10.2 11.0 13.2 17.1 11.6 
$250 - $1000 4.6 8.1 9.0 10.9 13.2 8.7 
> $1000 4.4 7.6 8.5 10.7 13.0 7.3 
Overall 4.5 7.9 8.7 11.0 14.2 8.0 
  % Change in EC from Asymptotic to Simulation-based Implementation   
≤ $100 2.8% 0.8% 2.1% 1.5% 3.3% 2.6% 
$100 - $250 1.1% 1.9% 1.6% 2.0% 2.9% 2.2% 
$250 - $1000 1.2% 1.6% 1.5% 2.4% 3.1% 2.1% 
> $1000 2.7% 2.4% 3.3% 3.1% 3.3% 2.9% 
Overall 2.4% 2.1% 2.8% 2.8% 3.2% 2.6% 
 
Table 4.12 presents capital charges generated under a simulation-based implementation of the single factor 
model presented in Subsection 4.1.2 and using boosted internally-calibrated asset correlations and PDs by 
RR.  The top panel presents the simulation-based capital charges by Risk Rating and Size Bucket.  The 
second panel presents capital charges under an equivalent calibration but using the asymptotic 
implementation of the single factor model.  The bottom panel presents the percentage change in going from 
the asymptotic implementation to the simulation-based implementation.  The figure in the bottom-right 
corner of the table gives the overall “granularity effect”, on EC, of explicitly modelling idiosyncratic 
factors given this boost.  Comparing to Table 4.10 we observe a notable decrease of the granularity effect 







EC Charge Comparison using Boosted Correlations Calibrated by RG-SG 
 
Size Group  
(‘000) 
Simulation-based Implementation EC (%) 
Overall Risk Group 
1-3 4-5 6 7 8-9 
≤ $100 12.9 14.7 14.1 23.2 24.8 20.2 
$100 - $250 6.0 13.1 14.5 14.5 21.5 14.2 
$250 - $1000 4.5 7.9 6.3 10.7 16.4 8.8 
> $1000 3.6 5.9 5.3 5.8 12.7 5.5 
Overall 3.9 6.8 6.0 8.0 16.0 7.0 
 
Asymptotic Implementation EC (%) 
 
≤ $100 12.4 14.2 13.6 22.1 23.4 19.2 
$100 - $250 5.8 12.8 14.0 14.0 20.7 13.7 
$250 - $1000 4.4 7.7 6.0 10.4 15.8 8.5 
> $1000 3.4 5.8 5.1 5.5 12.0 5.3 
Overall 3.8 6.7 5.8 7.6 15.2 6.8 
  % Change in EC from Asymptotic to Simulation-based Implementation   
≤ $100 4.0% 3.5% 4.3% 5.0% 5.8% 5.1% 
$100 - $250 2.8% 2.9% 3.7% 3.2% 4.0% 3.5% 
$250 - $1000 2.7% 2.4% 4.6% 2.9% 3.9% 3.3% 
> $1000 4.0% 2.8% 4.1% 5.2% 5.9% 4.2% 
Overall 3.7% 2.8% 4.1% 4.1% 4.9% 3.9% 
 
Table 4.13 presents capital charges generated under a simulation-based implementation of the single factor 
model presented in Subsection 4.1.2 and using boosted internally-calibrated asset correlations and PDs by 
RG-SG.  The top panel presents the simulation-based capital charges by Risk Rating and Size Bucket.  The 
second panel presents capital charges under an equivalent calibration but using the asymptotic 
implementation of the single factor model.  The bottom panel presents the percentage change in going from 
the asymptotic implementation to the simulation-based implementation.  The figure in the bottom-right 
corner of the table gives the overall “granularity effect”, on EC, of explicitly modelling idiosyncratic 
factors given this boost.  Comparing to Table 4.11 we observe a notable decrease of the granularity effect 







Default Rate Correlations by Industry for CreditRisk+ Implementation 
 
Industry BUS CON MAN NBUS OTH RES RET SOP TOU TRS WHS 
BUS 1 0.59 0.64 0.16 0.06 0.51 0.23 0.91 0.10 0 0.08 
CON 
 
1 0.74 0.51 0.51 0.28 0.45 0.45 0.17 0.25 0.36 
MAN 
  
1 0.57 0.44 0.29 0.68 0.49 0.37 0.40 0.61 
NBUS 
   
1 0.26 0.31 0.43 0 0.16 0.56 0.76 
OTH 
    
1 0 0.60 0.04 0.27 0.17 0.33 
RES 
     
1 0.05 0.39 0.15 0 0.27 
RET 
      
1 0.16 0.80 0.44 0.66 
SOP 
       
1 0.01 0 0 
TOU 
        
1 0.33 0.57 
TRS 
         
1 0.39 
WHS 
          
1 
 








 EC Charges by Risk and Size Group using RG Calibration 
 
EC (%) under CR+ Single Sector (RG) 
Size Group ('000) 
Risk Group 
Overall 
 1-3  4-5 6 7  8-9 
≤ $100 0.52 0.94 1.26 1.85 3.74 1.93 
$100 - $250 0.51 0.92 1.25 1.77 3.64 1.65 
$250 - $1000 0.47 0.84 1.18 1.64 3.26 1.30 
> $1000 0.51 0.87 1.23 1.73 3.27 1.12 
Overall 0.50 0.87 1.22 1.71 3.34 1.21 
EC (%) under CR+ Multiple Sector (RG) 
≤ $100 0.16 0.28 0.37 0.55 0.99 0.54 
$100 - $250 0.16 0.26 0.39 0.52 1.00 0.47 
$250 - $1000 0.16 0.28 0.39 0.53 0.97 0.41 
> $1000 0.29 0.45 0.62 0.85 1.53 0.57 
Overall 0.26 0.40 0.55 0.74 1.28 0.53 
EC (%) under CR+ Multiple Correlated Sectors (RG) 
≤ $100 0.36 0.64 0.85 1.26 2.44 1.28 
$100 - $250 0.35 0.62 0.87 1.19 2.40 1.10 
$250 - $1000 0.34 0.58 0.81 1.11 2.12 0.88 
> $1000 0.40 0.66 0.92 1.27 2.34 0.84 
Overall 0.39 0.64 0.89 1.22 2.29 0.87 
 
Table 5.2A – Economic Capital charges are calculated under various implementations of the CreditRisk+ 
framework.  In all cases, default rates by Risk Group are used to define the PD and PD volatility.  In 
addition, industry segregations are used to define sectors – both in the standard Multiple Sector 









 EC Charges by Risk and Size Group using RG-SG Calibration 
 
EC (%) under CR+ Single Sector (RG-SG) 
Size Group ('000) 
Risk Group 
Overall 
 1-3  4-5 6 7  8-9 
≤ $100 1.30 2.06 2.52 3.77 5.64 3.36 
$100 - $250 0.77 1.33 1.63 1.77 3.72 1.88 
$250 - $1000 0.42 0.73 1.17 1.43 2.88 1.16 
> $1000 0.31 0.66 0.84 1.31 3.22 0.88 
Overall 0.36 0.74 0.99 1.43 3.33 1.06 
EC (%) under CR+ Multiple Sector (RG-SG) 
≤ $100 0.39 0.61 0.73 1.11 1.49 0.93 
$100 - $250 0.24 0.37 0.50 0.52 1.02 0.54 
$250 - $1000 0.14 0.24 0.39 0.46 0.86 0.37 
> $1000 0.17 0.35 0.43 0.65 1.52 0.44 
Overall 0.18 0.33 0.43 0.61 1.27 0.45 
EC (%) under CR+ Multiple Correlated Sectors (RG-SG) 
≤ $100 0.88 1.39 1.66 2.51 3.62 2.20 
$100 - $250 0.53 0.87 1.10 1.17 2.41 1.24 
$250 - $1000 0.29 0.50 0.79 0.96 1.84 0.77 
> $1000 0.24 0.49 0.62 0.94 2.27 0.64 
Overall 0.27 0.53 0.70 1.00 2.25 0.74 
 
Table 5.2B – Economic Capital charges are calculated under various implementations of the CreditRisk+ 
framework.  In all cases, default rates by RG-SG are used to define the PD and PD volatility.  In addition, 
industry segregations are used to define sectors – both in the standard Multiple Sector implementation and 










 EC Ratios under Various Implementations by Risk and Size Group  
 
Ratio of Single Sector to Multiple Sector Implementations  
Size Group ('000) 
Risk Group 
Overall 
 1-3  4-5 6 7  8-9 
≤ $100 3.29 3.36 3.40 3.37 3.77 3.61 
$100 - $250 3.21 3.53 3.24 3.38 3.64 3.51 
$250 - $1000 2.86 3.05 3.02 3.07 3.37 3.16 
> $1000 1.77 1.91 1.98 2.04 2.14 1.98 
Overall 1.94 2.15 2.20 2.30 2.61 2.29 
 Ratio of Single Sector to Multiple Correlated Sectors Implementations  
≤ $100 1.44 1.46 1.48 1.47 1.53 1.51 
$100 - $250 1.44 1.49 1.45 1.49 1.52 1.50 
$250 - $1000 1.39 1.44 1.46 1.47 1.54 1.48 
> $1000 1.27 1.32 1.33 1.37 1.40 1.34 
Overall 1.30 1.35 1.37 1.40 1.46 1.39 
 Ratio of Multiple Correlated Sectors to Multiple Sector Implementations  
≤ $100 2.29 2.30 2.29 2.28 2.46 2.40 
$100 - $250 2.24 2.37 2.24 2.27 2.40 2.35 
$250 - $1000 2.05 2.11 2.08 2.09 2.19 2.13 
> $1000 1.39 1.46 1.49 1.49 1.53 1.48 
Overall 1.50 1.59 1.61 1.64 1.80 1.65 
 
Table 5.3A – Economic Capital charges are calculated under various implementations of the CreditRisk+ 
framework.  In all cases, default rates by RG are used to define the PD and PD volatility.  In addition, 
industry segregations are used to define sectors – both in the standard Multiple Sector implementation and 









 EC Ratios under Various Implementations by Risk and Size Group 
 
Ratio of Single Sector to Multiple Sector Implementations  
Size Group ('000) 
Risk Group 
Overall 
 1-3  4-5 6 7  8-9 
≤ $100 3.34 3.40 3.44 3.40 3.78 3.60 
$100 - $250 3.26 3.56 3.28 3.41 3.64 3.51 
$250 - $1000 2.89 3.07 3.04 3.09 3.36 3.16 
> $1000 1.76 1.90 1.97 2.02 2.13 1.98 
Overall 2.06 2.24 2.30 2.35 2.62 2.38 
 Ratio of Single Sector to Multiple Correlated Sectors Implementations  
≤ $100 1.47 1.49 1.52 1.50 1.56 1.53 
$100 - $250 1.46 1.52 1.48 1.52 1.54 1.52 
$250 - $1000 1.42 1.47 1.49 1.50 1.56 1.51 
> $1000 1.29 1.34 1.35 1.39 1.42 1.37 
Overall 1.34 1.39 1.40 1.43 1.48 1.43 
 Ratio of Multiple Correlated Sectors to Multiple Sector Implementations  
≤ $100 2.28 2.28 2.27 2.26 2.43 2.35 
$100 - $250 2.22 2.34 2.22 2.24 2.36 2.31 
$250 - $1000 2.04 2.09 2.04 2.06 2.15 2.10 
> $1000 1.36 1.42 1.45 1.45 1.50 1.45 
Overall 1.54 1.61 1.64 1.64 1.77 1.67 
 
Table 5.3B – Economic Capital charges are calculated under various implementations of the CreditRisk+ 
framework.  In all cases, default rates by RG-SG are used to define the PD and PD volatility.  In addition, 
industry segregations are used to define sectors – both in the standard Multiple Sector implementation and 










 EC Charges by Industry and Risk Group using RG Calibration 
 
EC (%) under CR
+




 1-3  4-5 6 7  8-9 
BUS 0.53 0.94 1.48 1.92 3.68 1.32 
CON 0.49 0.86 1.20 1.64 3.42 1.06 
MAN 0.51 0.88 1.22 1.72 3.37 1.14 
NBUS 0.50 0.85 1.18 1.65 3.38 1.31 
OTH 0.50 0.90 1.28 1.75 3.41 1.33 
RES 0.50 0.85 1.25 1.70 3.54 1.46 
RET 0.47 0.86 1.20 1.68 3.28 1.12 
SOP 0.48 0.85 1.19 1.84 2.94 1.41 
TOU 0.52 0.83 1.14 1.67 3.18 1.40 
TRS 0.50 0.85 1.18 1.71 3.26 1.18 
WHS 0.50 0.90 1.28 1.69 3.74 1.09 
Overall 0.50 0.87 1.22 1.71 3.34 1.21 
EC (%) under CR
+
 Multiple Sector (RG) 
BUS 0.14 0.23 0.42 0.46 0.58 0.29 
CON 0.16 0.22 0.30 0.30 0.65 0.25 
MAN 0.41 0.67 0.91 1.23 2.38 0.84 
NBUS 0.16 0.22 0.32 0.44 0.78 0.34 
OTH 0.09 0.18 0.27 0.23 0.38 0.20 
RES 0.14 0.17 0.24 0.29 0.74 0.31 
RET 0.18 0.37 0.51 0.63 1.01 0.42 
SOP 0.18 0.33 0.40 0.92 0.66 0.48 
TOU 0.27 0.34 0.44 0.70 1.17 0.56 
TRS 0.17 0.25 0.33 0.44 0.72 0.31 
WHS 0.18 0.28 0.45 0.48 1.22 0.35 
Overall 0.26 0.40 0.55 0.74 1.28 0.53 
EC (%) under CR
+
 Multiple Correlated Sectors (RG) 
BUS 0.30 0.53 0.86 1.08 1.95 0.73 
CON 0.35 0.61 0.84 1.11 2.32 0.74 
MAN 0.48 0.82 1.13 1.58 3.09 1.06 
NBUS 0.33 0.53 0.75 1.04 2.08 0.82 
OTH 0.25 0.46 0.66 0.85 1.62 0.65 
RES 0.21 0.33 0.47 0.62 1.36 0.56 
RET 0.38 0.71 0.98 1.35 2.57 0.90 
SOP 0.24 0.44 0.58 1.05 1.29 0.70 
TOU 0.34 0.51 0.70 1.04 1.91 0.86 
TRS 0.29 0.48 0.66 0.94 1.75 0.66 
WHS 0.37 0.67 0.96 1.23 2.77 0.81 
Overall 0.39 0.64 0.89 1.22 2.29 0.87 
 
Table 5.4A – Economic Capital charges are calculated under various implementations of the CreditRisk+ 
framework.  In all cases, default rates by Risk Group are used to define the PD and PD volatility.  In 
addition, industry segregations are used to define sectors – both in the standard Multiple Sector 








 EC Charges by Industry and Risk Group using RG-SG Calibration 
 
EC (%) under CR
+




 1-3  4-5 6 7  8-9 
BUS 0.41 0.86 1.24 1.70 3.73 1.21 
CON 0.36 0.76 1.01 1.45 3.46 0.94 
MAN 0.36 0.74 0.98 1.44 3.36 0.98 
NBUS 0.40 0.76 1.03 1.41 3.40 1.20 
OTH 0.38 0.79 1.03 1.52 3.45 1.20 
RES 0.36 0.75 1.03 1.44 3.51 1.33 
RET 0.35 0.73 0.95 1.42 3.29 0.98 
SOP 0.32 0.67 0.87 1.47 2.86 1.20 
TOU 0.36 0.69 0.94 1.37 3.14 1.23 
TRS 0.34 0.71 0.95 1.39 3.28 1.01 
WHS 0.35 0.77 1.03 1.41 3.80 0.94 
Overall 0.36 0.74 0.99 1.43 3.33 1.06 
EC (%) under CR
+
 Multiple Sector (RG-SG) 
BUS 0.10 0.20 0.34 0.40 0.63 0.26 
CON 0.11 0.19 0.24 0.26 0.67 0.21 
MAN 0.27 0.53 0.69 0.98 2.29 0.69 
NBUS 0.12 0.21 0.28 0.39 0.84 0.32 
OTH 0.07 0.15 0.21 0.20 0.40 0.18 
RES 0.10 0.15 0.19 0.24 0.76 0.28 
RET 0.13 0.31 0.39 0.52 1.02 0.36 
SOP 0.12 0.26 0.29 0.74 0.67 0.40 
TOU 0.18 0.29 0.36 0.59 1.21 0.50 
TRS 0.11 0.20 0.25 0.35 0.72 0.26 
WHS 0.12 0.23 0.34 0.39 1.23 0.29 
Overall 0.18 0.33 0.43 0.61 1.27 0.45 
EC (%) under CR
+
 Multiple Correlated Sectors (RG-SG) 
BUS 0.23 0.48 0.71 0.95 1.97 0.66 
CON 0.26 0.54 0.72 1.00 2.41 0.67 
MAN 0.33 0.66 0.87 1.27 2.95 0.87 
NBUS 0.25 0.48 0.64 0.88 2.10 0.75 
OTH 0.19 0.39 0.52 0.72 1.61 0.58 
RES 0.15 0.29 0.39 0.54 1.40 0.52 
RET 0.27 0.59 0.76 1.13 2.56 0.78 
SOP 0.16 0.35 0.43 0.84 1.27 0.59 
TOU 0.23 0.42 0.56 0.84 1.86 0.74 
TRS 0.18 0.37 0.49 0.71 1.64 0.52 
WHS 0.26 0.56 0.76 1.01 2.78 0.68 
Overall 0.27 0.53 0.70 1.00 2.25 0.74 
 
Table 5.4B – Economic Capital charges are calculated under various implementations of the CreditRisk+ 
framework.  In all cases, default rates by RG-SG are used to define the PD and PD volatility.  In addition, 
industry segregations are used to define sectors – both in the standard Multiple Sector implementation and 










 Ratios of Various Implementation EC by Industry and Risk Group 
 





1-3 4-5 6 7 8-9 
BUS 3.89 4.15 3.50 4.21 6.35 4.62 
CON 3.06 3.91 3.97 5.53 5.28 4.21 
MAN 1.25 1.32 1.35 1.40 1.41 1.35 
NBUS 3.09 3.78 3.75 3.78 4.31 3.87 
OTH 5.32 5.04 4.74 7.49 8.86 6.49 
RES 3.52 4.88 5.28 5.82 4.81 4.78 
RET 2.64 2.30 2.36 2.68 3.25 2.67 
SOP 2.68 2.56 2.99 1.99 4.45 2.95 
TOU 1.92 2.43 2.58 2.38 2.71 2.48 
TRS 3.01 3.44 3.58 3.92 4.52 3.77 
WHS 2.82 3.17 2.88 3.50 3.07 3.07 
Overall 1.94 2.15 2.20 2.30 2.61 2.29 
 Ratio of Single Sector to Multiple Correlated Sectors 
Implementations  
BUS 1.76 1.78 1.72 1.78 1.89 1.81 
CON 1.38 1.43 1.43 1.48 1.47 1.44 
MAN 1.06 1.08 1.08 1.09 1.09 1.08 
NBUS 1.54 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.62 1.60 
OTH 1.97 1.96 1.93 2.07 2.10 2.03 
RES 2.36 2.61 2.66 2.72 2.60 2.59 
RET 1.24 1.22 1.22 1.24 1.27 1.24 
SOP 1.96 1.93 2.03 1.75 2.27 2.02 
TOU 1.51 1.61 1.64 1.61 1.66 1.63 
TRS 1.72 1.77 1.78 1.82 1.86 1.80 
WHS 1.33 1.35 1.34 1.37 1.35 1.35 
Overall 1.30 1.35 1.37 1.40 1.46 1.39 
 Ratio of Multiple Correlated Sectors to Multiple 
Sector Implementations  
BUS 2.21 2.33 2.03 2.36 3.36 2.55 
CON 2.22 2.75 2.78 3.75 3.59 2.93 
MAN 1.18 1.23 1.25 1.28 1.29 1.25 
NBUS 2.01 2.38 2.36 2.38 2.66 2.43 
OTH 2.70 2.58 2.45 3.62 4.21 3.20 
RES 1.49 1.87 1.99 2.14 1.85 1.84 
RET 2.12 1.89 1.93 2.16 2.55 2.15 
SOP 1.37 1.33 1.47 1.14 1.96 1.46 
TOU 1.28 1.50 1.57 1.48 1.63 1.53 
TRS 1.76 1.95 2.01 2.16 2.42 2.09 
WHS 2.12 2.34 2.16 2.55 2.28 2.27 
Overall 1.50 1.59 1.61 1.64 1.80 1.65 
 
Table 5.5A – Economic Capital charges are calculated under various implementations of the CreditRisk+ 
framework.  In all cases, default rates by Risk Group are used to define the PD and PD volatility.  In 
addition, industry segregations are used to define sectors – both in the standard Multiple Sector 








 Ratios of Various Implementation EC by Industry and Risk Group 
 





1-3 4-5 6 7 8-9 
BUS 4.12 4.25 3.65 4.25 5.96 4.71 
CON 3.28 4.04 4.16 5.51 5.14 4.40 
MAN 1.32 1.39 1.42 1.46 1.46 1.42 
NBUS 3.20 3.70 3.70 3.65 4.04 3.78 
OTH 5.83 5.27 4.96 7.56 8.59 6.77 
RES 3.82 5.09 5.54 5.89 4.64 4.80 
RET 2.74 2.35 2.43 2.72 3.23 2.74 
SOP 2.72 2.52 2.98 1.99 4.24 2.98 
TOU 1.97 2.39 2.58 2.34 2.59 2.45 
TRS 3.17 3.61 3.85 4.01 4.54 3.96 
WHS 2.99 3.31 3.05 3.60 3.09 3.18 
Overall 2.06 2.24 2.30 2.35 2.62 2.38 
 Ratio of Single Sector to Multiple Correlated Sectors 
Implementations  
BUS 1.79 1.80 1.75 1.80 1.89 1.83 
CON 1.37 1.40 1.41 1.45 1.44 1.42 
MAN 1.11 1.12 1.13 1.14 1.14 1.13 
NBUS 1.56 1.60 1.60 1.60 1.62 1.61 
OTH 2.03 2.00 1.98 2.10 2.13 2.07 
RES 2.38 2.58 2.63 2.67 2.52 2.54 
RET 1.26 1.23 1.24 1.26 1.28 1.26 
SOP 1.98 1.93 2.04 1.76 2.25 2.04 
TOU 1.55 1.65 1.69 1.64 1.69 1.66 
TRS 1.85 1.91 1.94 1.95 2.00 1.95 
WHS 1.36 1.38 1.36 1.40 1.37 1.37 
Overall 1.34 1.39 1.40 1.43 1.48 1.43 
 Ratio of Multiple Correlated Sectors to Multiple 
Sector Implementations  
BUS 2.30 2.36 2.08 2.36 3.15 2.57 
CON 2.40 2.88 2.95 3.81 3.58 3.11 
MAN 1.19 1.24 1.26 1.29 1.29 1.26 
NBUS 2.05 2.32 2.31 2.29 2.49 2.35 
OTH 2.87 2.63 2.50 3.59 4.03 3.26 
RES 1.60 1.97 2.11 2.21 1.84 1.89 
RET 2.18 1.91 1.96 2.17 2.52 2.18 
SOP 1.38 1.31 1.46 1.13 1.88 1.46 
TOU 1.27 1.45 1.53 1.43 1.53 1.47 
TRS 1.71 1.89 1.99 2.05 2.27 2.03 
WHS 2.20 2.40 2.24 2.58 2.26 2.32 
Overall 1.54 1.61 1.64 1.64 1.77 1.67 
 
Table 5.5B – Economic Capital charges are calculated under various implementations of the CreditRisk+ 
framework.  In all cases, default rates by RG-SG are used to define the PD and PD volatility.  In addition, 
industry segregations are used to define sectors – both in the standard Multiple Sector implementation and 








 EC Charges by Industry and Size Group using RG Calibration 
 
EC (%) under CR
+
 Single Sector (RG) 
Industry 










BUS 2.21 1.84 1.41 1.14 1.32 
CON 1.93 1.60 1.14 0.93 1.06 
MAN 1.68 1.48 1.18 1.09 1.14 
NBUS 2.04 1.67 1.37 1.17 1.31 
OTH 2.39 1.81 1.48 1.16 1.33 
RES 1.94 1.74 1.50 1.39 1.46 
RET 1.90 1.70 1.22 1.02 1.12 
SOP 1.89 1.62 1.59 1.36 1.41 
TOU 2.03 1.81 1.53 1.31 1.40 
TRS 2.11 1.59 1.31 1.10 1.18 
WHS 2.07 1.74 1.20 0.98 1.09 
Overall 1.93 1.65 1.30 1.12 1.21 
EC (%) under CR
+
 Multiple Sector (RG) 
BUS 0.26 0.23 0.20 0.34 0.29 
CON 0.24 0.21 0.18 0.29 0.25 
MAN 1.03 0.92 0.75 0.86 0.84 
NBUS 0.36 0.31 0.28 0.37 0.34 
OTH 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.24 0.20 
RES 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.38 0.31 
RET 0.48 0.44 0.34 0.44 0.42 
SOP 0.23 0.21 0.25 0.54 0.48 
TOU 0.51 0.47 0.43 0.61 0.56 
TRS 0.24 0.19 0.19 0.35 0.31 
WHS 0.36 0.32 0.24 0.39 0.35 
Overall 0.54 0.47 0.41 0.57 0.53 
EC (%) under CR
+
 Multiple Correlated Sectors (RG) 
BUS 1.13 0.94 0.74 0.67 0.73 
CON 1.27 1.06 0.76 0.67 0.74 
MAN 1.49 1.32 1.05 1.02 1.06 
NBUS 1.21 1.00 0.83 0.76 0.82 
OTH 1.08 0.82 0.69 0.60 0.65 
RES 0.61 0.56 0.50 0.58 0.56 
RET 1.46 1.31 0.95 0.84 0.90 
SOP 0.74 0.64 0.65 0.71 0.70 
TOU 1.12 1.01 0.86 0.84 0.86 
TRS 1.04 0.79 0.66 0.64 0.66 
WHS 1.44 1.21 0.84 0.75 0.81 
Overall 1.28 1.10 0.88 0.84 0.87 
 
Table 5.6A – Economic Capital charges are calculated under various implementations of the CreditRisk+ 
framework.  In all cases, default rates by Risk Group are used to define the PD and PD volatility.  In 
addition, industry segregations are used to define sectors – both in the standard Multiple Sector 









 EC Charges by Industry and Size Group using RG-SG Calibration 
 
EC (%) under CR
+
 Single Sector (RG-SG) 
Industry 










BUS 3.83 2.11 1.26 0.89 1.21 
CON 3.36 1.83 1.02 0.70 0.94 
MAN 2.99 1.71 1.05 0.85 0.98 
NBUS 3.48 1.89 1.22 0.93 1.20 
OTH 4.04 2.04 1.32 0.91 1.20 
RES 3.33 1.94 1.34 1.17 1.33 
RET 3.35 1.92 1.09 0.79 0.98 
SOP 3.20 1.76 1.42 1.10 1.20 
TOU 3.48 2.01 1.36 1.07 1.23 
TRS 3.56 1.84 1.17 0.86 1.01 
WHS 3.61 2.02 1.07 0.74 0.94 
Overall 3.36 1.88 1.16 0.88 1.06 
EC (%) under CR
+
 Multiple Sector (RG-SG) 
BUS 0.49 0.28 0.20 0.27 0.26 
CON 0.44 0.25 0.17 0.22 0.21 
MAN 1.75 1.01 0.64 0.65 0.69 
NBUS 0.67 0.38 0.27 0.31 0.32 
OTH 0.25 0.14 0.13 0.20 0.18 
RES 0.24 0.16 0.14 0.33 0.28 
RET 0.85 0.50 0.31 0.34 0.36 
SOP 0.41 0.24 0.23 0.44 0.40 
TOU 0.92 0.55 0.40 0.52 0.50 
TRS 0.39 0.22 0.17 0.28 0.26 
WHS 0.62 0.36 0.22 0.30 0.29 
Overall 0.93 0.54 0.37 0.44 0.45 
EC (%) under CR
+
 Multiple Correlated Sectors (RG-SG) 
BUS 1.96 1.08 0.66 0.52 0.66 
CON 2.27 1.24 0.70 0.51 0.67 
MAN 2.54 1.46 0.90 0.77 0.87 
NBUS 2.07 1.13 0.74 0.60 0.75 
OTH 1.80 0.92 0.61 0.47 0.58 
RES 1.09 0.64 0.46 0.51 0.52 
RET 2.55 1.47 0.84 0.64 0.78 
SOP 1.26 0.70 0.58 0.57 0.59 
TOU 1.89 1.10 0.76 0.68 0.74 
TRS 1.60 0.84 0.55 0.47 0.52 
WHS 2.46 1.38 0.74 0.56 0.68 
Overall 2.20 1.24 0.77 0.64 0.74 
 
Table 5.6B – Economic Capital charges are calculated under various implementations of the CreditRisk+ 
framework.  In all cases, default rates by RG-SG are used to define the PD and PD volatility.  In addition, 
industry segregations are used to define sectors – both in the standard Multiple Sector implementation and 










 Implementation Ratios by Industry and Size Group 
 
Ratio of Single Sector to Multiple Sector Implementations  
Industry 










BUS 8.61 8.10 6.93 3.40 4.62 
CON 8.00 7.57 6.43 3.23 4.21 
MAN 1.63 1.61 1.56 1.28 1.35 
NBUS 5.64 5.39 4.88 3.15 3.87 
OTH 17.13 14.94 10.99 4.74 6.49 
RES 14.51 12.86 9.95 3.66 4.78 
RET 3.96 3.84 3.55 2.33 2.67 
SOP 8.22 7.69 6.41 2.52 2.95 
TOU 3.98 3.86 3.55 2.15 2.48 
TRS 8.95 8.34 7.01 3.13 3.77 
WHS 5.72 5.48 4.93 2.55 3.07 
Overall 3.61 3.51 3.16 1.98 2.29 
 Ratio of Single Sector to Multiple Correlated Sectors Implementations  
BUS 1.95 1.94 1.91 1.71 1.81 
CON 1.52 1.51 1.50 1.39 1.44 
MAN 1.12 1.12 1.11 1.07 1.08 
NBUS 1.68 1.67 1.65 1.54 1.60 
OTH 2.21 2.19 2.15 1.93 2.03 
RES 3.16 3.12 3.01 2.39 2.59 
RET 1.30 1.30 1.29 1.22 1.24 
SOP 2.55 2.53 2.45 1.92 2.02 
TOU 1.81 1.80 1.77 1.56 1.63 
TRS 2.03 2.02 1.98 1.73 1.80 
WHS 1.44 1.44 1.42 1.31 1.35 
Overall 1.51 1.50 1.48 1.34 1.39 
 Ratio of Multiple Correlated Sectors to Multiple Sector Implementations  
BUS 4.41 4.17 3.63 1.99 2.55 
CON 5.27 5.00 4.30 2.33 2.93 
MAN 1.45 1.44 1.40 1.20 1.25 
NBUS 3.36 3.23 2.96 2.04 2.43 
OTH 7.74 6.81 5.12 2.45 3.20 
RES 4.59 4.12 3.30 1.53 1.84 
RET 3.05 2.97 2.76 1.91 2.15 
SOP 3.22 3.05 2.62 1.31 1.46 
TOU 2.20 2.15 2.01 1.38 1.53 
TRS 4.40 4.13 3.53 1.81 2.09 
WHS 3.97 3.82 3.46 1.94 2.27 
Overall 2.40 2.35 2.13 1.48 1.65 
 
Table 5.7A – Economic Capital charges are calculated under various implementations of the CreditRisk+ 
framework.  In all cases, default rates by Risk Group are used to define the PD and PD volatility.  In 
addition, industry segregations are used to define sectors – both in the standard Multiple Sector 









 Implementation Ratios by Industry and Size Group 
 
Ratio of Single Sector to Multiple Sector Implementations  
Industry 










BUS 7.88 7.44 6.41 3.31 4.71 
CON 7.70 7.27 6.18 3.20 4.40 
MAN 1.71 1.69 1.63 1.31 1.42 
NBUS 5.18 4.97 4.51 2.99 3.78 
OTH 16.13 14.07 10.41 4.66 6.77 
RES 13.66 12.11 9.42 3.51 4.80 
RET 3.94 3.82 3.51 2.31 2.74 
SOP 7.81 7.31 6.10 2.49 2.98 
TOU 3.77 3.65 3.37 2.08 2.45 
TRS 9.22 8.54 7.10 3.11 3.96 
WHS 5.83 5.57 4.98 2.48 3.18 
Overall 3.60 3.51 3.16 1.98 2.38 
 Ratio of Single Sector to Multiple Correlated Sectors Implementations  
BUS 1.96 1.94 1.91 1.72 1.83 
CON 1.48 1.48 1.46 1.36 1.42 
MAN 1.17 1.17 1.16 1.11 1.13 
NBUS 1.68 1.67 1.65 1.54 1.61 
OTH 2.24 2.22 2.17 1.96 2.07 
RES 3.05 3.01 2.91 2.32 2.54 
RET 1.31 1.31 1.30 1.23 1.26 
SOP 2.54 2.51 2.44 1.92 2.04 
TOU 1.84 1.83 1.80 1.58 1.66 
TRS 2.22 2.20 2.15 1.84 1.95 
WHS 1.46 1.46 1.44 1.32 1.37 
Overall 1.53 1.52 1.51 1.37 1.43 
 Ratio of Multiple Correlated Sectors to Multiple Sector Implementations  
BUS 4.03 3.82 3.35 1.93 2.57 
CON 5.20 4.92 4.24 2.34 3.11 
MAN 1.45 1.44 1.40 1.19 1.26 
NBUS 3.09 2.98 2.74 1.94 2.35 
OTH 7.19 6.32 4.79 2.38 3.26 
RES 4.48 4.03 3.24 1.51 1.89 
RET 3.00 2.92 2.71 1.88 2.18 
SOP 3.07 2.91 2.50 1.30 1.46 
TOU 2.04 1.99 1.87 1.32 1.47 
TRS 4.16 3.88 3.30 1.69 2.03 
WHS 3.98 3.82 3.45 1.88 2.32 
Overall 2.35 2.31 2.10 1.45 1.67 
 
Table 5.7B – Economic Capital charges are calculated under various implementations of the CreditRisk+ 
framework.  In all cases, default rates by RG-SG are used to define the PD and PD volatility.  In addition, 
industry segregations are used to define sectors – both in the standard Multiple Sector implementation and 







Intra-Sector Default Correlations for Single and Multiple Sectors Implementations 
 





1-3 4-5 6 7 8-9 
Probability of Default (%) 
1.30 2.29 3.24 4.63 8.75 
Default Correlation (%) 
Single 4.62 0.06 0.11 0.15 0.21 0.40 
BUS 4.43 0.06 0.10 0.14 0.21 0.39 
CON 4.68 0.06 0.11 0.15 0.22 0.41 
MAN 4.89 0.06 0.11 0.16 0.23 0.43 
NBUS 4.46 0.06 0.10 0.14 0.21 0.39 
OTH 4.44 0.06 0.10 0.14 0.21 0.39 
RES 4.40 0.06 0.10 0.14 0.20 0.38 
RET 4.68 0.06 0.11 0.15 0.22 0.41 
SOP 4.33 0.06 0.10 0.14 0.20 0.38 
TOU 4.34 0.06 0.10 0.14 0.20 0.38 
TRS 4.72 0.06 0.11 0.15 0.22 0.41 
WHS 4.75 0.06 0.11 0.15 0.22 0.42 
 
Table 5.8 provides the default correlations obtained in the Single Sector and Multiple Sectors 
implementations of the CreditRisk+ framework, along with the components used to calculate them.  
Specifically, Table 5.8 provides the Probability of Default by RG and the squared volatility ratio by 
Industry, under the Multiple Sectors implementation, and for the portfolio as a whole under the Single 
Sector implementation.  Default correlations within a given RG segment are calculated by multiplying the 
respective PDs and ratios.  By and large, default correlations show little variation across industries, and 
increase with PD, as expected.  The highest ratio is obtained in MAN while the lowest is obtained in the 
SOP industry.  This can be attributed to the calibration of the mu and sigma factors for each industry and 









 Simulation Descriptive Statistics 
 




















Max 3.81% 3.61% 3.50% 3.93% 4.84% 
Min 0.42% 0.43% 0.47% 0.64% 0.81% 
Skewness 0.586 0.421 0.500 0.922 1.782 
Kurtosis 0.584 0.254 0.362 1.267 4.948 
Std Dev 0.35% 0.32% 0.34% 0.35% 0.35% 
Mean 1.46% 1.45% 1.45% 1.46% 1.45% 
Percentile Value at Risk 
75.00% 1.67% 1.66% 1.66% 1.65% 1.60% 
90.00% 1.92% 1.88% 1.90% 1.92% 1.90% 
95.00% 2.08% 2.02% 2.05% 2.11% 2.14% 
99.00% 2.42% 2.30% 2.36% 2.50% 2.69% 
99.50% 2.55% 2.41% 2.48% 2.66% 2.92% 
99.90% 2.86% 2.65% 2.72% 3.00% 3.43% 
99.95% 2.98% 2.73% 2.82% 3.12% 3.68% 
99.99% 3.32% 2.93% 3.03% 3.44% 4.14% 
Percentile Economic Capital 
75.00% 0.21% 0.20% 0.21% 0.20% 0.14% 
90.00% 0.47% 0.42% 0.44% 0.47% 0.45% 
95.00% 0.63% 0.57% 0.60% 0.66% 0.68% 
99.00% 0.96% 0.85% 0.91% 1.05% 1.24% 
99.50% 1.10% 0.95% 1.03% 1.21% 1.47% 
99.90% 1.41% 1.19% 1.27% 1.54% 1.98% 
99.95% 1.53% 1.27% 1.37% 1.66% 2.22% 
99.99% 1.87% 1.48% 1.57% 1.99% 2.68% 
 
Table 6.1A presents loss distribution statistics for losses obtained under the CreditRisk
+
 and AVM 
frameworks.  The top panel of Table 6.1A provides maximum and minimum values obtained in 150,000 
draws of portfolio losses under each framework, as well as the skewness, kurtosis, mean, and standard 
deviation of the resultant loss distribution.  The middle panel of Table 6.1A provides the Value-at-Risk 
(VaR), or loss distribution value at various percentiles or critical values.  The bottom panel presents 
Economic Capital values corresponding to VaR values obtained in the middle panel, less portfolio 
Expected Loss values (approximated by the loss distribution mean values given in the top panel). 
CreditRisk
+








 Simulation Descriptive Statistics 
 
Loss Distribution Statistics 
  AVM (RG) CR
+
 (RG) {W=1} AVM (RG-SG) CR
+
 (RG-SG) {W=1} 
Max 3.81% 3.61% 2.99% 2.67% 
Min 0.42% 0.43% 0.30% 0.27% 
Skewness 0.586 0.421 0.659 0.476 
Kurtosis 0.584 0.254 0.750 0.361 
Std Dev 0.35% 0.32% 0.29% 0.27% 
Mean 1.46% 1.45% 1.12% 1.12% 
Percentile Value at Risk 
75.00% 1.67% 1.66% 1.29% 1.29% 
90.00% 1.92% 1.88% 1.50% 1.48% 
95.00% 2.08% 2.02% 1.64% 1.60% 
99.00% 2.42% 2.30% 1.92% 1.85% 
99.50% 2.55% 2.41% 2.05% 1.94% 
99.90% 2.86% 2.65% 2.31% 2.15% 
99.95% 2.98% 2.73% 2.40% 2.24% 
99.99% 3.32% 2.93% 2.70% 2.44% 
Percentile Economic Capital 
75.00% 0.21% 0.20% 0.17% 0.17% 
90.00% 0.47% 0.42% 0.38% 0.36% 
95.00% 0.63% 0.57% 0.52% 0.48% 
99.00% 0.96% 0.85% 0.81% 0.73% 
99.50% 1.10% 0.95% 0.94% 0.83% 
99.90% 1.41% 1.19% 1.19% 1.03% 
99.95% 1.53% 1.27% 1.29% 1.12% 
99.99% 1.87% 1.48% 1.59% 1.33% 
 
Table 6.1B presents loss distribution statistics for losses obtained under the CreditRisk
+
 and AVM 
frameworks.  The top panel of Table 6.1B provides maximum and minimum values obtained in 150,000 
draws of portfolio losses under each framework, as well as the skewness, kurtosis, mean, and standard 
deviation of the resultant loss distribution.  The middle panel of Table 6.1B provides the Value-at-Risk 
(VaR), or loss distribution value at various percentiles or critical values.  The bottom panel presents 
Economic Capital values corresponding to VaR values obtained in the middle panel, less portfolio 
Expected Loss values (approximated by the loss distribution mean values given in the top panel). 
CreditRisk
+
 and AVM values are obtained under Risk Group (RG) and Risk Group – Size Group (RG-SG) 








 EC under Various Implementations and Calibrations 
 





 1-3  4-5 6 7  8-9 
≤ $100 0.91 1.92 2.08 2.92 3.78 2.76 
$100 - $250 0.77 1.58 1.74 2.29 3.13 1.95 
$250 - $1000 0.62 1.28 1.43 1.92 2.42 1.44 
> $1000 0.69 1.34 1.53 2.15 2.63 1.32 
Overall 0.69 1.35 1.52 2.11 2.73 1.41 
EC (%) under Simulation-based CR
+
 {W=1}  
≤ $100 0.65 1.13 1.47 2.22 4.35 2.75 
$100 - $250 0.53 1.00 1.35 1.87 3.65 1.82 
$250 - $1000 0.43 0.80 1.13 1.52 2.85 1.24 
> $1000 0.54 0.86 1.17 1.70 3.14 1.08 
Overall 0.53 0.86 1.17 1.67 3.22 1.19 
EC (%) under Simulation-based CR
+
 {σ/μ=0.25}  
≤$100 0.78 1.37 1.80 2.63 3.75 2.59 
$100 - $250 0.66 1.16 1.61 2.15 3.14 1.80 
$250 - $1000 0.52 0.96 1.30 1.79 2.48 1.31 
> $1000 0.63 1.03 1.42 1.96 2.67 1.18 
Overall 0.62 1.03 1.41 1.94 2.77 1.27 
EC (%) under Simulation-based CR
+
 {σ/μ=0.5}  
≤ $100 1.00 2.01 2.13 3.28 4.57 3.22 
$100 - $250 0.85 1.68 1.89 2.60 3.84 2.26 
$250 - $1000 0.67 1.37 1.60 2.16 2.95 1.64 
> $1000 0.73 1.39 1.60 2.28 3.06 1.41 
Overall 0.73 1.41 1.62 2.29 3.25 1.54 
EC (%) under Simulation-based CR
+
 {σ/μ=1}  
≤ $100 1.26 2.66 2.86 4.26 6.01 4.23 
$100 - $250 1.12 2.23 2.53 3.33 5.08 2.98 
$250 - $1000 0.89 1.76 2.17 2.73 3.86 2.13 
> $1000 0.90 1.73 2.07 2.86 4.04 1.78 
Overall 0.91 1.78 2.12 2.88 4.28 1.98 
 
Table 6.2 presents Economic Capital results derived under the Single Sector simulation-based 
implementation of the CreditRisk
+
 framework under various settings and an RG calibration.  Results are 






Intra-Sector Default Correlations Comparison under Single Sector Frameworks 
 
Default Correlations (%) 
Size Group ('000) 
Risk Group 
 1-3  4-5 6 7  8-9 
AVM Default Correlation (%) 
≤$100 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.41 0.37 
$100 - $250 0.07 0.31 0.35 0.38 0.59 
$250 - $1000 0.10 0.23 0.09 0.31 0.65 
> $1000 0.08 0.14 0.09 0.08 0.27 




≤$100 0.17 0.26 0.33 0.48 0.67 
$100 - $250 0.10 0.17 0.21 0.24 0.45 
$250 - $1000 0.06 0.10 0.16 0.21 0.39 
> $1000 0.04 0.09 0.11 0.18 0.44 
Overall 0.06 0.11 0.15 0.21 0.40 
Single Sector CreditRisk
+
 {σ/μ=0.25}  
≤$100 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.41 0.37 
$100 - $250 0.07 0.18 0.24 0.26 0.52 
$250 - $1000 0.06 0.11 0.09 0.23 0.45 
> $1000 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.27 




≤$100 0.21 0.19 0.16 0.41 0.37 
$100 - $250 0.07 0.30 0.35 0.38 0.59 
$250 - $1000 0.10 0.23 0.09 0.31 0.65 
> $1000 0.08 0.14 0.09 0.08 0.27 
Overall 0.09 0.20 0.20 0.28 0.30 
Single Sector CreditRisk
+
 {σ/μ=1}  
≤$100 0.21 0.19 0.16 0.41 0.37 
$100 - $250 0.07 0.30 0.35 0.38 0.59 
$250 - $1000 0.10 0.23 0.09 0.31 0.65 
> $1000 0.08 0.14 0.09 0.08 0.27 
Overall 0.09 0.20 0.20 0.28 0.30 
 
Table 6.3A describes the representative default correlations, obtained under the CreditRisk
+
 and AVM 
frameworks, for borrowers within homogenously defined segments of our SME portfolio.  Segments here 








 Single Sector Risk Factor Weights by Segment and Calibration 
 




 1-3  4-5 6 7  8-9 
Probability of Default (%) 
≤$100 2.81 4.34 5.59 8.15 11.39 
$100 - $250 1.71 2.85 3.63 4.01 7.71 
$250 - $1000 1.00 1.72 2.78 3.50 6.68 
> $1000 0.68 1.49 1.92 3.02 7.43 
Overall 1.30 2.29 3.24 4.63 8.75 
Single Sector CreditRisk
+
 {σ/μ=0.25}  
≤$100 1.00 0.82 0.67 0.86 0.67 
$100 - $250 0.82 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
$250 - $1000 1.00 1.00 0.71 1.00 1.00 
> $1000 1.00 1.00 0.86 0.64 0.73 




≤$100 0.53 0.41 0.33 0.43 0.34 
$100 - $250 0.41 0.64 0.61 0.61 0.53 
$250 - $1000 0.62 0.73 0.35 0.58 0.60 
> $1000 0.69 0.62 0.43 0.32 0.37 
Overall 0.51 0.59 0.49 0.48 0.35 
Single Sector CreditRisk
+
 {σ/μ=1}  
≤$100 0.27 0.20 0.17 0.21 0.17 
$100 - $250 0.20 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.27 
$250 - $1000 0.31 0.36 0.18 0.29 0.30 
> $1000 0.35 0.31 0.22 0.16 0.18 
Overall 0.26 0.29 0.24 0.24 0.18 
 
Table 6.3B describes the risk factor weights obtained under various settings of the Single Sector 
implementation of CreditRisk
+
.   Results are presented by various segments, where segments here are 
defined along Risk and Size Group.  The top panel of Table 6.3B presents probabilities of default for the 
respect segments.  Segment risk weights and probabilities of default, along with normalized sector standard 
deviation settings, are used in the calculation of default correlations in the CreditRisk
+
 framework; see 







Intra-Sector Default Correlations Comparison under Single Sector Frameworks 
 
Ratios of Default Correlations (%) 
Size Group ('000) 
Risk Group 
 1-3  4-5 6 7  8-9 
Ratio of AVM to Single Sector CreditRisk
+
 {W=1} 
≤$100 1.21 0.73 0.50 0.85 0.55 
$100 - $250 0.73 1.79 1.67 1.59 1.30 
$250 - $1000 1.62 2.31 0.55 1.47 1.66 
> $1000 2.03 1.61 0.83 0.44 0.61 
Overall 1.46 1.84 1.34 1.34 0.74 
Ratio of AVM to Single Sector CreditRisk
+
 {σ/μ=0.25}  
≤$100 1.14 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 
$100 - $250 1.00 1.66 1.49 1.47 1.12 
$250 - $1000 1.54 2.11 0.99 1.36 1.44 
> $1000 1.90 1.53 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Overall 1.07 1.38 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Ratio of AVM to Single Sector CreditRisk
+
 {σ/μ=0.5} 
≤$100 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 
$100 - $250 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
$250 - $1000 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 
> $1000 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Overall 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Ratio of AVM to Single Sector CreditRisk
+
 {σ/μ=1}  
≤$100 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 
$100 - $250 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
$250 - $1000 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 
> $1000 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Overall 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
Table 6.3C describes ratios of representative default correlations obtained under various settings of the 
Single Sector implementation of CreditRisk
+
 to those obtained under the AVM framework.  Segments here 







 Boosted Implementations Simulation Descriptive Statistics 
 












 (RG-SG) {W=1} 
Boost 
Max 16.9% 12.4% 15.2% 9.7% 
Min 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Skewness 2.217 1.614 2.402 1.661 
Kurtosis 8.078 3.918 9.668 4.158 
Std Dev 1.3% 1.2% 1.0% 0.9% 
Mean 1.5% 1.5% 1.1% 1.1% 
Percentile Value at Risk 
75.00% 1.9% 2.0% 1.5% 1.5% 
90.00% 3.1% 3.0% 2.4% 2.3% 
95.00% 4.0% 3.7% 3.1% 2.9% 
99.00% 6.2% 5.4% 5.0% 4.3% 
99.50% 7.2% 6.2% 5.9% 4.9% 
99.90% 9.7% 7.8% 8.1% 6.2% 
99.95% 10.7% 8.5% 8.9% 6.8% 
99.99% 13.4% 10.2% 11.0% 8.1% 
Percentile Economic Capital 
75.00% 0.5% 0.5% 0.3% 0.4% 
90.00% 1.6% 1.6% 1.3% 1.2% 
95.00% 2.5% 2.3% 2.0% 1.8% 
99.00% 4.7% 4.0% 3.9% 3.2% 
99.50% 5.8% 4.7% 4.8% 3.8% 
99.90% 8.2% 6.4% 7.0% 5.1% 
99.95% 9.2% 7.0% 7.8% 5.7% 
99.99% 11.9% 8.7% 9.9% 7.0% 
 
Table 6.4 presents loss distribution statistics for losses obtained under the boosted implementations of the 
CreditRisk
+
 and AVM frameworks.  The top panel of Table 6.4 provides maximum and minimum values 
obtained in 150,000 draws of portfolio losses under each framework, as well as the skewness, kurtosis, 
mean, and standard deviation of the resultant loss distribution.  The middle panel of Table 6.4 provides the 
Value-at-Risk (VaR), or loss distribution value at various percentiles or critical values.  The bottom panel 
presents Economic Capital values corresponding to VaR values obtained in the middle panel, less portfolio 
Expected Loss values (approximated by the loss distribution mean values given in the top panel). 
CreditRisk
+
 and AVM values are obtained under Risk Group (RG) and Risk Group – Size Group (RG-SG) 
calibrations.  CreditRisk
+









  Capital Charges (%) under Basel II (Case 2)   
Size Group ('000) 
Risk Group 
Overall 
1-3 4-5 6 7 8-9 
≤ $100 5.1 5.8 5.6 6.2 7.9 6.7 
$100 - $250 4.4 4.9 4.9 4.9 6.6 5.3 
$250 - $1000 3.5 3.9 4.0 4.1 5.1 4.1 
> $1000 8.6 9.7 10.1 10.8 13.2 9.8 
Overall 7.6 8.2 8.5 8.6 9.5 8.2 
  Boosted Simulation-based AVM {RG} EC (%) 
 
≤ $100 6.9 12.0 12.7 16.9 21.1 16.1 
$100 - $250 5.9 10.4 11.1 13.4 17.6 11.9 
$250 - $1000 4.6 8.2 9.1 11.2 13.6 8.9 
> $1000 4.6 7.8 8.8 11.0 13.4 7.5 
Overall 4.7 8.1 9.0 11.3 14.6 8.2 
  Boosted Simulation-based CR
+
 (RG) {W=1} EC (%) 
 
≤ $100 3.8 6.8 9.1 13.7 26.0 16.5 
$100 - $250 3.2 5.9 7.9 10.8 21.7 10.8 
$250 - $1000 2.5 4.6 6.5 8.9 16.7 7.2 
> $1000 2.5 4.4 6.1 8.8 16.5 5.5 
Overall 2.6 4.6 6.3 9.0 18.0 6.4 
  Boosted Simulation-based CR
+
 (RG-SG) {W=1} EC (%)   
≤ $100 10.3 16.4 19.8 30.5 43.0 30.0 
$100 - $250 5.4 9.2 11.4 11.7 24.4 13.3 
$250 - $1000 2.5 4.4 7.1 8.6 16.3 7.1 
> $1000 1.6 3.7 4.7 7.4 18.0 4.7 
Overall 2.0 4.3 5.7 8.4 20.3 6.2 
  Boosted Simulation-based AVM {RG-SG} EC (%)   
≤ $100 12.9 14.7 14.1 23.2 24.8 20.2 
$100 - $250 6.0 13.1 14.5 14.5 21.5 14.2 
$250 - $1000 4.5 7.9 6.3 10.7 16.4 8.8 
> $1000 3.6 5.9 5.3 5.8 12.7 5.5 
Overall 3.9 6.8 6.0 8.0 16.0 7.0 
 
Table 6.5 presents capital charges obtained under the boosted simulation-based implementation of the 
Single Sector CreditRisk
+
 and AVM frameworks, as well as those obtained under the Basel II (Case 2) 
implementation; see Chapter 3 for Basel II partial implementations.  CreditRisk
+
 Capital charges are 
obtained under RG and RG-SG calibrations and a boosted unitary weight setting, and are presented by Risk 





Comparative Capital Ratios for Boosted Simulation-based EC Charges 
 
Ratio of Boosted CR
+
 (RG) {W=1} Capital Charges to Basel II 
Size Group ('000) 
Risk Group 
Overall 
 1-3  4-5 6 7  8-9 
≤ $100 0.7 1.2 1.6 2.2 3.3 2.5 
$100 - $250 0.7 1.2 1.6 2.2 3.3 2.0 
$250 - $1000 0.7 1.2 1.6 2.2 3.3 1.8 
> $1000 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.3 0.6 
Overall 0.3 0.6 0.7 1.1 1.9 0.8 
Ratio of Boosted CR
+
 (RG-SG) {W=1} Capital Charges to Basel II 
≤ $100 2.0 2.8 3.5 4.9 5.4 4.5 
$100 - $250 1.2 1.9 2.3 2.4 3.7 2.5 
$250 - $1000 0.7 1.1 1.8 2.1 3.2 1.8 
> $1000 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.7 1.4 0.5 
Overall 0.3 0.5 0.7 1.0 2.1 0.8 
Ratio of Boosted CR
+
 (RG-SG) {W=1} Capital Charges to AVM (RG-SG) 
≤ $100 0.8 1.1 1.4 1.3 1.7 1.5 
$100 - $250 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.8 1.1 0.9 
$250 - $1000 0.6 0.6 1.1 0.8 1.0 0.8 
> $1000 0.5 0.6 0.9 1.3 1.4 0.9 
Overall 0.5 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.3 0.9 
Ratio of Boosted CR
+
 (RG) {W=1} Capital Charges to AVM 
≤ $100 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.2 1.0 
$100 - $250 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.2 0.9 
$250 - $1000 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.2 0.8 
> $1000 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.2 0.7 
Overall 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.2 0.8 
 
Table 6.6 presents comparative ratios for capital charges obtained under the boosted simulation-based 
implementation of the Single Sector CreditRisk
+
 frameworks as compared to those obtained under the 
Basel II (Case 2) implementation and the corresponding AVM implementations; see Chapter 3 for Basel II 
partial implementations.  Capital charges are obtained under RG and RG-SG calibrations and a boosted 
unitary weight setting, and are presented by Risk and Size Group segments, as well as for the overall 
portfolio.  See Table 6.5 for corresponding capital charges. 
 
